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3Abstract
This doctoral thesis summarizes research in quantum cryptography done at the De-
partment of Electronics and Telecommunications
1
 at the Norwegian University of
Science and Technology (NTNU) from 1998 through 2007.
The opening parts contain a brief introduction into quantum cryptography as well as
an overview of all existing single photon detection techniques for visible and near
infrared light. Then, our implementation of a fiber optic quantum key distribution
(QKD) system is described. We employ a one-way phase coding scheme with a
1310 nm attenuated laser source and a polarization-maintaining Mach-Zehnder inter-
ferometer. A feature of our scheme is that it tracks phase drift in the interferometer at
the single photon level instead of employing hardware phase control measures. An
optimal phase tracking algorithm has been developed, implemented and tested. Phase
tracking accuracy of ±10° is achieved when approximately 200 photon counts are
collected in each cycle of adjustment. Another feature of our QKD system is that it
uses a single photon detector based on a germanium avalanche photodiode gated at
20 MHz. To make possible this relatively high gating rate, we have developed, imple-
mented and tested an afterpulse blocking technique, when a number of gating pulses is
blocked after each registered avalanche. This technique allows to increase the key
generation rate nearly proportionally to the increase of the gating rate. QKD has been
demonstrated in the laboratory setting with only a very limited success: by the time of
the thesis completion we had malfunctioning components in the setup, and the quan-
tum bit error rate remained unstable with its lowest registered value of about 4%.
More than half of the thesis is devoted to various security aspects of QKD. We have
studied several attacks that exploit component imperfections and loopholes in optical
schemes. In a large pulse attack, settings of modulators inside Alice’s and Bob’s setups
are read out by external interrogating light pulses, without interacting with quantum
states and without raising security alarms. An external measurement of phase shift at
Alice’s phase modulator in our setup has been demonstrated experimentally. In a faked
states attack, Eve intercepts Alice’s qubits and then utilizes various optical imperfec-
tions in Bob’s scheme to construct and resend light pulses in such a way that Bob does
not distinguish his detection results from normal, whereas they give Bob the basis and
bit value chosen at Eve’s discretion. Construction of such faked states using several
different imperfections is discussed. Also, we sketch a practical workflow of breaking
into a running quantum cryptolink for the two abovementioned classes of attacks. A
special attention is paid to a common imperfection when sensitivity of Bob’s two
detectors relative to one another can be controlled by Eve via an external parameter,
for example via the timing of the incoming pulse. This imperfection is illustrated by
measurements on two different single photon detectors. Quantitative results for a faked
states attack on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) and the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-
Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocols using this imperfection are obtained. It is shown how
faked states can in principle be constructed for quantum cryptosystems that use a phase-
time encoding, the differential phase shift keying (DPSK) and the Ekert protocols.
                                                     
1 Department of Physical Electronics before 2004.
4Furthermore we have attempted to integrate this imperfection of detectors into the
general security proof for the BB84 protocol. For all attacks, their applicability to and
implications for various known QKD schemes are considered, and countermeasures
against the attacks are proposed.
The thesis incorporates published papers [J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2023 (2001)], [Appl.
Opt. 43, 4385 (2004)], [J. Mod. Opt. 52, 691 (2005)], [Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313
(2006)], and [quant-ph/0702262].
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81.  Quantum cryptography
1.1.  Introduction to cryptography
Cryptography is an art of transforming information into something unintelligible for
anyone but the intended recipient. This process of transformation is called encryption,
and the reverse process is called decryption. The initial information to be encrypted is
called plaintext, and the same information in an encrypted state is called ciphertext.
Cryptography has been used for diplomatic, military, commercial, and private
communication, and also historically for obstructing religious texts. The earliest known
methods of encryption date back to the first millennium B.C., and consist of simple
transposition and substitution ciphers: Greek skytale, Caesar cipher, Hebrew traditional
atbash [1, 2].
Security of ciphers initially depended on an adversary not having the knowledge of
the encryption algorithm. As ciphers evolved, security begin to depend instead on the
knowledge of a short secret key (e.g., a keyword or keyphrase) combined with the lack
of knowledge how to deduce this key from the ciphertext. Until the middle of the 20th
century, nobody has managed to rigorously prove that a given cipher could not be
broken. Indeed, almost the whole history of cryptography has consisted of a cipher
being broken, subsequently replaced by another (perceivingly stronger) one, the latter
being broken after some time, and so on. People who work on breaking ciphers are
called cryptanalysts.
The first provably secure cipher, a “one-time pad”, was proposed around 1920 by
Gilbert Vernam [3, 4]. The cipher is very simple and can be performed manually: each
symbol of a plaintext is added modulo alphabet size with a symbol of a random secret
key to form a ciphertext; on the receiving end, the same operation with an identical
copy of the key is used to extract the plaintext. The security of one-time pad was, in
fact, not proven until 1949, when Claude Shannon showed in his theory of information
that the security was guaranteed if the key was as long as the message, and never
reused [5]. The latter condition is obligatory: if the key is reused, plaintext of all mes-
sages encoded with it can be, and routinely has been, extracted by cryptanalysts.
Although the one-time pad has been employed for sensitive communications (e.g.,
with spies), for most uses it remained impractical because of the need for a large and
constant supply of key material. Distributing this secure key between users prior to the
communication is the most troublesome part of the one-time pad. Any communication
channel could in principle be eavesdropped on and a copy of the key obtained (but, as
we’ll see a couple pages later, this is only true for any classical communication chan-
nel; a quantum channel can be made non-eavesdroppable). A personal meeting is not
an option for many uses, and even if it is, there is an additional problem of storing the
key securely. Modern cryptography employs other solutions for mass encryption and
for key distribution.
91.2.  Modern cryptography
After mid-1970s, cryptography became ubiquitous, used by ordinary people in eve-
ryday life (often without realizing it). Also, a definition of cryptography broadened:
once concerned solely with encryption, it now encompassed other tasks, such as sign-
ing and various forms of authentication. Two major developments occurred in that
decade.
One development was that a public standard of a symmetric cipher, Data Encryp-
tion Standard (DES), was released. A symmetric cipher uses a relatively short identical
key at both sides, and can quickly encrypt a large amount of information with this key.
Although the original DES is no longer considered secure (its limited key length of
56 bits later allowed it to be cracked on a dedicated hardware in less than 24 hours),
there are other newer symmetric ciphers with longer keys in use today, e.g., Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [6].
Another develpment was the discovery of an entirely new class of cryptography,
public key cryptography. It utilizes pairs of keys, a private key and a public key. The
public key can only be used for encryption, and the private key for decryption. These
two keys are connected to one another via a one-way function, which is easy to com-
pute in one way (to obtain the public key from the private key) but extremely hard to
compute in the opposite way (to deduce the private key from the public key). The
public key is widely announced and the private key is kept secret. Anyone can encrypt
a message using the public key, but it can only be decrypted by the recipient holding
the private key. One example of such one-way function is miltiplication of two large
prime numbers: their product is easy to compute, but factoring the product is hard; this
is ised in the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) encryption system [7]. Besides encryp-
tion, public key cryptography allows signing (the holder of a private key can compute a
signature of a message, which everyone can verify using his public key, but not forge)
and authentication (veryfying the integrity and origin of a message). Public key cryp-
tography is relatively computationally intense, and is unsuitable for rapid encryption of
a large amount of data.
In most modern cryptographic systems, public key cryptography and symmetric ci-
phers are used in tandem. Such is the suite of cryptographic protocols used on the
internet. There is an established public key infrastructure consisting of a hierarchy of
certificate authorities. Certificate authorities confirm, through a chain of signatures, or
certificates, that a given public key indeed belongs to a given party (identified by a
business address and domain name). Then, public key cryptography can be used to
share a random secret key with that party. This random key is subsequently used in a
symmetric cipher to encrypt the data transmission.
The security of these systems hinges on the strength of symmetric ciphers, and on
the existence of one-way functions. Neither has been proven. In particular, it has not
been ruled out that an efficient factorization algorithm exists. To the contrary, an
algorithm for a quantum computer that does factorization in polynomial time has been
devised by Peter Shor [8] and experimentally tested in the simplest case (the number
15 was factorized into its prime factors 3 and 5 on a nuclear magnetic resonance
quantum computer) [9]. It is an open question whether a quantum computer of a practi-
cally useful size can be built or an efficient classical factorization algorithm be found.
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However, the probability that either of these two developments happen in the future
cannot be neglected. Then, not only public key cryptography does become insecure,
but it becomes insecure retroactively: all encrypted communication intercepted in the
past will be read. This creates an unacceptable risk for those applications of cryptogra-
phy where data keep value for a long time. It should be also noted that an efficient
classical factorization algorithm is a mathematical advance that may happen behind
closed doors of a government lab, and be not publicly announced. In any case, when it
is announced that public key cryptography is broken, all remaining public key crypto-
systems would have to be replaced by something else.
Thus, using public key cryptography for key distribution is convenient but risky.
Using modern symmetric ciphers instead of the one-time pad also bears some risk, but
is necessary for encryption of large amount of data modern secure communications
require (such as virtual private networks encrypting all traffic exchanged between
remote offices of a company).
Until the advent of quantum cryptography, the only alternative to public key cryp-
tography was distributing secret keys via trusted couriers, or exchanging them at a
personal meeting.
1.3.  Idea of quantum cryptography. BB84 protocol
Quantum cryptography offers something not possible in the classical domain. It al-
lows to distribute (or more accurately said, randomly generate) a secret key over an
open communication channel. The laws of physics as we know them today guarantee
that any attempt of eavesdropping on this open channel will introduce errors into the
key, and thus eavesdropping is guaranteely revealed.
Quantum cryptography cannot securely transmit a predetermined information; it can
only securely generate a random key. Once generated, this random key can be subse-
quently used in a symmetric cipher, such as the one-time pad or one of the modern
symmetric ciphers, to securely transmit data over a classical communication channel.
A running quantum cryptography channel will steadily generate new secret key mate-
rial. Thus, quantum cryptography is solving the most difficult problem in modern
cryptography, that of key distribution.
Quantum cryptography uses quantum states, such as polarizations of single photons,
to transmit bits of information. It is not possible to make a perfect copy of an unknown
quantum state [10], which precludes its precise measurement by an eavesdropper.
Perhaps the reader would remember the Heisenberg uncertainty principle: if one meas-
ures the precise position of a particle, all information about its momentum is lost, and
vice versa. There are many pairs of properties which cannot be precisely measured
simultaneously: for example, horizontal-vertical and diagonal states of photon polari-
zation is one such pair. The idea to use this property of quantum states to securely
encode information originated with Stephen Wiesner in the early 1970s [11].2 In his
                                                     
2 Wiesner initially submitted his paper to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, which
promptly rejected the submission because computer scientists did not comprehend the physics
jargon in which it was written [12]. The paper in its original form was published more than a
decade later in another journal [11].
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Fig. 1. Principle of the BB84 protocol (reprinted from [20]).
paper, he described two ideas, one of which was “money... physically impossible to
counterfeit” that needed what we would today call a long-term quantum memory,
which was not and is still not practically realized. By 1984, Wiesner’s idea was taken
forward by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard (who knew of it through personal
contacts) in a more practical form: now, quantum states of photons propagating
through an optical channel encoded a secure key. The transmission protocol they have
devised, Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol [13,
14], is still in use today.
Let’s see how a secret key can be transmitted over an open channel in the BB84
protocol. The sender, commonly called Alice, transmits a sequence of photons to the
receiver, commonly called Bob (Fig. 1). Alice prepares each photon in one of the four
linear polarizations: horizontal or vertical (belonging to the horizontal-vertical basis),
or one of the two 45° diagonal ones (belonging to the diagonal basis). It is agreed that
one of the polarizations in each basis represents bit 0 and the other bit 1. For each
photon, Alice chooses the basis and bit value at random. Bob tries to measure the
polarization of each photon, choosing at random between the horizontal-vertical and
diagonal measurement basis. Bob’s measurement apparatus for each basis can, for
example, be a birefringent prism separating the incoming photons into orthogonal
polarizations, followed by a pair of single photon detectors. Bob has only one attempt
at measuring polarization, because in the process of measurement the photon is de-
stroyed. He remembers his basis and the result of measurement. After a certain number
of photons has been transmitted, Alice and Bob talk to one another via a conventional
communication channel, e.g., via an internet connection, and publicly compare the
transmission and detection bases for each photon (but not the bit values). In approxi-
mately half the cases Bob has happened to detect the photon not in the basis in which it
has been transmitted. In these cases, his detection result is random and uncorrelated
with Alice; these bits are discarded from the key. In the remaining half of the cases,
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Bob has detected the photon in the same basis in which it has been transmitted by
Alice. In these cases, Bob gets the same bit value as Alice; these bits form a secret key
now shared between Alice and Bob.
Let’s consider what happens if an eavesdropper, commomly called Eve, tries to in-
tercept the key. At the time of photon transmission, neither Alice’s nor Bob’s basis has
been announced. Eve knows neither in which basis each photon has been prepared by
Alice nor in which basis it is to be detected by Bob. She has to randomly guess the
basis and detect the photon herself. After detection, she has to regenerate the photon
and send it to Bob, so that he detects it and uses this bit in the key (if Bob fails to
register a photon, it does not contribute to the key). With 50% probability, Eve’s basis
is different from Alice’s basis. Eve regenerates the photon in the basis she has chosen,
with the bit value she has obtained from her detection. The photons intercepted and
resent by Eve in the wrong basis that are detected by Bob in the correct (i.e. Alice’s)
basis cause detection results uncorrelated with Alice, i.e. 50% error probability for
these photons at Bob. Thus, if Eve intercepts and resends every photon in the transmis-
sion, she introduces on average 25% errors in the secret key. Alice and Bob measure
the error rate (called the quantum bit error rate, or QBER) by publicly comparing a
randomly chosen subset of the sectret key. The presence of errors reveals eavesdrop-
ping.
The straightforward intercept-resend strategy described above is not the optimal
one. There are subtler and more complex attacks Eve can carry out that introduce fewer
errors. However, it has been generally shown that no attack obtaining full information
about the key can introduce less than 11% QBER.3
Up to now, we have assumed that equipment is perfect. In reality, there are losses in
the apparatus and in the transmission channel, leading to Bob failing to register a
photon in the majority of bit slots. There are also inevitable imperfections that lead to
errors in the key even in the absence of eavesdropping (due to misalignment in the
optics, environmental perturbations, noise in the detectors).
Losses are dealt with simply: those bit slots where Bob has not registered a photon
are not used in the key. In a real system, losses and inefficiencies are large: Bob regis-
ters one photon per several hundred or thousand bit slots on average. Thankfully, all
the failures to register a photon can be simply discarded, proportionally reducing the
key transmission rate but otherwise not affecting the security.4
The security proofs say that all errors in the key should be attributed to eavesdrop-
ping, regardless of their probable real source. It turns out that it is possible to recover a
shorter error-free and secure key from a longer key with errors, provided QBER is less
than 11%. After having discarded incompatible bases, Alice and Bob correct errors by
comparing block parities of their copies of the key over the classical communication
channel [14]. During this error correction step, they necessarily announce some infor-
mation about the key over the classical channel, where it can be watched by Eve. After
                                                     
3 The 11% lower bound for QBER is valid for a sufficiently well built equipment that con-
forms to the idealised model used in the security proof, and for a true single photon source; see
Section 4.2.  Various non-idealities in the equipment may give additional advantage to Eve and
further lower the bound. We have been researching some of these non-idealities, see Chapter 4. 
4 With non-ideal photon sources and noisy detectors, there unfortunately are limits on how
much loss can be tolerated; see Section 4.2.1. 
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the error correction, they have two identical copies of the key, partial information
about which is known to Eve. Eve could have obtained some information by eaves-
dropping at the time of photon transmission (her amount of information upper bound
by the QBER), and she has watched the discussion during the error correction. In order
to obtain a shorter key about which Eve knows nothing, Alice and Bob estimate the
maximum amount of information that could be available to Eve, given the QBER they
have measured, and given the actual performance of their error correction algorithm
(for the theoretical function of available secure information vs. QBER, see Fig. 36 on
p. 76). Then, Alice and Bob perform a privacy amplification step by compressing the
key using hash functions, by the amount they have determined. The resulting key is
shorter, but it is guaranteed that Eve knows a negligible amount of information
about it.
Need for authentication
In the QKD protocol described above, it is assumed that Eve listens to all informa-
tion transmitted over the classical channel between Alice and Bob, but cannot change
this information. To prevent the classical transmissions from being tampered with, they
must be authenticated. Unconditionally secure authentication techniques exist [15].
They require spending some amount of secret key material. Fortunately, a fraction of
the secure key obtained in each key generation cycle is sufficient for authentication in
the next cycle, so the overall balance of key generation is positive. A subtler problem
arises when Alice and Bob have to do their very first key generation cycle. If the first
exchange is not authenticated, then in principle a man-in-the-middle attack is possible:
Alice and Bob could in fact be talking to Eve who has inserted herself in both quantum
and classical communication channels and simultaneously impersonates Bob for Alice
and Alice for Bob. The first exchange must be authenticated with a small secret key
delivered by the usual means (personal meeting) at the time of equipment installation.
Because of this, quantum key distribution would be more correctly called quantum key
growing.
The need for initial authentication is not a requirement unique for quantum cryptog-
raphy. It is universal to all secure communication: you cannot say whom you are
communicating with unless you share a common secret with him. The public key
cryptography is not an exception: to satisfy the need for initial authentication, a set of
puiblic keys of several certificate authorities is usually delivered with the operating
system or inside a copy of communication software (e.g., a web browser); further
authentication is provided through the public key infrastructure. QKD could also be
authenticated through the public key infrastructure: such an authentication would be
secure from being cracked retroactively (because, once authenticated, the security of
key exchange no longer depends on public key cryptography). However, as we have
noted in Section 1.2. , relying on public key cryptography is not a good idea in the long
run. Should QKD receive widespread use in a form of a network, an alternative
authentication infrastructure could be developed. Research into this is currently under-
way.
When we talk in the previous paragraph about the possibility of using public key
infrastructure for authentication of QKD, it touches an interesting point. One additional
advantage of quantum cryptography over classical cryptography is that the former
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cannot be cracked retroactively. We’d rather say of course that quantum cryptography
cannot be cracked at all, but suppose a practical loophole is left unnoticed in its early
implementations. In order to exploit the loophole, Eve needs to have the knowledge of
it and the necessary technology at the time of quantum transmission. Once the key is
generated by QKD, it cannot be cracked retroactively — unlike classical cryptography,
where intercepted (i.e. copied) transmissions can be cracked later.
Phase coding
When optical fiber is used as the transmission channel, polarization becomes an in-
convenient choice for encoding qubits. Standard singlemode optical fiber of the type
commonly used in communication networks changes the polarization of propagating
light in a random and unstable way. Rather than track these changes in real time, it is
more convenient to encode qubits in another property of light well-preserved under
propagation in the fiber, namely the relative phase of two closely spaced light pulses. A
scheme using such an encoding is shown in Fig. 2. It is, in essence, a single Mach-
Zehnder interferometer with a phase modulator in each arm. To make the interferome-
ter stable and to reduce the number of transmission fibers required, the two arms are
multiplexed into a single fiber before leaving Alice, and demultiplexed after entering
Bob. The arms in Alice’s and Bob’s halves of the interferometer have different lengths,
so that the pulses from different arms are separated by the length (or time)
LA–SA = LB–SB while travelling the transmission line. As long as environmental per-
turbations in the transmission line have a characteristic time scale much longer than the
time separating the pulses, the two pulses suffer the same polarization transformation
and time delay in the line. Hence they interfere well at the rightmost Bob’s coupler.
The result of interference (determining which of the Bob’s single photon detectors D0
and D1 clicks) depends on the difference between the phase shifts applied at Alice’s
and Bob’s phase modulators, φA–φB. Alice chooses the bit value and transmission basis
by applying one of the four phase shifts –3π/4, –π/4, π/4, 3π/4 at her modulator. Bob
chooses the detection basis by applying either –π/4 or π/4 phase shift at his modulator
(all possible phase combinations and interference outcomes are listed in Table 1 on
p. 24).
Fig. 2. Interferometric QKD channel with phase coding. The two arms of the Mach-
Zehnder interferometer are multiplexed into a sinlgle transmission line.
Light
source
Alice Bob
Transmission
line
φA
φB D0
D1
LA
SA LB
SB
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The two encodings discussed above are, unsurprisingly, called polarization coding
and phase coding. It can be shown that they are isomorphic to one another [16]. The
transmission protocol for both encodings is exactly the same: each phase shift value
used in phase coding has its polarization state counterpart in polarization coding.
Phase coding and its variations are used in all today’s fiber optic QKD systems.
Polarization coding has only been used in the first fiber-based experiments [17, 18].
However, polarization coding is entirely suitable for and is used in QKD systems with
a line-of-sight free space transmission channel, because air does not distort polariza-
tion.
For additional popular introductions, see Refs. 19, 20, 21. A good description of the
BB84 protocol is given in Ref. 14.
1.4.  Review of quantum cryptography research
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Over fifteen years, QKD moved from a proof-of-the-principle experiment set up on
an optical table to production-ready equipment using installed fiber optic cables several
tens of kilometers long.
In the first experimental demonstration of QKD completed in 1989 [14], the quan-
tum channel was a thirty centimeter long path of air in a laboratory. Soon afterwards,
experiments moved towards using optical fiber as the quantum communication chan-
nel. In the list that follows, we single out the maximum achieved transmission distance
as the figure of merit; however, for any given application, other parameters such as the
key generation rate or complexity of equipment can be more important. After the first
experiments by Muller et al. in Geneva with 1.1 km long fiber [17, 22], the transmis-
sion distance was extended in 1995 to 23 km over an undersea fiber optic cable [23,
18]. At about the same time, Townsend at British Telecom demonstrated 30 km trans-
mission [24]. He later tested it with various configurations of optical network [25, 26]
and improved the distance to ~50 km [27]. An experiment over the same distance was
later repeated by Hughes et al. at Los Alamos [28]. In 2001, Hiskett et al. in the UK
reported 80 km transmission distance [29]. In 2004–2005, two groups in Japan and one
in the UK reported QKD and single-photon interference experiments at over 100 km
distance [30, 31, 32]. The current record is held by the Los Alamos — NIST collabora-
tion at 184 km [33], using a sub-Kelvin cooled transition edge sensor for single photon
detection (see Section 3.1. ). However, if we restrict ourselves to practical detectors
based on avalanche photodiodes (APDs), the earlier experiment over 122 km done by
researchers at Toshiba in Cambridge, UK remains the leader [31].
Transmission distances claimed by experimenters must be viewed with some cau-
tion. All the experiments listed above use attenuated laser pulses instead of true single
photon sources. They typically set attenuation at an arbitrarily chosen level, when light
leaving Alice contains on average, depending on the attenuator setting, 0.1 to 0.5
photons per pulse (statistically, of course: there will be pulses where you register no
photons, pulses with one photon, and fewer pulses with two or more photons, their
                                                     
5 For a comprehensive review of developments in quantum cryptography until 2001, please
see Ref. 16. We only recap the milestone experiments in this section, without going into detail.
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probabilities given by the Poisson distribution). Then, the experimenters increase the
transmission distance, and thus the attenuation in the line, until so few photons reach
Bob that randomly occurring dark counts in his single photon detectors contribute
enough errors to raise the QBER to almost 11%. This, they claim, sets the distance
limit. Of course, the history of distance improvements is mostly the history of making
less noisy single photon detectors, together with switching from 800 nm to 1300 nm to
1550 nm transmission window in order to get lower attenuation per kilometer. The
problem is, this estimate of the transmission distance does not take into account some
powerful attacks Eve in principle is allowed to do when Alice’s source has a multi-
photon component (even though these attacks are not practically possible with today’s
technology). When accurately accounted for an unlimited Eve (i.e., Eve limited only by
the laws of physics), the maximum transmission distance in these experiments shortens
severalfold. For example, the last experiment listing 184 km for limited Eve can only
provide transmission up to 67.5 km with unconditional security [33]. These issues have
slowly been realized by the community, and ways to bring the unconditional-security
distance closer to the original estimates are currently being developed, in a form of
new and modified protocols, such as the decoy state protocol. Please see Section
4.2.1. for a more detailed discussion of the issues introduced in this paragraph.
Another issue is that the key generation rate near the maximum distance can be
miniscule, less than a few bits per second. To get more useful rates on order of hun-
dreds and thousands of secure bits per second (these rates are attainable with current
QKD setups), one must abstain from making the link length close to the limit.
Although fiber-based transmission is probably optimal for terrestrial communica-
tions, several experimens on free space line-of-sight QKD have been done. The ulti-
mate rationale for these experiments is to pave the way for QKD between a low-
orbiting satellite and earth-bound users. Since the satellite circles the planet, it could in
successive short sessions establish a secret key shared by widely separated users (the
satellite is considered a trusted party by all of them). The obstacles to implement the
satellite-earth QKD are losses due to scattering in the atmosphere, diffraction and
atmospheric turbulence, a need for spectral, temporal and spatial filtration for daylight
use, suitable telescopic optics, and accurate tracking. The loss and filtration issues have
been addressed in the latest experiments to an extent satisfying or exceeding the re-
quirements that a real satellite link would impose. From this standpoint, a satellite
QKD link has been shown feasible; the question of implementing it hinges on com-
mercial interest (i.e., a lack thereof for the time being). Free space experiments use
polarization coding and photons in the 600–900 nm wavelength range, for which very
good detectors based on silicon APDs exist (see Section 3.1. ). After the first demon-
stration over 300 m in 1996 [34], several experiments in the 0.5–2 km transmission
range followed [35, 36, 37, 38]. In 2002, QKD experiments over 10 km distance in
daylight at Los Alamos [39] and over 23.4 km at night in Germany [40, 41] were
reported. A feasibility study of a satellite system exists [42]. In the other extreme, an
ultrashort range free space QKD setup has been developed, allowing secure generation
of key over several tens of centimeters (or at most a few meters) between a portable
storage card and a “quantum ATM” [43].
It is theoretically possible to extend the transmission distance over a terrestrial
QKD link via the use of quantum repeaters and nested purification protocol [44, 45]. In
this protocol, a link is divided into segments. Entangled pairs of photons are transmit-
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ted over each segment; thereafter, a pair of of high fidelity is obtained from several
pairs of lower fidelity by entanglement purification, first over each segment, then over
groups of segments, nesting until the desired length of the link is reached. The protocol
in principle allows to obtain an entangled pair of high fidelity over an arbitrary dis-
tance, and thus be able to do QKD over an arbitrary distance, with required resources
(which are measured in time or in the total number of initial entangled pairs in all
segments) scaling only polynomially with distance. However, an experimental demon-
stration of quantum repeaters is likely some years away, and of course their practical
security (e.g., Eve exploiting imperfections of components) has not been studied.
The only practical way to extend the distance beyond that of a single point-to-point
link today is to build a chain of these QKD links with trusted secure nodes in connec-
tion points. This approach can be generalized to a multiuser key distribution network
with trusted nodes [46]. Possible architectures and protocols for such a network are
being developed.
Since 2004, quantum cryptography systems have been commercially availabe. Pres-
ently, two small companies, id Quantique and MagiQ Technologies [47], are ready to
deliver a complete QKD link paired with standard virtual private network (VPN)
classical encryption equipment. As of 2006, they have reportedly served very few, if
any, customers. The present cost of QKD equipment is of the order of 100,000 U.S.
dollars for a complete point-to-point set [48], so expensive due to being the first com-
mercial samples, practically hand-made. However, there is nothing intrinsically expen-
sive about quantum cryptography hardware: in mass production and with mature
technology, it should not cost much more than any other computer component. Several
other companies and organizations (e.g., Toshiba, NIST, QinetiQ, SmartQuantum [49])
have production-ready QKD technology. In the currently advertised commercial appli-
cations, a high-throughput (gigabits per second) VPN link is encrypted with key mate-
rial generated by QKD. Typical VPN data rates rule out the use of one-time pad; a
symmetric cipher such as AES with a frequently updated key (e.g., a new key supplied
several times per second) has to be used. This is barely a modest incremental im-
provement in the level of security; the main benefit of the existing commercial quan-
tum cryptography systems seems to be that an automatic system replaces manual key
distribution. QKD will never match classical network links in speed, but improvements
allowing a couple orders of magnitude faster key generation rate than available today
are being researched. Then, it is a question of management to select the most sensitive
traffic for one-time pad encryption, while the rest can be encrypted by a modern sym-
metric cipher with frequently changed key.
In general, quantum cryptography is a diverse interdisciplinary field where many
opportunities for academic research and for trying new ideas exist. It has stimulated
development of new mathematical and experimental techniques useful outside the
context of quantum cryptography. The use of intrinsically analog optical signals in the
quantum communication channel make the design of devices in several ways more
intricate than that of purely digital encryption equipment or software.
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1.5.  Thesis outline
We joined the field of quantum cryptography in 1998, when it was already moder-
ately advanced. This thesis presents the results produced by our small group at NTNU
over the eight years.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the background for
QKD over optical fibers, details of our QKD setup (excluding the single photon detec-
tor) and experimental results obtained with this setup. Chapter 3 presents a review of
existing single photon detection techniques, and a description of the single photon
detector used in our setup. Chapter 4 presents our view of the security of QKD sys-
tems, new attacks we have proposed and studied; it ends with our latest paper. In
Conclusion, results are recapped and possible directions of further research are out-
lined.
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2.  Quantum key distribution over
optical fibers
Today, optical fibers are the most promising media for quantum key distribution.
Commercial QKD systems are already available [47]. Several recent experiments have
demonstrated QKD over distances exceeding 100 km [33, 30, 31, 32]. Protocols that
provide truly secure transmission over large distances using an attenuated semicon-
ductor laser as the light source are being developed (see Section 4.2.1. ). The distance
is currently limited by the noise level (measured in dark count probability) of commer-
cially available single photon detectors (SPDs) for the 1550 nm fiber transmission
window. APD-based SPDs continue to improve. Moreover, superconducting SPDs that
exist today (see Section 3.1. ) could be used in a QKD system, further improving the
transmission distance [33].
Sending quantum states over an optical fiber presents an unique set of challenges.
These challenges are briefly discussed below, followed by a description of our imple-
mentation of a QKD setup, results of a QKD experiment, and a phase tracking tech-
nique that we have thoroughly studied and implemented in our setup.
2.1.  Technical issues and choice of coding
A number of issues can present a problem for QKD over optical fibers:
• Polarization transformation in standard singlemode comunication fibers, random
and changing with time. When a laser source is used in a QKD system, polariza-
tion transformation in the fiber can be tracked. However, with wideband sources
like a parametric downconversion source of entangled photons (typically ~5 nm
emission linewidth), a standard singlemode fiber several kilometers long be-
comes depolarizing [50].
• Polarization dependence of components in Bob’s (and, in the case of a “plug and
play” scheme considered below, Alice’s setup). Notably, a practical high-speed
phase modulator used in phase coding schemes, LiNbO3 planar waveguide
modulator, usually is a polarizing component. A scheme exists for a polarizing
phase modulator to work as a polarization-insensitive component [51, 52] and is
used in a QKD implementation [53], but it adds complexity. Another solution is
not to use a phase modulator at Bob at all, but make a scheme with passive basis
choice.
• Phase drift in the interferometer (see Section 2.3. ) harmful in phase coding
schemes. Solutions to this problem include active phase tracking, and a stable
interferometer construction. The latter can be either heavily isolated fibers, or
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small integrated interferometers reported stable over hours [54], especially po-
larization-insensitive ones [30].
• Chromatic dispersion effects in standard single-mode fibers. In some QKD ex-
periments reported to date, chromatic pulse broadening becomes a concern [30,
32, 55].
There isn’t an ideal solution to all these problems at once. Every invented optical
scheme for QKD has its advanteges and drawbacks. Also one must keep in mind
eavesdropping, because some optical schemes are more vulnerable to attacks than other
(see Chapter 4. ).
The first experimental implementations of QKD over optical fibers used polariza-
tion coding [17, 18]. Although it is in principle possible to track polarization accu-
rately, the community has quickly switched to phase coding schemes. Relative phase of
pulses closely following one another in fiber does not change, unlike their polarization.
In some of the phase coding schemes, it is still desirable to track polarization (when
Bob’s setup is polarization-dependent), but accuracy requirements for polarization
tracking are somewhat relaxed.
Two main phase coding schemes are considered below. One is a straightforward
scheme with one-way pulse propagation. Another is a “plug and play” scheme with
two-way pulse propagation, where both phase drift in the interferometer and polariza-
tion transformation in the fiber are compensated automatically, without the need for
stabilization and active tracking.
2.1.1.  One-way phase coding scheme
The first common scheme with phase coding (introduced by Bennett in 1992 theo-
retically [14] and by Townsend et al. in 1993 experimentally [56]) consists of just a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, with arms multiplexed into a single fiber at Alice and
demultiplexed at Bob. As an example, we reprint here a version of this scheme by
Marand and Townsend [24], where demultiplexing the pulses at Bob is done on a
polarization splitter (Fig. 3). The polarization splitter allows to separate the pulses
coming from the transmission fiber into the arms with a loss lower than the 3 dB a
scheme with a common 50/50 coupler in this place would have. In exchange however,
this scheme requires polarization tracking at Bob.
Schemes of this general type (differing in details) are used in several other experi-
ments [28, 31, 57].
2.1.2.  “Plug and play” scheme
The second common scheme with phase coding (introduced by Muller and cowork-
ers in 1997 [58]) features light pulses travelling first from Bob to Alice, getting re-
flected by a Faraday mirror at Alice, and travelling back to Bob through the same
transmission fiber (Fig. 4). The two-way propagation with a Faraday reflector auto-
matically compensates for all polarization fluctuations in the transmission channel: the
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Fig. 3. Reprinted from [24]: interferometric quantum cryptography scheme.
Fig. 4. Reprinted from [58]: “plug and play” system with phase coding. A short laser
pulse sent by Bob is split into two at coupler C2. The first part, P1 goes straight to Al-
ice, while the second one, P2, is first delayed by the M2–M1 delay line. Both pulses are
reflected back towards Bob at M3. Alice measures the intensity of the incoming pulses,
and attenuates them to single-photon levels. The phase modulators (PM) modulate the
path length between the two pulses. On arrival to Bob’s side, part of P1 is delayed by
M1–M2, and thus interferes with incoming P2. The interference pattern at D0 gives the
relative phase settings of Alice and Bob. Use of the Faraday rotators (FR) before the
mirrors makes it possible to cancel out all birefringence effects in the fibers.
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pulses always return to Bob in a polarization orthogonal to the one they left in [59, 60,
16]. Phase drift in the interferometer is also automatically compensated in this scheme.
Fig. 4 depicts the first scheme that uses the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol with one detec-
tor.6 A version of this scheme exists [62, 63] that uses two detectors and can implement
the BB84 or the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) [64, 65, 66] protocols.
The “plug and play” scheme is convenient for implementation, because it does not
require complex adjustments during operation. It has its own limitations and risks
noted below in Section 2.3.  Schemes of the “plug and play” type are used in a few
other experiments [e.g., 67, 68, 69, 70] and in both commercial systems [47].7
Besides the two types of schemes presented above, more schemes with phase cod-
ing exist. Among them are the frequency coding scheme [72] using the B92 protocol,
phase-time coding scheme [73], differential phase shift keying (DPSK) schemes [32,
74, 75]. However, security of these schemes and protocols has not been studied to the
same depth as for the first two schemes. Also, we do not consider here schemes using a
source of entangled photons [76, 77, 78, 50, 55]. Even though similar challenges exist
for them, entangled photon sources are not just yet suitable for a commercial system.
2.2.  Our implementation of one-way phase coding
scheme
We chose to build a QKD setup based on the Marand-Townsend scheme [24] with a
time- and polarization-multiplexed Mach-Zehnder interferometer and time-multiplexed
detector (Fig. 3). The main difference of our interferometer was the use of polarization-
maintaining (PM, not to confuse with phase modulator) fiber in Alice’s and Bob’s
setups, which eliminated polarization controllers from the scheme (but not the polari-
zation controller at the input of Bob). We also planned to improve the laser pulse rate,
and hence the key generation rate, through the use of afterpulse blocking technique at
the detector, described in Chapter 3.  We use the BB84 protocol [13, 14].
Althoug this straightforward, one-way optical scheme required active phase and
polarization tracking, we preferred it over the “plug and play” type scheme. In the
latter scheme, the light pulses were accessible to Eve before they were modulated and
attenuated to a single photon level inside Alice’s setup. We decided that the security of
the “plug and play” scheme was insufficiently studied to choose it for implementation.
In the following years, our reservations have been partially confirmed. It has turned out
to be more difficult to protect the “plug and play” scheme from a large pulse attack
                                                     
6 The B92 protocol is different from the BB84 in that it relies on coherent states instead of
the single photon (number) states, encodes bits using just two states instead of the four, and
implements a homodyne measurement at Bob. See Ref. 61 for the definition of B92.
7 Details of the commercial QKD systems [47] have not been openly published in writing, to
our best knowledge. However, we can infer the type of scheme used by id Quantique from prior
publications by the Geneva group, and the one used by MagiQ Technologies from several U.S.
patent applications their employees have recently submitted. Recent conference talks given by
representatives of both companies (e.g., [71]) confirm this. If you buy a system from either
company, you get one with the “plug and play” type of optical scheme.
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(see Section 4.3.1. ), and it has been shown that the phase information Eve has in the
“plug and play” scheme can give her additional information unless a phase randomizer
is included into Alice’s setup [79]. On the other hand, our one-way scheme has de-
manded extra work in implementing active phase tracking (see Section 2.3. ).
Please keep in mind that we had to make our choice of scheme in 1998, when many
of the newer schemes mentioned above were not known.
2.2.1.  Polarization-maintaining double Mach-Zehnder
interferometer
The optical part of the QKD setup consists of a laser, Mach-Zehnder interferometer,
and a single photon detector (Fig. 5). The 1310 nm laser (semiconductor gain-switched
laser, Fujitsu FLD3F6CX) emits 100 ps wide pulses at 10 MHz repetition rate. The
pulses (already strongly linearly polarized) pass through a polarizer (OZ Optics) and
are split into two arms of interferometer on a variable ratio PM coupler (evanescent-
wave all-fiber, Canadian Instrumentation and Research Ltd.). The interferometer in
Alice’s and Bob’s setups is made of PM fiber (Fujikura PANDA) and all components
are oriented such that the light is polarized along the slow axis of the fiber. One arm of
the interferometer is short on Alice’s side and goes straight to the polarization combi-
ner (OZ Optics). The other arm is long and contains a four meter delay line, a variable
delay line (50 mm variation, Princeton Optics) to get the length of the two interfer-
ometer arms exactly equal, and Alice’s phase modulator (polarizing LiNbO3 planar
waveguide, Alenia Marconi; half-wave voltage 3.5 V). Pulses from the two arms on
Alice’s side are combined into a single fiber (standard SM fiber) on the polarization
combiner, such that they are separated by a delay and have at this point orthogonal
linear polarizations. Then they pass through a variable attenuator (JDS Fitel VA4; set
at ca. 60 dB) in order to get the average photon number per pulse pair down to sub-
photon level. We thus use not a true single photon source in our system, but a weak
coherent state source (see Section 4.2.1. ).
As the two pulses pass through the communication line consisting of standard sin-
gle mode (SM) fiber, they undergo a polarization transformation. However, this trans-
formation is the same for both pulses, and their polarizations, although being arbitrary
elliptical at the output of the line, remain orthogonal to one another. With the help of a
polarization controller (all-fiber type PFPC, OZ Optics) at Bob, their polarization can
be restored back to linear and properly oriented so that the pulses are routed each into
its own arm of interferometer on a polarizing splitter (OZ Optics). The pulse that has
travelled the long arm at Alice now goes into the short arm. The pulse that has trav-
elled the short arm at Alice goes into the long arm at Bob that contains a delay line and
Bob’s phase modulator (polarizing LiNbO3 planar waveguide, Uniphase
8
; half-wave
voltage 8.2 V). Both pulses come to the 50/50 PM coupler (evanescent-wave all-fiber
variable ratio coupler, Canadian Instrumentation and Research Ltd.; set at 50/50 split-
ting ratio) at the same time and are oriented to have the same polarization, so they
                                                     
8 The phase modulators at Alice and Bob were initially identical ones made by Uniphase,
but we had to replace one of them after an experimental mishap (see Appendix A).
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Fig. 5. QKD setup. Optical scheme.
Table 1. Implementation of the BB84 protocol in our setup.
Alice Bob
Bit value ϕA ϕB ϕA–ϕB Bit value
0 –π/4– –π/4– 0 0
0 –π/4– π/4 –π/2– ?
1 3π/4 –π/4– π 1
1 3π/4 π/4 π/2 ?
0 π/4 –π/4– π/2 ?
0 π/4 π/4 0 0
1 –3π/4– –π/4– –π/2– ?
1 –3π/4– π/4 π 1
interfere. The outcome of interference, i.e. which output port at the coupler the result-
ing pulse takes, depends on the difference between phase shifts in Alice’s and Bob’s
phase modulators ϕA–ϕB (Table 1). One of the output ports is agreed to represent “0”
bit value, and the other “1” bit value in the protocol. When the phase difference equals
0 or π, the interference outcome is definite; with other phase differences the photon
appears randomly at one of the output ports.
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In principle, we could use two SPDs: one at each output port of the coupler. How-
ever, following Townsend, we multiplex the ports into a single fiber using a ten meters
long delay line and a polarization combiner (OZ Optics). Then we use one detector
gated at double the laser pulse rate, i.e., at 20 MHz. Our SPD is APD-based and is
described in Chapter 3.  The approximately ten meters long delay line is legth-adjusted
so that its delay equals the gate pulse period (50 ns) with a precision better than the
detector gate width (gate width ~1 ns, desired precision better than 100 ps; the actual
splicing precision happened to be better than 25 ps or 5 mm, as the measurement of
detector sensitivety curves described in Section 4.3.3.2.  incidentally revealed).
The interferometer was initially assembled on an optical table (Fig. 6), and its op-
eration was checked. Then, Alice’s and Bob’s halves of the interferometer were
mounted onto 6 mm thick aluminium plates (Figures 7, 8), covered with thermoisola-
tion, and put each into a box sized approximately 420x420x150 mm (Fig. 9).
Our system requires active tracking and compensation of phase drift in the interfer-
ometer, which we have implemented (see Section 2.3. ). Tracking of polarization
transformation in the communication line would also be desired, because proper split-
ting of pulses into the arms at Bob’s polarizing splitter depends on the accurate polari-
zation. However, some inaccuracy in polarization is tolerable: it would send some
fraction of the pulses into a wrong arm, where they do no harm arriving at the detector
outside its gating windows. This inaccurate splitting only leads to additional loss. In
principle one could forgo polarization adjustment altogether, which in this scheme
would result in average >50% reduction of the key generation rate, and periods of total
fading. The speed with which the polarization transformation in the line changes de-
pends on the environment around the communication cable. In lab demonstrations with
spooled fiber, as well as in underground and undersea fiber optic cables, polarization
can remain stable for tens of minutes [18, 80, 81]. However, in aerial cables it can
change quickly [81]. Techniques for polarization tracking developed for coherent
optical communication systems in the 1980s could be adapted for our system [82]. We
have not implemented polarization tracking, because for initial demonstrations manual
adjustment of the polarization controller before each test run would suffice.
2.2.2.  Electronics and control systems
The electrical diagram of our system is shown in Fig. 10. Alice’s and Bob’s setups
are controlled by two PCs connected via internet (10 Mbps LAN) used as a public
channel. Each PC is equipped with a high-speed arbitrary waveform generator card
(National Instruments NI 5411) used for driving the phase modulators. Amplifiers
placed in Box 1 and Box 2 boost the voltage for phase modulators. Bob also has a
digital I/O card (DIO D32HS) used for generating the trigger signal and for reading
detector data. Data acquisition from the APD is done by Box 3, which contains
512 KiB buffer memory with 20 MHz serial input. This memory can store up to
2097152 consecutive pairs of detection outcomes received from the APD electronics
described in Chapter 3.  The buffer memory is needed because a PC cannot reliably
read serial data at the required rate. The memory in Box 3 fills up with detector data
automatically in about 210 ms following the trigger, and then Bob's PC can read its
contents byte by byte using the digital I/O card.
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The synchronization of the whole system is done with the help of several genera-
tors. The master clock generator (SRS DS345) outputs a stable 20 MHz signal. This
signal synchronizes Box 3, the 20 MHz generator that produces gate pulses for the
APD, and the 10 MHz slave clock generator (consisting in reality of two generators:
E-H Research Laboratories Inc. EH129 and Datapulse 101). The 10 MHz clock from
the slave generator is sent to the laser electronics, to Box 3 (to initiate data acquisition
in phase with the laser pulse) and, through manually adjustable phase delay circuits (in
Box 1 and Box 2), to the phase locked loop (PLL) inputs of Alice’s and Bob’s arbitrary
waveform generator cards.9 The laser electronics (not shown on the diagram) consists
of a step recovery diode circuit, which sharpens the falling edge of the 10 MHz signal
from the EH129 generator, which has 500 ps fall time, and allows to obtain relatively
short light pulses with 100 ps full width at half maximum (FWHM) from the laser.
Also not shown on the diagram is a distribution buffer between the master clock gen-
erator and receivers of the master clock signal, which contains repeaters and a fre-
quency divider for synchronization of the 10 MHz generators.
A typical transmission cycle consists of Alice and Bob loading the memory in their
waveform generator cards with waveforms for the phase modulators. Then Bob gener-
ates the trigger signal, which simultaneously starts waveform generators in Alice’s and
Bob’s cards, and detector data acquisition into the buffer memory in Box 3, all of
which now proceeds automatically without software control. Alice and Bob simply
wait 210 ms, after which the buffer memory is full and Bob can read and process a part
of, or all its content.
The control software is written in LabVIEW with some C++ inserts to speed up
processing large amount of data, namely reading and initial processing detector data
from Box 3. The software loops through two parts: the phase adjustment routine (de-
scribed in Section 2.3. ) and the QKD routine. All intermediate data from these two
routines, as well as the measured QBER, are displayed.
More details on the electronics and software, including a detailed electrical and op-
tical interconnections diagram of the setup, can be found in Mikhail Chizhov’s master
thesis [84].
Although this electronics can be used, with some amount of trouble, for laboratory
experiments, it would require several modifications for a production system. Firstly,
the buffer memory in Box 3 should be made smarter: it should record only the bit slots
where the detector has clicked (e.g., record slot numbers with clicks). Since most of the
slots normally contain no clicks, this greatly reduces the amount of data Bob’s PC has
to read and process, easing the processor load. Secondly, random waveform generation
for phase modulators must be made in hardware, the basis and bit values temporarily
stored in a memory there, and only the basis and bit values where Bob’s detector has
registeres a click should be read from the memory of waveform generators into the
PCs. This also eases the processor and I/O load. These two measures together would
enable continuous operation of the system at the laser pulse rate we use (10 MHz) or at
                                                     
9 We could not get the National Instruments NI 5411 arbitrary waveform generator cards
live up to their specification and synchronize reliably with the rest of the setup, despite having
tried different modes of external synchronization of the cards. Only unreliable, intermittent
synchronization was achieved, which hampered our experiments greatly. This appeared to be a
problem with the card design.
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a higher pulse rate. Without them in our impementation, we had to take a shortcut by
generating 256-bit long pseudorandom waveforms for phase modulators in a loop, and
processing the detector data in a time much longer than it takes to record it into the
buffer memory in Box 3.10
Besides smarter electronics, a production system must have a separate channel for
transmitting the 10 MHz clock and the trigger signal from Bob to Alice (in our setup
the signals are carried by three 50 Ohm electrical cables, i.e. it is not yet suitable for a
separate-locations experiment). The synchronization channel could use a separate
optical fiber [55, 53, 29], or an optical signal that is wavelength division multiplexed
into the same fiber that carries qubits [57, 31, 29].
2.2.3.  Results of quantum key distribution
We initially tested the assembled interferometer spread on the optical table (Fig. 6)
and measured fringe visibility at 1310 nm. The fringe visibility in both “0” and “1”
time windows attained after adjustments of variable couplers was better than 0.96, and
loss in Bob’s part of the interferometer averaged over the “0” and “1” time windows
was 4.2 dB. We have also tested several samples of different APDs and located a
sample of FD312L Ge APD that had sufficiently low dark count probability (5·10–5 at
16% quantum efficiency) to run QKD over at least 20 km of single-mode fiber at a
reasonably low average photon number at the output of Alice µ=0.2 (if we disregarded
the PNS attack, see Section 4.2.1. ). This looked sufficiently good.
However, to demonstrate QKD, a good amount of electronics and control software
described in the previous section needed to be built around the interferometer. Also, we
needed to mount the interferometer into portable boxes, and implement active phase
tracking described in the next section before we could do QKD. In the meantime, we
had started to use the setup for studies of practical security, and a mishap occurred
during the large pulse attack experiment (see Section 4.3.1. ). One of the phase modu-
lators in the interferometer was irreparably damaged, as shown in Appendix A. The
shifted focus of studies towards security, combined amount of work to complete the
QKD system and this mishap put off the demonstration of QKD towards the end of
author’s stay in Trondheim, after some of the other results presented in this thesis had
already been obtained. By the time we were ready to demonstrate QKD, it turned out
both the optical scheme and the electronics had developed additional problems.11
                                                     
10 It takes 210 ms to fill the buffer memory. Our C++ routine calling a generic I/O memory
range access driver for each byte takes about 30 s on a 400 MHz PC to read the entire memory.
If we took the trouble of writing our own Windows driver that can directly access the I/O port,
this time would probably be down to under 2 s. Programming I/O access certainly was simpler
in the days of MS-DOS.
11 Alice’s part of the setup had acquired very high attenuation (as much as 51 dB: the sus-
pected culprit was the variable delay line that had probably came out of alignment internally). This
required adding a makeshift attenuator in the other arm, by winding PM fiber in the short arm at
Alice on a mandrel with a low curvature radius. Still the interferometer remained barely controlla-
ble and unstable, not being able to attain the high fringe visibility initially measured. To make
things worse, the 10 MHz pulse generator died (we had to replace it with another model) and
Alice’s NI 5411 DAC card began sporadically losing synchronization with the rest of the setup.
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Fig. 11. QKD run no. 1.  QBER vs. time.  Each transmission cycle takes ca. 3 s; the
chart shows 100 cycles.
Fig. 12. QKD run no. 2.  QBER vs. time.  Each transmission cycle takes ca. 3 s; the
chart shows 100 cycles.
In the little time left, we only managed to demonstrate operation with a rather high
QBER and no communication line (i.e. Alice’s setup connected to Bob’s setup via a
variable attenuator and a short five-meter optical cable), as described below.
Result of one of the best test runs with Alice connected directly to Bob is shown in
Fig. 11. The best (lowest) QBER during the “calm” periods on the chart was about 4%.
The peaks are due to an unstable 10 MHz pulse generator. Having replaced the pulse
generator with yet another one, and having added a variable optical attenuator between
Alice and Bob to simulate the loss in the communication line, we have made another
test run (Fig. 12) which has shown an average value of QBER = 5.7%. Virtually all of
the QBER on the charts is due to bad fringe visibility and intermittent problems with
synchronization; detector dark counts only account for QBERdet = 0.1%. In these tests,
256-bit long pseudorandom sequences in a loop were used for basis and bit values at
Alice’s and Bob’s modulators. Key extraction in software was not implemented: we
only had the sifting stage and the stage that compares the raw keys to calculate the
QBER. Also, in these test runs, the average number of photons at the output of Alice
was set to 5.1 photons/pulse, to make manual adjustments in the poorly controllable
interferometer prior to the test run easier. Instead of afterpulse blocking (which in these
tests was set to 0 blocked pulses), we implemented software-only afterpulse discarding,
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with twenty bit pairs following every count discarded [85];12 however we could not
measure its effect on the QBER because the bad fringe visibility masked any other
effect.
The number of problems with poorly behaving electronics and faulty components
we have encountered on the way to demonstrate QKD, and incompleteness of our
implementation show that we have underestimated the effort required to build a robust
and complete QKD system. Also, the goal of the higher pulse rate turned out to be too
much of a burden for a research lab. Among the experiments and theoretical studies
presented in the thesis, the QKD demonstration experiment described in this section is
the one where the author is the least happy with the results.
2.3.  Phase control techniques
Our choice of optical scheme implied that in order to do QKD, active phase track-
ing and control must be employed. When we started implementing it, we realized that
the task was in fact general to many QKD schemes. It might be especially actual for
entanglement-based schemes (the first implementations of which had recently been
demonstrated [76, 77, 78]) if they were to work over long distance and at the same time
avoid heavy constructive phase stabilization measures. Additionally, efficient meas-
urement of phase at low light level might be applicable outside the quantum communi-
cation domain, e.g., in optical measurements. We thus decided to study the phase
tracking problem more thoroughly than would be needed just to get it solved in our
setup.
This section consists of our paper published in the Journal of Applied Optics 43,
4385–4392 (2004); figures numeration and references in the paper have been inte-
grated with the rest of the thesis, otherwise the paper is equivalent to the published
version sans language changes made by the journal copy editor.
After that, we discuss two assumptions that were taken for granted in the paper.
One of these assumptions was not quite correct. In result, the required number of
counts may increase by as much as +56% under certain conditions (namely, when
QBER is not zero as assumed in the paper but approaches 10%).
                                                     
12 We came to the idea of afterpulse discarding independently of Yoshizawa and coworkers
of Ref. 85.
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Real-time phase tracking in single-photon
interferometers
VADIM MAKAROV, ALEXEI BRYLEVSKI, and DAG R. HJELME
A new technique for phase tracking in quantum cryptography systems is proposed
that adjusts phase in an optimal way, using only as few photon counts as neces-
sary. We derive an upper bound on the number of photons that need to be regis-
tered during phase adjustment in order to achieve a given phase accuracy. It turns
out that most quantum cryptosystems can successfully track phase on single-
photon level, fully in software, without any additional hardware components and
extensive phase stabilization measures. The technique is tested experimentally on
a quantum cryptosystem.
OSIC codes: 030.5260, 040.5570, 060.5060, 120.5050, 270.1670.
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution systems (QKD systems) are the new generation of crypto-
graphic systems. They transmit a random key securely over an optical fiber (“quantum
channel”). This random key is then used for encryption and decryption of confidential
information, which then can be sent in encrypted form over any non-protected commu-
nication channel. Over the last decade, quantum cryptosystems have been actively
developed.
Most of the systems are based on fiber optic interferometers. An inevitable problem
for these interferometers is the phase drift. The phase between the interferometers’
arms has to be matched for transmission, in order for interference results to be con-
trollable. If no special measures are taken during the assembly of interferometer, the
relative phase between the two arms can drift rather quickly (e.g., 0.6 rad/min as re-
ported in [24] or 2 rad/min in our experiment described later in this paper).
Just how much inaccuracy is acceptable in phase matching? The error probability is
the ratio of error counts to the total number of counts. In an interferometric system, that
would correspond to the lower part of the sin2 interference curve. Thus, the contribu-
tion of phase mismatch ∆ϕ to the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is
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which rises quadratically for small ∆ϕ (Fig. 13).
The key extraction algorithm can handle QBER up to a certain threshold value. This
threshold value, according to some recent security analyses, is approximately 11% [86,
16, 87]. The larger the QBER, the bigger part of the key has to be discarded during key
extraction, leaving us with lower key exchange rate, which approaches zero as QBER
approaches 11%. QBER value of 11% could be caused by 38° phase mismatch if it
were the only error source.
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Fig. 13. QBER vs. interferometer phase mismatch in absence of other error sources.
In real systems, other sources of error as well as QBERopt ∆ϕ contribute to the total
QBER. Some of these other sources of error (e.g., detector dark counts) are much
harder to control than phase accuracy. We therefore want to keep QBERopt ∆ϕ within
about one percent (less if possible), to minimize its impact on the key exchange rate.
This translates into a required phase accuracy of 10° or better.
2. Existing solutions
There are three known ways to deal with phase drift:
(1) “Plug & play” interferometer configuration (round-trip light propagation, auto-
compensating).
(2) Strict thermo- and mechanical isolation (slows down phase drift).
(3) Periodical switching to bright light regime for active phase tracking.
(1) “Plug & play” system presents an elegant solution both for polarization fluc-
tuations and for phase drift. In this approach, light pulses travel from Bob to Alice, get
reflected by a Faraday mirror and then travel back to Bob: this automatically compen-
sates for all polarization fluctuations in the transmission channel [59, 60]. The two
interfering pulses also follow exactly the same path in Alice’s and Bob’s interferome-
ters, albeit in different directions: this automatically compensates for phase drift,
eliminating the need for active adjustments [88]. A system of this type is easier to
develop into a product than the other quantum cryptosystems, and is the first one being
deployed commercially [63, 47].
Unfortunately, “plug & play” configuration has limitations, which stem from bidi-
rectional light propagation:
• This configuration can only be used for QKD with faint laser pulses and with
modulators in Alice’s and Bob’s setups. There are no “plug & play” configura-
tions for entangled-pair-based schemes.
• The system is difficult to protect from external interrogation attacks (“Trojan
horse” attacks), and it appears to be more vulnerable to implementation attacks
[89].
• It has a penalty factor of ~3 in the key generation rate comparing to an
equivalent non-plug and play configuration, because one cannot let light pulses
propagate in opposite directions in the transmission channel at the same time,
due to Rayleigh backscattering from bright pulses. Pulses have to be transmitted
37
in batches with pauses between them, and a fiber delay line in Alice’s setup em-
ployed [90].
(2) Passive measures like thermo- and mechanical isolation can, if done properly,
keep phase sufficiently stable without adjustment for several hours. This is enough for
many laboratory experiments, where initial adjustment or calibration is performed
manually and is followed by a test run of limited duration. The phase, however, even-
tually drifts away. In a production system, automatic phase tracking would always be
needed.
For example, the group in Geneva took careful measures to stabilize their interfer-
ometers, so that experimental tests could be performed without continuous phase
tracking. They keep interferometer arms reasonably short, few tens of centimeters
[76, 91]. Their bulk optics interferometer is built on a base made of material with low
thermal expansion coefficient, and is thermoisolated well [50]. When it comes to fiber
optics interferometers, they are packed into sand-filled copper tubes and are actively
thermostabilized at a constant temperature, by incorporating a heater and temperature
sensor into the assembly [92].
In another example, the EQUIS project aims at manufacturing Alice's and Bob's
interferometers as integrated planar silica waveguide structures [93]. These devices are
inherently more stable owing to their small size and monolithic construction. Each of
them is thermostabilized by a thermoelectric heater/cooler, and the phase is reported to
be “very stable” [54].
Thermostabilization can also be used to track phase if the heater/cooler is included
into a feedback loop. It has an obvious disadvantage of very long (hours) warm-up
time [76]; moreover, it also takes long time to stabilize the phase after any mechanical
or thermal impact on the system.
(3) For rapid phase tracking, Townsend used two additional components to perform
phase adjustment: a piezoelectric transducer to adjust the length of one of the arms of
Alice’s interferometer, and an electrically switched attenuator [24]. The adjustment
was performed by switching to low attenuation and scanning the phase by piezoelectric
transducer until the photon count rate at one of the Bob’s output ports was minimized.
The thermal phase drift rate reported by Townsend was ~0.6 rad/s.
Although it is possible to achieve very slow phase drift rates by constructive meas-
ures, they make production more expensive, and can also add bulk and weight to the
equipment. It would be of advantage if standard fiber optic assembly technology could
be used, with standard splicing equipment, no severe restrictions on the length of fiber
pigtails, and possibly with only light foam insulation around the assembled interfer-
ometer. Such an interferometer exhibits rather fast phase drift and makes it necessary
to adjust phase every few seconds, like in Townsend’s setup [24]; the phase adjustment
itself should therefore be quick. There is, however, a problem of achieving desired
phase accuracy in a short time: existing quantum cryptosystems generate limited count
rates at the detectors during normal operation (typically a few thousand counts per
second), and statistical noise is significant.
For faint pulse systems that contain a laser and a strong attenuator, one can use an
electrically switched attenuator to temporarily increase count rates during phase ad-
justment as in [24]. This extra optical component, however, adds cost and lowers
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reliability (the system does need to employ some kind of adjustable attenuator to set
the mean photon number at the time of installation, but it need not be fast nor even
electrically-controlled). It should also be possible to electrically control the energy of
the laser pulse (by changing its brightness and/or duration), but we are not aware of
any tests of this technique in quantum cryptosystems.
Most importantly, for systems based on single-photon and photon pair sources (e.g.,
parametric downconversion sources) increasing light output of the source can be im-
practical or impossible.
We therefore decided to find a technique that does not require any extra compo-
nents and performs phase adjustment fully in software, at single-photon level, utilizing
only as few detector counts as necessary to achieve required phase accuracy.
The research that comes closest to this idea is the experiment at Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory. They suggested deriving the feedback signal for phase tracking from
key data (“from the key error rate and key bias”) [28]. However, no further details have
been published, to our knowledge. Their interferometer contains PZT-driven air gaps
to control the phase, both on Alice’s and Bob’s side. The published experimental
results hint at constructive isolation as well: phase appears to be stable without adjust-
ment over time span of 10 minutes, and the interferometer boxes are quite bulky.
3. Phase tracking algorithm
The quantum key distribution setup we consider consists of Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer with a phase modulator in each arm. The phase modulator in one arm resides on
Alice’s side, and phase modulator in another arm resides on Bob’s side. Single-photon
detector(s) reside on Bob’s side. For more details we refer the reader to Section 4 and
to [24, 94].
For the whole duration of adjustment, Alice sets her phase modulator to zero (0 V)
and transmits photons as usual. Only Bob’s phase modulator is used.
The software phase tracking algorithm we devised consists of two stages; stage 1
for rough phase adjustment, and stage 2 for fine phase compensation.
Stage 1. Rough phase compensation.
In this stage, Bob scans the whole phase range (0° to 360°) in a small number of
steps using his modulator, and records the number of detector counts collected at each
step by “0” and “1” photon detectors (or in “0” and “1” detector time slots if only one
photon detector is used in the system). He then notes the phase settings of his modula-
tor at which the smallest number of counts occurred in “0” detector time slot and “1”
detector time slot, respectively. The value of this phase setting for “1” time slot can be
either less or greater than the value of phase setting for “0” time slot, depending on the
position of the interference curves in the scanning range. In the former case, we add
180° to the value of phase setting for “1” time slot; the latter case, we subtract 180°
from the value of phase setting for “1” time slot. After this, we calculate an average of
the values for “0” and “1” time slots, which improves accuracy. This is assumed to be
the “roughly determined phase compensation”, ϕ0.
This scan allows Bob to quickly determine the position of minima of interference
curves with an accuracy of 20–30°. Further improvement of precision requires a differ-
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ent method, because the sin2-shaped interference curves are both flat and have the
highest relative statistical fluctuations near their minima. To get the best accuracy in a
given counting time, we propose to count photons at the points on the interference
curves where they have the maximum slope-to-statistical-deviation ratio. To the first
approximation, these points are ϕ0+90° and ϕ0−90°. We do this counting in stage 2.
The purpose of stage 1 is to quickly provide a rough estimate of these points. How-
ever, stage 1 need not be repeated on subsequent runs of phase adjustment if it is
known that the phase has not deviated much. This can be inferred from successful key
exchange immediately prior to the phase adjustment, or guaranteed by the time since
the last run combined with the fastest estimated drift rate.
Stage 2. Fine phase compensation.
In this stage, Bob switches his modulator between ϕ0+90° and ϕ0−90° in a symmet-
ric square-wave pattern, and records the number of photon counts at each phase setting.
This results in four count values:
N0+ – the number of photons detected at ϕ0+90° phase setting in “0” time slot;
N0− – the number of photons detected at ϕ0−90° phase setting in “0” time slot;
N1+ – the number of photons detected at ϕ0+90° phase setting in “1” time slot;
N1− – the number of photons detected at ϕ0−90° phase setting in “1” time slot.
On Fig. 14, Function 0 is our assumption of the position of the interference curve
N(ϕ) after performing the first stage of phase adjustment, with the minimum at ϕ0.
Function 1 is a more accurate position of the interference curve N(ϕ), with the mini-
mum at ϕ1, which is unknown to us at this point.
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Using the equations above, one can derive correction δ as a function of N0+, N0−, N1+,
N1−, Nmin and Nmax (for full derivation, see [83]). Nmin and Nmax can be actually different
for “0” and “1” time slots, so we split them into Nmin0, Nmin1, Nmax0, and Nmax1. The
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Fig. 14. Illustration of phase adjustment at stage 2. Only the interference curve for “0”
time slot is shown.
In the experiment, we assumed Nmin0=Nmin1=0, Nmax0=N0++N0− and Nmax1=N1++N1−. 
Nmin0 and Nmin1 are in practice non-zero, due to imperfect fringe visibility and detector
dark counts. They could be estimated more precisely should it be necessary.
The resulting correction δ is added to ϕ0 to get the more accurate value of phase
compensation, ϕ1. The voltage corresponding to ϕ1 is applied as an offset voltage to
Bob’s phase modulator during the key transmission session that follows phase adjust-
ment.
There will be some random error in ϕ1, due to statistical fluctuations in the number
of counts N0+, N0−, N1+, N1−. We can calculate how many counts need to be collected in
order to achieve a given phase accuracy with a certain probability.
The interference curve is given by
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Thus, at our ±90° counting points the slope of interference curve approximately is
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N obeys Poisson distribution, which approaches Gaussian distribution for the relatively
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large mean number of counts involved. Assuming  Nmin=0  and 
2
max
N
N = , the statisti-
cal error level ∆N follows as
2
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kkN =σ=∆ , (3)
where σ is the standard deviation and k is the number of standard deviations corre-
sponding to a given probability of the actual number of counts falling within
( )NNNN ∆+∆− , . Combining Eqs. (2) and (3), we obtain
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This is the number of counts needed to achieve phase error of ∆ϕ or less, where the
probability of not exceeding this phase error is set by the number of standard devia-
tions k. Actually, we are collecting counts in both detection windows, not in just one,
and obtain phase correction by averaging over all four count values according to
Eq. (1). Averaging works in such a way that the same right-hand side of Eq. (4) would
then estimate the total number of counts
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For example, to achieve our goal of 10° or better accuracy in, say, 95% of the phase
adjustment attempts (k=2), it would suffice to register approximately
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in stage 2 of phase adjustment. We have also determined empirically that stage 1
requires fewer counts than stage 2 (this is illustrated later).
Equation (5) provides an upper bound estimate for the number of counts required.
Whether a more count-efficient phase adjustment algorithm exists, remains an open
question.
Using the estimate given in Eq. (6), one could check if a quantum cryptosystem can
function with software-only phase tracking, or it needs one of the additional measures
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reviewed in Section 2. To do the check, we need to know the fastest phase drift rate in
the interferometer, and the lowest photon counting rate possible in the specified range
of operating conditions in which the system will be used. The operating conditions that
affect phase drift rate will be the environment in which the end equipment is installed
(temperature, humidity, vibration etc.). The operating condition that determines the
photon counting rate will primarily be the line attenuation (currently limited by the
dark count rate of the detectors). Knowing these two rates, one can check how far the
phase can drift during the time required to collect ca. 200 counts. If the phase drifts
away by significantly less than 10° during that time, it can be tracked easily using only
periodic phase adjustment described in this paper; only a fraction of the channel time
would be spent on phase tracking, leaving most of the channel capacity to QKD. If,
however, the phase drifts away by more than 10°, additional hardware measures are
needed to slow down phase drift and/or speed up phase adjustment. This is just a rule
of thumb. If the actual drift rate falls close to this figure, the necessity of hardware
measures would depend on the exact design of the system, tradeoffs and reliability
margins; discussing this gray zone is beyond the scope of this paper.
4. Experiment
We have tested the phase adjustment algorithm on our QKD setup.
A. Experimental setup
The QKD setup uses time- and polarization-multiplexed Mach-Zehnder interferometer
(general scheme first proposed by Townsend et al. in [94]) and BB84 protocol [13].
The optical scheme is shown on Fig. 15.
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Fig. 15. QKD setup.
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100 ps-wide light pulses are emitted by a 1310 nm semiconductor laser at 10 MHz
rate. The arms of the interferometer are made from polarization-maintaining (PM) fiber
(Fujikura PANDA fiber); everything is aligned such that light propagates in the slow-
axis mode of PM fiber. One arm of the interferometer in Alice's setup is ~2 m long
whereas the other arm is ~6 m long; the arms in Bob's setup are also ~6 m and ~2 m
long. The phase modulators are of lithium niobate planar-waveguide type (Alenia
Marconi-made at Alice’s side and Uniphase-made at Bob’s side); they only pass one
polarization. The phase modulators have half-wave voltage of several volts and are
each controlled by a high-speed DAC card. The pulses from the two arms of interfer-
ometer have orthogonal polarization in the line and are also separated by time. Polari-
zation controller restores the polarization state of the pulses after the line so that they
split into two arms properly. Imperfect adjustment of this polarization controller and
small polarization fluctuations in the line should neither affect phase tracking nor
QKD, because if a part of the pulse is split into the wrong arm, the wrongly split part
arrives at the detector outside its detection windows, and because phase tracking is not
sensitive to fluctuations in absolute light level.
Alice’s and Bob’s setups are mounted onto an aluminium plate (Fig. 16) and cov-
ered with thermoisolation. As it turned out, this kind of construction exhibits phase
drift rate of up to 2 rad/min when left at rest in normal indoor conditions (in an optical
lab).
The APD is gated at 20 MHz. This relatively high gating frequency is made possi-
ble by the use of afterpulse blocking technique [95]. Data from the APD is buffered in
a 4 Mbit FIFO memory before it is read into Bob’s PC. We use Soviet-made Ge APD
(standard part number FD312L, developed by NPO Orion), placed inside a liquid
nitrogen tank. The best APD sample we have has  5  10
–5
  dark count probability at
16% quantum efficiency. Given 4.2 dB measured loss in Bob's optical setup,
0.5 dB/km losses in fiber at 1310 nm, acceptable contribution of detector dark counts
Fig. 16. Bob’s interferometer. All components are mounted on a 400x400x6 mm alu-
minium plate, and their fiber pigtails are affixed to the plate surface with pieces of adhe-
sive tape. Everything is covered by custom-cut pieces of foam insulation (not shown on
the photo) and mounted inside a box. Alice’s interferometer is similar.
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to the bit error rate QBERdet of, say, 4%, and mean photon number per pulse at Alice's
output µ=0.2, the APD we have would allow for about 20 km long QKD link.
With the APD we have, the photon counting rate in the system at the longest possi-
ble link length would be no less than 5000 counts per second (at which rate QBERdet
would closely approach 11%). The 200 counts required for a phase adjustment would
be accumulated in at most 40 ms. Given the fastest phase drift rate measured, a drift of
up to 0.08° can occur in this time. Thus, according to the criterion given in the end of
Section. 3, the system is well suited to software-only phase tracking. QBERopt ∆ϕ and
time spent on phase adjustment would not reduce the key generation rate much.
At the time of phase tracking experiment, our system was not ready for demon-
strating QKD (most notably due to poor fringe visibility of about 0.8, which has since
been improved to 0.92, and due to faulty Alice's DAC card). However, this has not
affected the phase tracking algorithm, which we have successfully tested.
B. Results for phase tracking
In our tests, phase adjustment is performed every 3 seconds, which corresponds to
phase drift of up to 6° between adjustments. The data is captured into the FIFO mem-
ory in less than 40ms, but processing them actually takes much longer than that, be-
cause readout from the memory and other operations are slow due to inefficient soft-
ware (mostly written in LabVIEW for the purposes of the experiment). To reduce
readout time, µ has been increased to 0.37 and no transmission line is used (i.e. Alice
connected straight to Bob). This should not affect test results for phase tracking, how-
ever.
In the first test run, we performed both stage 1 and stage 2 phase adjustment each
time, using rough phase compensation ϕ0 from stage 1 as a starting point for stage 2.
Fig. 17 shows typical data collected in stage 1. Statistical noise at such a low average
number of counts yields wildly varying shapes, which are hardly recognizable as
interference curves at the first look. If we collected much more counts on stage 1, we
would indeed see nice sine- and cosine-shaped curves. However, even this noisy data
allows reliable determination of ϕ0 with accuracy of 20–30°, as the upper graph in
Fig. 18 illustrates. ϕ0 is then used as input to stage 2. Results of stage 2 are shown on
the lower graph in Fig. 18. The graph is less noisy and shows that stage 2 works well
with this input data.
In fact, stage 1 is not very important and is treated here in such detail only to study
the whole problem better. In a properly working system, one can always take the phase
compensation from the previous phase adjustment and use it as input to stage 2. This is
what we did on the second test run, illustrated in Fig. 19.
Judging from the width of noise trace on Fig. 19, the goal of “10° or better phase
accuracy most of the time” is achieved. It is not possible to assess statistical fluctua-
tions quantitatively, because in this experiment we do not know the underlying phase
drift with a better accuracy. However, the smoother parts of the curve suggest that the
level of statistical fluctuations is close to what is expected in our phase tracking algo-
rithm. To quantify the error level accurately, we would need to run a control phase
measurement in parallel, which is what our setup is not equipped to do. It would be
also possible to confirm the performance of phase tracking by the results of QKD if
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Fig. 17. Interference curves for “0” and “1” time slots, plotted from data measured in a
single run of stage 1 phase adjustment. The 2π phase range was scanned in 16 steps, and
on average 150 counts were collected on stage 1. Curve with solid points is for “0” time
slot and curve with hollow points is for “1” time slot.
Fig. 18. Voltage on Bob’s phase modulator, scaled to the equivalent phase shift.
A one-hour fragment of phase tracking data from a test run with both stage 1 and
stage 2 phase adjustment performed each time. Phase adjustment is run every 3 seconds;
the average number of counts collected in stage 1 is 150, and in stage 2 – 230.
Vertical hops on the graphs do not represent any phase discontinuity (phase is cyclic
over 2π), but do represent jumps in phase modulator voltage, because we had to stay
within the voltage range of our phase modulators limited to just over ±Vπ. If we ne-
glected jumps in phase modulator voltage and printed cylindrically-shaped graphs for
phase, there would be no hops on them.
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Fig. 19. Voltage on Bob’s phase modulator, scaled to the equivalent phase shift.
A one-hour fragment of phase tracking data from a test run with only stage 2 of the
phase adjustment performed each time. Phase compensation from previous phase ad-
justment is used as input to stage 2. Phase adjustment is run every 3 seconds, and the
average number of counts is 230 for each adjustment.
QBERopt ∆ϕ were a mayor contribution to the total QBER (which is not the case with
our setup: the contribution due to poor fringe visibility would dominate, masking
QBERopt ∆ϕ).
Looking at the graphs, it is easily noted that phase drift in our interferometer is not
entirely random, but mostly occurs with slowly changing rate. This may allow us to further
reduce the number of counts required for phase adjustment, i.e. do better than Eq. (5),
because the phase could be partly predicted by extrapolating recent tracking data.
5. Conclusion
The phase adjustment technique described in this paper tracks phase drift in interfer-
ometers at low light levels, typical for single-photon applications. This gives the de-
signer of a quantum cryptography system new degrees of freedom. Using these results,
one can accurately estimate requirements for successful phase tracking. In most cases,
it is possible to construct interferometers without heavy thermoisolation and without
additional components like fast electrically controlled variable attenuator, at the cost of
some programming. In effect, expensive hardware measures are replaced by software.
We hope that this work will ease the development of advanced and more secure
types of quantum cryptosystems into commercial products.
[ End of included paper ]
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On choice of points for stage 2 of phase tracking algorithm
In the paper we wrote: “To get the best accuracy in a given counting time, we pro-
pose to count photons at the points on the interference curves where they have the
maximum slope-to-statistical-deviation ratio. To the first approximation, these points
are ϕ0+90° and ϕ0−90°.”  Let’s show that this assumption is correct.
The slope of the interference curves for the “0” and “1” detectors (assuming sym-
metrical curves for both detectors) depends on phase ϕ as
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ,ϕ−∝ϕ−=
+ϕ−
ϕ
==+ϕ−
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sin 21
2
sin 21
2cos 21
d
d
S2sin 21
d
d
S
2
1
2
0
e
e
eeee
(7)
where e is a parameter that depends on the fringe visibility and detector dark count
level and shows how far the lowest ponts on the curve are from zero. The parameter e
is chosen to be equivalent to QBER in the case when imperfect fringe visibility and
detector dark counts are the only contributions to QBER (which is nearly always so in
the absence of eavesdropping). Let’s call e the base level. A typical QKD setup will
work at the values of e ranging from less than two percent (at short distances and with
good optical alignment) to around 10% at the distance limit.
The statistical deviations (in approximation of Gaussian distribution) depend on
phase as
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It can be shown that, if we have two channels carrying the same useful signal with
amplitudes S0 and S1 mixed with statistically independent Gaussian noise with root-
mean-square amplitudes D0 and D1 respectively, these two channels can be added
together with weights m/S0 and (1– m)/S1, where
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in order to obtain a single channel with the best signal to noise ratio. Our two interfer-
ence curves present the same situation: they have the slope, which directly translates to
the amplitude of the useful error signal, and different statistical deviations (i.e. noise).
The effective slope-to-statistical-deviation ratio after summing as described above is
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Fig. 20. Effective slope to statistical deviation ratio Seff/D as a function of ϕ (Eq. 10)
plotted for several values of base level e typical for quantum cryptography setups
(e = 0.01 (1%) to e = 0.1 (10%)) as well as for e = 0. Note that the Gaussian approxima-
tion assumed in the derivation may not hold near 0° and 180° for the e = 0 curve.
A: point used for all derivations in the above paper.
Let’s plot Seff/D as a function of ϕ for several values of the base level e (Fig. 20).
We see that for non-zero values of e, the best Seff/D is actually achieved at the chosen
±90° points, so the assumption in the paper is correct.13
                                                     
13 Only Seff/D peaks at ±90°. S0/D0 and S1/D1, i.e., the slope-to-statistical-deviation ratios for
individual interference curves (not plotted), peak at phase points less than ±90° off the mini-
mum of each interference curve; however, their values are always lower than the peak value of
Seff/D.
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Effect of non-zero QBER on required number of counts
In the paper, the assumption of Nmin = 0 was made when deriving Eqs. (3)–(6). In
fact, Nmin > 0, i.e. e = QBER > 0, leads to gentler slope of the interference curves, so
more counts need to be collected in stage 2 to achieve the same phase accuracy. Fig-
ure 20 can be used to estimate the difference. The point marked A corresponds to the
S/D ratio used in the paper. The actual S/D ratio depends on e and is in practice lower
(see where the curves cross the 90° vertical line). To obtain the actual number of
counts required, the right hand side of Eqs. (5) and (6) should be multiplied by the
factor of
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This factor can be as large as 1.56 for systems working around their distance limit (i.e.,
at QBER = 10%). This correction is sufficiently large and must be taken into account.
Using data discarded during sifting for phase tracking
One may notice that the key bits discarded by Alice and Bob on the sifting stage
(i.e. those bits detected by Bob in a basis incompatible with Alice) could be used for
phase tracking. Indeed, these Bob’s detections are at the ±90° points from the extrema
of the interference curves. Perhaps this is what Hughes and coworkers have meant in
Ref. 28. However, this would require Alice to divulge her bit values for these bits to
Bob (and to Eve) over the public channel. One should be very careful to see if such a
disclosure fits well with the general security proof. This remains an open question. If it
can’t be shown that the security proof holds in such a case, then the phase adjustment
must be performed separately from key generation.
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2.4.  Conclusion
In this chapter, the design of an interferometric fiber optic QKD system and results
of QKD experiments have been presented. We have successfully developed and dem-
onstrated an optimal phase tracking technique for the interferometer that works in the
single photon mode and keeps the phase error within ±10° when acquiring approxi-
mately 200 photon counts per cycle of adjustment. The results of QKD demonstration
have been poor, limited by unfixed problems in equipment. QBER values of 4 and
5.7% have been measured in two test runs conducted without a real communication
line.
It is interesting to note that we have seemingly been the first to use PM fiber in a
QKD setup. Later, PM fiber has also been used in Geneva group’s “plug and play”
setup [62, 63].
Regarding phase tracking, several other groups have implemented active phase
tracking in some form [e.g., 57, 55]. We do not know yet if anybody benefits from our
optimal calculation. Anyway, it has been interesting to find a possible fundamental
limit on phase tracking performance. In the future, transmission distances for QKD will
keep getting longer (and the line attenuation higher), so our results would hopefully be
useful some day.
Trying to build a working QKD system from scratch has been an educating experi-
ence. If the author had to do it again, he would set different priorities and obtain pub-
lishable results quicker. However, this part of our research project has stimulated other
directions of research. A single photon detector with afterpulse blocking developed for
the QKD system is described in the next chapter. The focus of our studies has gradu-
ally shifted towards security, where the author thinks we have got our most interesting
results, explored in Chapter 4. 
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3.  Single photon detection
The ability to detect single quanta of light at the wavelength of interest plays a criti-
cal role in quantum communication systems. In QKD, characteristics of detectors
determine such vital parameters as the longest transmission distance and the key gen-
eration rate. QKD requires detectors working in the transmission windows of telecom-
munication fiber (1300 nm and 1550 nm) for long-distance communication, and also in
the 600–850 nm range for detection of entangled photons inside Alice’s setup and for
use in free space communication channels.
We have implemented a gated APD-based SPD for the 1300 nm and 1550 nm
transmission windows. Our detector has been the first to include an afterpulse blocking
technique that allows to increase the gating rate beyond the limitations imposed by the
afterpulsing effect in APDs. The detector and test results are described later in Sections
3.2. and 3.3.  The original contribution by the author is the afterpulse blocking tech-
nique and its implementation, described at the end of the chapter in Section 3.3. 
Although APD-based SPDs remain the most practical and universally used, several
other types of SPDs with superior characteristics have been developed, especially in
the recent years. It is important to keep track of new developments in this area, both
from the perspective of possible improvements in quantum communication and com-
putation experiments resulting from the use of better detectors, and from the perspec-
tive of illustrating possibilities accessible to Eve today. Different types of SPDs are
briefly reviewed below, ending with a comparison table on p. 62, before we present our
APD-based detector.
3.1.  Review of single photon detection techniques
for visible and near IR light
The eye
Like many things man tries to construct, single photon detectors exist in nature:
they have evolved in living beings. For example, rods in dark-adapted retina of verte-
brates function in photon counting mode, each rod producing a current pulse after
absorbing a photon [96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102]. Humans require detection of 5–8
photons in different rods to become consciously aware of a weak flash of light (which
corresponds to ca. 100 photons entering the pupil) [96]. For other animals, such as
toad, this threshold might be lower [98]. Since the response is invoked by discrete
detection events, photon statistics of incident light plays a role, producing a distinct
effect when super-Poissonian light is used in an experiment [102]. The sensitivity of
vision (and how the signals from photoreceptors are processed by the nervous system)
appears to be limited by the dark count level. The dark count level is primarily deter-
mined by the rate of random thermal isomerization, indistinguishible from photoise-
merization, of rhodopsin molecules in rods [98, 99, 100]. The exact inner workings of
the rod are not fully known. Curiously, modern human-made single photon detectors
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for visible light around 500 nm wavelength working at non-cryogenic temperatures
have much higher dark count rates than that of a single rod. A rod produces on average
one dark count per several tens of seconds [99, 101].
No use of animals in QKD setups has been reported. There are at least eleven dif-
ferent types of artificial devices that allow us to do single photon counting.
Geiger-Müller counter
The first single photon detector sensitive to visible light was probably the one de-
veloped by G.L. Locher in 1932 [103]. It employed a Geiger-Müller gas-filled tube
with photosensitive cathode coated with an alkali or alkaline earth metal (several
metals were tried: Na, K, Cs, Sr). The Geiger-Müller tube was connected to a three-
stage vacuum tube amplifier followed by an oscilloscope, a loudspeaker, or a mechani-
cal counter. The latter consisted of a modified wrist watch; such was the state of the art
of automatic digital counting at that time. The use of photosensitive Geiger-Müller
counters continued into the following decades, in scintillation counters [104].
Photomultiplier
The first photomultiplier tubes (PMTs) were constructed in 1935–1936 [105, 106].
Although their first application (sound pickup in movie projection) did not imply
single photon resolution, eventually PMTs became used in the photon counting mode.
Modern PMTs are employed today in many scientific applications, especially in those
that require very large photosensitive areas.
Wavelength sensitivity of PMTs, just as that of Geiger-Müller counters, is deter-
mined by the coating of photocathode. Many decent materials are available for visible
light and UV-sensitive photocathodes. However, near IR sensitivity is not easily attain-
able. Hamamatsu has developed InP/InGaAs(P) photocathodes that have about 1%
quantum efficiency up to 1600 nm and a smaller efficiency up to 1700 nm. R5509-73
PMT using this photocathode with a sensitive area of 24 mm2 is available [107].
A version of PMT called hybrid photodetector (HPD) exists in which the series of
dynodes is replaced with an avalanche diode [106]. A photogenerated electron is acceler-
ated by a large voltage (> 4 kV) towards the surface of a semiconductor avalanche diode
mounted inside the vacuum tube. The initial amplification by a factor of >1000 due to
bombardment by a high-energy electron is followed by ca.  50 avalanche multiplica-
tion. HPD has a lower multiplication noise than PMT and is able to distinguish between
one- and two-photon detection events most of the time, albeit with a significant error
probability. (VLPC/SSPM devices described later in this review have yet lower multipli-
cation noise and are able to resolve the photon number more reliably than HPD.)
Avalanche photodiode
APD is a solid-state counterpart of PMT and Geiger-Müller tube. In the APD, a
photon is absorbed in the bulk of a semiconductor, where it generates an electron-hole
pair. If a sufficiently high electric field is present, carriers would be accelerated to
speeds where they can generate more electron-hole pairs through impact ionization,
resulting in avalanche multiplication. In semiconductor, both elecrons and holes cause
ionization, though the ionization coefficients for electrons and holes would generally
be different, depending on the material. Depending on the structure of the diode (one
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Fig. 21. Schematic cross-section of Si APD with reach-through structure developed by
McIntyre and Webb in 1970s (reprinted from [108]).
example structure is shown in Fig. 21), the initial electron-hole pair can be photogener-
ated in the high-field multiplication region where it causes an avalanche immediately,
or the pair can be photogenerated in another region (called an absorption layer) but
either electron or hole subsequently drifts or diffuses into the multiplication region.
Initial studies of the APD behavior and theory of avalanche multiplication (includ-
ing detection of single photons) were done in the 1960s–70s [109, 110, 111]. For a
review of single photon detection using APDs, see Ref. 108 (and for an older review,
also [112]).
The multiplication gain M the APD achieves strongly depends on the reverse bias
voltage applied to the diode. Depending on the structure and thickness of the depletion
zone, APDs operate at bias voltages ranging from 10 to 500 V [113].
The APD can be operated with a finite gain M at a bias voltage set below the break-
down voltage VB, or it can be operated in a so-called Geiger mode when the bias
voltage exceeds VB (Fig. 22). In the finite gain mode (point A in the figure) photogen-
erated carriers are multiplied on average M times, resulting in a larger photocurrent
than without multiplication. The APD can be used in a conventional photoreceiver in
this mode, e.g., in telecommunication applications. In principle, the finite gain mode
can also be used for single photon detection if a sufficiently low-noise amplifier and
sensitive comparator are connected to the APD [111]. However, constructing a low-
noise electronics and making a good single photon detector in this mode of operation
is, in practice, difficult [114, 115, 116]. Instead, Geiger mode is almost universally
used for photon counting. If the APD is biased above VB and no current flows through
it (point B in Fig. 22), a single carrier can trigger a self-sustaining avalanche that
quickly leads to a macroscopic current, in the milliampere range (point C in the figure),
which can be easily registered by the electronics. To quench the avalanche, an external
circuit lowers the bias voltage at the APD, then raises it back to the operating point (i.e.
point B) so that the APD is ready to detect another photon.
The rise of the avalanche and its quenching are both statistical processes. The pho-
togenerated carrier may fail to generate more carriers before leaving the junction. The
avalanche that has started can quench before reaching the self-sustaining state, due to
statistical fluctuations in the number of carriers present in the junction at any given
instant (the probability of spontaneous quenching is significant for current less than
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Fig. 22. Regions of APD operation (at low intensity of incident light) in the reverse I–V
characteristics of a p–n junction.
ca. 100 µA). Similarly, when the bias voltage is being lowered slowly in order to
quench a self-sustaining avalanche, the avalanche would quench at a random time
before the voltage is lowered to VB.
The quantum detection efficiency (QE) of an APD-based SPD is a product of two
factors: the probability of the photon being absorbed in the active volume of the APD,
and the probability of the photogenerated carriers to initiate an avalanche that gets
successfully registered by an external circuit. These two factors are largely independ-
ent. The photon absorption probability depends on the photon wavelength and on the
APD construction. The avalanche initiation probability increases with the excess
voltage VE, which is defined as the difference between the bias voltage and VB.
There are three main methods of quenching the avalanche in Geiger mode [113].
• Passive quenching. In this method, the APD is biased through a large resistor
(typically hundreds of kiloohms). During the avalanche, the capacity of the APD
and the stray capacitance (combined, they can be as low as a few picofarads) are
quickly discharged, and the voltage at the APD drops to the point when the ava-
lanche quenches. Then, the capacitance is slowly recharged through the bias re-
sistor, and the voltage is restored.
• Active quenching. In this method, the onset of the avalanche is sensed by an
external circuit that lowers the bias voltage at the APD below VB via an active
feedback loop. After a certain hold-off time, the bias voltage is quickly restored
by the same active circuit.
• Gated mode of operation. If the expected time of arrival of a photon is well
known, the bias voltage can be raised above VB shortly before this time, and
lowered shortly after. The rest of the time it is kept below VB (Fig. 23). If an
avalanche is triggered during the gating pulse, it can be registered by an external
circuit, and is quickly quenched when the gating pulse ends.
There is some probability that an avalanche starts without photon absorption. These
events are called dark counts. In QKD, dark counts contribute directly to the QBER,
–VAPD
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Fig. 23. Voltage at the APD in the gated mode of operation. The expected time of pho-
ton arrival is periodic in the depicted case.
limiting the maximum tolerable attenuation in the transmission channel and thus the
maximum transmission distance of today’s QKD systems (i.e. the distance at which
QBER is still lower than 11%, allowing for extraction of a secure key). The three main
effects that cause dark counts are the following [110, 108].
• Thermal generation of carriers through generation-recombination (GR) centers,
i.e., local levels with mid-gap energy. This effect can be strongly reduced by
lowering temperature, and by improving the semiconductor technology to reduce
the density of GR centers.
• Band-to-band tunneling under strong electric field. This effect does not
strongly depend on the temperature. Although in properly constructed APDs
the tunneling probability is small, it sets the ultimate limit on the dark count
rate.
• Emission of minority carriers trapped in deep trap levels, i.e., energy levels
between mid-gap and band edge. The carriers get trapped in these levels during
the avalanche and are subsequently randomly released. The density of trap levels
can be reduced by improving the semiconductor technology. The population of
trap levels does not come close to saturation under normal operating conditions
in Geiger mode. Thus, the number of trapped carriers increases linearly with the
total charge that flows through the junction during the avalanche. The lifetimes
of the traps increase as the temperature is lowered. Dark counts caused by re-
lease of trapped carriers are called afterpulses. Afterpulsing is a major problem
limiting the photon counting rate in many applications; more on this in Sec-
tion 3.3. 
The choice of semiconductor material determines the wavelength sensitivity (re-
lated to the bandgap of the material), dark count rate and other properties of the APD.
APDs employed for photon counting have so far been made of three different semi-
conductor materials: Si, Ge, and a heterostructure made of InGaAs/InP.
VB
t
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• Silicon. Si APDs are sensitive to light in the wavelength range from at least
400 nm through 1100 nm. Sensitivity at the edges of this range depends on op-
timizations in the APD construction: at shorter wavelengths photons tend to be
quickly absorbed in a shallow surface layer, while at longer wavelengths the ab-
sorption coefficient in Si is low and a deep collection zone is required. Silicon
APDs have very good characteristics: dark count rate of several tens of counts
per second, QE routinely exceeding 65% in the middle of their wavelength range
(76% demonstrated at 702 nm [117]), counting rate of several MHz, low level of
afterpulses. Specially designed devices can achieve photon timing resolution, or
jitter, of as low as 27 ps FWHM [108]. All methods of quenching the avalanche
can be used with Si APDs. Single photon counting modules based on diodes spe-
cifically designed for photon counting are commercially available [118, 114].
Si APDs have low dark count rate and low level of afterpulses because the sili-
con technology is highly refined, unlike that of other semiconductor materials.
Unlike Si APDs, all existing commercial models of the two other types of APDs
listed below have primarily been designed for finite gain mode. They are
adopted for photon counting applications with varying success.
• Germanium. Wavelength sensitivity of Ge APDs [112, 119, 120] cooled to liq-
uid nitrogen temperature (77 K) extends to 1.4 µm. Cooling to this temperature
is required to lower the dark count rate, which is several orders of magnitude
greater than in Si APDs. Afterpulsing probability is also higher than in Si. How-
ever, both passive quenching and gated mode of operation are possible.
In order to further reduce tha dark count rate, Ge and InGaAs/InP APDs are
most often operated at a lower VE than Si devices, yielding QE in the 10 to 20%
range.
• InGaAs/InP heterostructure. In this type of APDs [121, 122, 123, 124, 125,
126, 127, 128, 129], photons are absorbed in a narrower bandgap InGaAs layer
while the avalanche multiplication of photogenerated carriers takes place in an
InP layer. The heterostructure is used because InGaAs is a material poorly suited
for avalanche multiplication: tunneling breakdown may occur at the field inten-
sity required for ionization. Also, the ionization coefficients for electrons and
holes in InGaAs are comparable, which in the finite gain mode would lead to a
higher noise level. The cut-off wavelength of InGaAs shortens as the tempera-
ture is lowered: the device loses sensitivity to 1.55 µm photons around –100°C.
This is a temperature that can be reached with a multistage thermoelectric
cooler. Afterpulsing is a severe problem in this type of APDs, especially at lower
temperatures when trap lifetimes soar. Only active quenching and gated mode of
operation are used with these APDs. In a given application, there will be an op-
timum temperature somewhere in the –100 to –20°C range at which the dark
counts due to thermal generation and those due to afterpulsing, when combined,
give the lowest overall dark count rate in the application. Commercial single
photon counting modules based on InGaAs/InP APDs are available [130]. Re-
search on diodes specifically designed for Geiger mode has begun [131].
The reader will find a description of the APD-based SPD we have constrcted, as
well as further treatment of engineering issues, in Sections 3.2. and 3.3. 
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Solid state photomultiplier, visible light photon counter
The last two detector types utilizing avalanche multiplication are solid state photo-
multiplier (SSPM) [132] and visible light photon counter (VLPC) [133]. They use
impurity-band ionization in arsenic-dopes silicon, as opposed to the valence to con-
duction band ionization in APDs. Much lower electric field is required for ionization of
As impurity-band levels, which lay 54 meV below the conduction band of Si. To
prevent thermal excitation of dopant atom’s electrons to the conduction band, the
device must be cooled below 7 K.
SSPM and VLPC are closely related devices sharing the avalanche mechanism and
fabrication technology. They differ only in the order in which the absorption and multi-
plication layers are stacked. Here we only consider the structure of the VLPC (Fig. 24).
A photon absorbed in the intrinsic region (undoped Si) generates an electron-hole pair.
The hole drifts to the gain region (As-doped Si), where it excites multiple electrons from
the impurity levels to the conduction band. These electrons are accelerated by the field
and cause more ionizations, creating an avalanche. The holes in the impurity state have
much lower mobility and do not acquire enough energy to cause ionizations; they slowly
drift by hopping between dopant atoms, and leave the device well after the avalanche.
The avalanche in the gain region is restricted to a small area of the detector and is
self-limiting, because the electric field in the avalanche area is lowered below the
ionization threshold by the space charge formed by the holes in the impurity state. The
amount of charge flowing through the device per avalanche is on the order of 3·104
electrons (exact value depends on the temperature and bias voltage), and has a small
statistical uncertainty for any given operating conditions. Due to the self-limiting
mechanism, the multiplication noise is record low, with the excess noise factor meas-
ured to be 1.015–1.03 [134, 133]. Each avalanche is localised to an area several mi-
crometers in size, while the total photosensitive area can be 1 mm in diameter. Simul-
taneous absorption of several photons in different points within the photosensitive area
leads to independent avalanches. The total output charge of the device is approximately
proportional to the number of photons absorbed. One- and two-photon events can be
reliably distinguished [135, 133].
Rather high QE values in excess of 88% at 694 nm have been achieved with VLPCs
[136]. On the other hand, SSPMs have been shown to be sensitive to photons through-
out a wide wavelength range 0.4–28 µm [132].
Fig. 24. Schematic structure of the VLPC detector (reprinted from [133]).
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Superconducting detectors
The next three types of SPDs utilize weird effects in low temperature supercon-
ductors to achieve each some combination of unique parameters not available in other
detector constructions. All three types of superconducting detectors can have extremely
low dark count rate and flat wavelength sensitivity extending far down into IR. In
addition, two of the three types allow energy resolution (translating into the ability to
resolve either photon number at a fixed wavelength, or wavelength of a single photon)
combined with QE that can approach 100% when proper optical coupling is provided
(a resonant cavity structure around the sensitive element). The third type does not have
these qualities, but instead has a very fast sub-nanosecond response with no hold-off
time and no afterpulsing. The drawback of superconducting detectors, making them
impractical for many applications, is the need to cool them down to a fraction of kelvin
(fisrt two types) or just to the liquid helium temperature (third type). However, closed
cycle coolers for sub-kelvin temperatures are commercially available [137].
The energy of a near IR photon is orders of magnitude larger than the bandgap 2∆ of
a superconductor. A photon absorbed in a superconducting material breaks a large num-
ber of Cooper pairs into quasiparticles (i.e. unpaired electrons); this can be considered as
the initial amplification mechanism in all three types of superconducting detectors.
Superconducting tunnel junction (Josephson junction) detector
Superconducting tunnel junction (STJ) single photon detector consists of a thin in-
sulating barrier between two layers of aluminium, which in order are sandwiched
between layers of niobium or tantalum (Fig. 25) [138, 139]. The device is cooled far
below the critical temperature Tc of both materials. A photon absorbed in an outer layer
creates a large number of quasiparticles. The quasiparticles are quickly collected and
trapped in the Al layers, which have a lower bandgap than the outer layers. A magnetic
field is applied parallel to the barrier to suppress tunneling of Cooper pairs. When a
bias voltage Vb < 2∆ /e, where e is the charge of electron, is applied to the device, the
only tunneling process that can take place is transfer of a charge carrier across the
barrier. A single quasiparticle typically crosses the barrier many times in both direc-
tions before dissipating (the mean number of crossings before dissipating depends on
the geometry and size of the device [139]), providing further amplification of the
number of electrons flowing through the detector per photon absorbed. The total
charge transferred per photon is proportional to the photon energy and has a rather
small statistical uncertainty, making the device photon number resolving at the near IR
or shorter wavelengths. The lifetime of quasiparticles ranges from microseconds to tens
of microseconds, defining the duration of the output current (which has the shape of a
fast rising and slowly exponentially decaying pulse) and limiting the counting rate.
Detectors based on this physical principle provide sensitivity from X-ray [140]
(having been used for X-ray spectroscopy for decades) to as far into infrared as 500 µm
[141] (not yet single photon resolving in that wavelength range
14
). A small array of
STJs has been fabricated and used for visible light astronomical observation [143],
providing energy and time resolution in addition to the pixel position X, Y in the array.
                                                     
14 Single photon resolution in the submillimeter wavelength range has been achieved with
another type of detector based on a single-electron transistor made of two quantum dots [142].
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Fig. 25. A diagram of a 2020 µm STJ device (not to scale). It was fabricated from a
‘sandwich’ of Nb/Al/Al2O3/Al/Nb deposited on polished sapphire. The base and top
niobium films have a thickness of 100 nm; both the aluminium films are 120 nm thick;
the aluminium oxide barrier has a thickness of ~1 nm (reprinted from [138]).
We think that this type of detector should have no intrinsic limitations of QE at the
visible and near IR wavelengths. All photons absorbed within the device are registered.
In theory, it should be possible to achieve absorption efficiency closely approaching
100% at a chosen wavelength with a suitable light coupling to the detector.
Transition edge sensor
Transition edge sensor (TES) microcalorimeter consists of a piece of wolfram film
(Fig. 26) [144, 145, 146]. The sensor is cooled below 100 mK, which is lower than Tc
of the W film. The film, however, is kept at the superconducting to normal transition
by Joule heating provided by the current from a biasing circuit (Fig. 27). The biasing is
stable due to the negative feedback: an increase in the sensor temperature and thus an
increase in its resistance causes a decrease in Joule heating. In operation, a photon is
absorbed in the W producing a photoelectron which heats the W electron system, raises
its resistance and causes a drop in the current. The integral of the drop in the current
multiplied by the bias voltage gives, with no free parameters, the energy absorbed by
the W. The current pulse is read by a SQUID array followed by a room-temperature
amplifier (Fig. 27). The pulse shape has a fast rise followed by an exponential decay;
the decay time constant is tens of microseconds, limiting the counting rate. TESes
generally have slightly better energy resolution than STJs.
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Fig. 26. Photograph of a TES with 1818 µm W sensor and Al voltage rails. The thick-
ness of the W film deposited on a Si substrate is 40 nm (reprinted from [144]).
               
Fig. 27. Schematic of a TES device biasing and readout. The voltage bias for the device
is provided by a room-temperature current source (Ibias) and a 100 µOhm shunt resistor
(Rb) at 4 K. The device signal Isense is amplified by a 100-element array of dc-SQUID
amplifiers and processed with room-temperature pulseshaping electronics (reprinted
from [145]).
Just like the previous detector, TES has no intrinsic limitations of QE. With a suit-
able optical construction, efficiency close to 100% at a chosen wavelength can be
achieved. QE of 88% at 1550 nm has been demonstrated with an optical cavity inte-
grated into the detector [147].
Superconducting single photon detector
Superconducting single photon detector (SSPD) consists of a thin superconducting
stripe biased in such a way that a current I slightly lower than the critical current Ic is
flowing through the stripe (Fig. 28) [148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155]. When a
photon is absorbed within the stripe (Fig. 29a), it quickly creates a non-
superconducting hot spot (b). The current I is forced to flow through a smaller cross-
section of the stripe around the hot spot. The current density now exceeds the critical
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Fig. 28. A scanning electron microscope image of a 108 µm2, 10 nm thick meander-
type SSPD, NbN superconducting stripe on a sapphire substrate. The stripe width is
~130 nm and the filling factor f = 0.2 (reprinted from [151]). This filling factor is due to
a particular technology used for fabricating the depicted sample, and is not the highest
achievable: f ~0.5 is possible with other technologies.
Fig. 29. Schematics of the hotspot-generated and supercurrent-assisted formation of a
resistive barrier in an ultrathin and submicrometer-width superconducting stripe, kept at
a temperature far below Tc. The arrows indicate the flow direction of a supercurrent bi-
asing the stripe (reprinted from [151]).
current density, phase slip centers appear (c) and a normal-conductivity bridge is
formed across the stripe (d). After a few picoseconds, the hotspot disappears because
the electrons in it have cooled through electron-phonon scattering, and superconduc-
tivity is restored to the original state (with no effects remaining in the detector). The
temporary formation of a non-superconducting bridge leads to a voltage pulse registra-
ble by electronics, e.g., as a 30 ps long 200 mV peak-to-peak amplitude pulse obtained
after a 40 dB amplifier [150]. This detector is fast, allowing counting rates in excess of
a gigahertz. The biasing scheme required for the fast self-resetting operation described
62
Table 2. Selected examples of performance of different single photon detector types.
Remarkable values of parameters are printed in bold.
Detector
Mechanism of
initial amplifi-
cation
Tem-
pera-
ture, K
λ, nm
Coun-
ting
rate,
Hz
a
QE, %
Jitter,
ps
Dark
count
rate,
s
–1
Energy or
photon
number
resolving?
b
Geiger-Müller
counter [103]
Avalanche
ionization in gas
room up to
750
100 N/A N/A 0.1 No
PMT: Multiplication of
electrons via
secondary
emission on a
series of dynodes
No
Hamamatsu
R5509-73 [107]
193 up to
1700
107 < 1 1500 1.6·105
APD: Avalanche
ionization of
valence band in
semiconductor
No
Si, Perkin-
Elmer SPCM-
AQR [118]
room
(Peltier
cooled)
700 5·106 65 350?
[108]
25
Si, planar
epitaxial
device [108]
500 40 27
Ge FD312L –
our SPD, see
Sect. 3.2. , 3.3. 
77 1310 (gated
at
2·10
7)
7 (5·10–5
per
gate)
InGaAs/InP
[30, 164, 165]
165 1550 (gated
at 106)
10 (2·10–7
per
gate)
InGaAs/InP,
id Quantique
id200 [130]
N/A
(Peltier
cooled)
900–
1700
(gated
at up to
4·106)
> 10
at 1.3,
1.55 µm
580 (< 5·10–5
ns–1)
VLPC [136] Avalanche
ionization of
shallow impurity
band in Si
6.9 694 ~106 88.2±5 N/A 2·10
4 Photon
number
STJ Single photon
creates many
free electrons in
superconductor;
each electron
crosses the
tunnel junction
multiple times
~ 0.3 ~105 ~ 0
c Energy or
photon
number
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( table continued )
Detector
Mechanism of
initial amplifi-
cation
Tem-
pera-
ture, K
λ, nm
Coun-
ting
rate,
Hz
a
QE, %
Jitter,
ps
Dark
count
rate,
s
–1
Energy or
photon
number
resolving?
b
TES: Temperature
sensitivity of
resistance at
superconducting
transition
~ 0
c Energy or
photon
number
[147, 146] < 0.1 1550 ~105 88.6
±0.4
N/A N/A
[33] 1550 ~105 65 90 ns 10
SSPD: Disruption of
near-critical
current in a small
hotspot in a thin
stripe spreads to
the whole stripe
cross-section
< 10 > 109 18
[150]
10–3 to
107
[152,
155]
d
No
[153] 1.8 1550 57 41 N/A
Wavelength
converter + Si
APD [157]
room
(heated)
1560
into
710
5·106? 46 350? 8·105 No
a
 Due to statistical nature of photon counting, and different saturation mechanisms in different
types of SPDs, the listed counting rate is a very rough estimate.
b
 Photon number resolving means being able to reliably distinguish at least between “one”,
“two”, and “three or more” photons absorbed simultaneously at the detector. Photon number
resolution in energy resolving detectors listed in the table is implemented when the incoming
radiation is narrowband, via dividing the total measured absorbed energy by the energy of a
single photon at the working wavelength. When a detector is not photon number resolving, it
distinguishes between the “no photon” and “one or more photons” events. It should be noted
that a photon number resolving detector unit could in principle be made with a 1-to-N beam-
splitter and multiple non-photon-number-resolving detectors, or with an equivalent approach
using time multiplexing [163].
c
 Dark counts in STJs and TESs are caused by blackbody radiation entering the detector. When
no cold filters on a fiber input are used, the dark count rate is ~102 Hz. However, it is estimated
that a bandpass filter for 1550 nm with 40 dB out-of-band suppression would reduce the dark
count rate to below 0.1 Hz [166].
d
 The dark count rate for a SSPD varies greatly depending on how close the operating current I
is to the critical current Ic of the stripe. Lower dark count rates can be achieved at a sacrifice
in QE.
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above [149] seems to prevent formation of more than one non-superconducting bridge
at a time; thus the detector is not photon number resolving. The theoretical model [148]
predicts a weak dependence of the integral of the voltage pulse on the photon energy;
however, energy resolution is yet to be experimentally demonstrated.
There has been a rapid progress in development of SSPDs. Just five years after the
first experimental demonstration of the hotspot-triggered, supercurrent-assisted forma-
tion of a resistive barrier across the superconducting stripe [149], a small series of
devices with an integrated optical cavity has been fabricated, showing a QE reliably
exceeding 40% at 1550 nm [153].
Wavelength conversion
While not a detection method in itself, the ability to change the wavelength of in-
coming photon towards a shorter one can be very useful. In general, detectors for
shorter wavelengths (e.g., Si APDs) have much better parameters than the existing
detectors of comparable complexity for near IR. One could change wavelength of the
photon and use a cheaper, smaller detector. It turns out, efficient wavelength conver-
sion for weak light (up to 100% efficient in theory) is possible via sum frequency
generation in nonlinear media. Although this technique is not new [156], efficient
conversion has been demonstrated experimentally in the last two years in fiber-coupled
periodically poled lithium niobate waveguides [157, 158, 159, 160] and in bulk peri-
odically poled lithium niobate [161]. Moreover, the process of nonlinear conversion is
noise-free and preserves the quantum state of the photon [162, 160], which opens up
for interesting possibilities in constructing quantum communication setups.
The present generation of wavelength converters is plagued by rather high intensity
of parasitic output light at the same wavelength as the converted photon. This makes
them, when used together with Si APDs, barely comparable in dark count level to
InGaAs/InP APDs used directly. Hopefully the origins of this problem would be
tracked down and dealt with in the coming years. If this problem is solved, we’d have a
very good detector for telecom wavelengths without the burden of cryogenic cooling.
Summary
Performance of selected SPDs of different types is summarized in Table 2. Only the
types of detectors that might be practically useful today for visible and near IR photon
counting have been reviewed. There are a few more detector types in development
using other physical principles. For instance, two more types of detectors have been
demonstrated, both operating at cryogenic temperatures. One detector is based on the
thermoelectric effect [167, 168]. Another one is based on dependence of the channel
conductivity in a field effect transistor on the exact number of electrons trapped in a
layer of quantum dots placed between the channel and the gate [169].
While APDs and PMTs are most widely used, other types of detectors show prom-
ise and may in the future be employed in a number of more demanding applications
and experiments (this process has already begun [33, 143]). For us, it is satisfying to
see that Eve can not only have perfect detectors in principle, but, at a large cost, can
manufacture close-to-perfect detector units for her eavesdropping activity today (see
Chapter 4).
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3.2.  Single photon detector based on avalanche
photodiode
In our QKD system, the expected time of photon arrival is well known and periodic.
In such a case, the gated mode of operation is the best choice. With a sufficiently short
gate, it minimizes the dark count rate and the amount of charge flowing through the
APD (thus reducing afterpulsing).
The use of a short gate pulse presents a peculiar problem: the rising and falling
edges of the gate pulse result in spikes of current of opposite polarity flowing through
the APD capacitance. These spikes are present in all gates, with and without avalanche,
and are of a magnitude comparable to the avalanche current. The detection circuit has
to distinguish between an avalanche and these current spikes. There are several possi-
ble solutions to this problem. It is possible to use a longer gate pulse with a sufficiently
high VE that induces a large avalanche current, and set the threshold in the detection
circuit above the spikes. However, this results in substantially increased afterpulse and
dark count probabilities [165, 170]. The most common solution is to cancel the spikes
with a counterphase arm that includes a trimming capacitor adjusted to match the
capacitance of the APD [171, 172]. Another solution for cancelling the spikes in a
gated detector employs an H-shaped network of transmission lines where the pulses of
opposite polarity reflected from the ends of the lines cancel each other [173, 174].
Alternatively, if a gated detector for QKD has two APDs, they can be connected in a
single detection circuit [30] such that, in the absence of avalanche, currents through the
APDs approximately cancel each other; in the presence of avalanche in one of the
APDs, the polarity of the output signal shows which of them has had the avalanche;
however, this circuit has the drawback of missing the events when both APDs have had
an avalanche simultaneously. In another approach, the spikes are not cancelled but a
voltage discriminator that senses the peak amplitude of the discharge (i.e., second)
spike is employed [170, 175], in fact creating a detector that senses an order of magni-
tude smaller avalanche charge flows than would be possible by a straightforward
approach. This detector, together with an afterpulse discarding technique (mentioned in
the next section), allows 10 MHz gate pulse rate in a QKD system, achieving a pro-
jected 30 Kbit/s secure key generation rate over 10 km of fiber at 1550 nm [175]. In
other approach, the current flowing through the APD is integrated, after which an
amplitude discriminator detects avalanches with a good sensitivity [176]; it is used to
select only the longest avalanche pulses for a given gate width, filtering out most of the
dark counts.
Our detector scheme implemented by Torbjørn Nesheim [177] has a design that
fully cancels the spikes. It employs a differential amplifier with two arms connected to
its inputs (Fig. 30). One arm connects to the APD submerged into liquid nitrogen in a
dewar flask. The compenating arm of exactly the same length contains a ~1 pF trim-
ming capacitor rigged from two short pieces of insulated wire intertwined together.
The length of the compensating arm is adjusted, by cutting and re-soldering, to match
that of the APD arm, and the trimming capacitor is adjusted, by winding and unwind-
ing the wires, to match the capacitance of the APD under the operating bias (the APD
capacitance drops slightly as the bias voltage is increased). The adjustment is done
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Fig. 30. Single photon detector with a balancing circuit to compensate for the APD ca-
pacitance. All cables are 50 Ohm terminated (termination resistors are not shown).
while observing the output signal of the differential amplifier. When properly adjusted,
the current spikes from the gate pulse fully cancel; only avalanche pulses are present at
the output of the differential amplifier. The gate pulse generator (Avtech AVM-3-C)
provides 2 ns wide gate pulses with 100 ps rise time and 600 ps fall time at the repeti-
tion rate of 20 MHz or less; the desired peak-to-peak amplitude of the gate pulse at the
APD is set by adding radio frequency (RF) attenuators at the output of the generator.
The differential amplifier has a bandwidth of ~1 GHz.
We have tested several APDs in this scheme: one InGaAs/InP Fujitsu FPD5W1KS,
several samples of Ge Soviet/Russian-made FD312L, FD312, FD322. Out of the tested
APDs, only two samples of FD312L had a sufficiently low dark count rate to be of use
in a QKD system. Just as other groups, we have found that the best (i.e. lowest) dark
count probability to QE ratio for APDs tends to be achieved at lower values of VE and
QE [123, 124, 127, 128, 69]. We planned to do QKD experiments at the largest toler-
able attenuation of the communication line, which could be made larger if this ratio is
low. We therefore set VE at roughly the lowest value at which avalanche pulses could
still be reliably registered by a counter, in practice limited by the level of electrical
noise at the output of the differential amplifier. In such operating conditions, the best
sample of FD312L had the dark count probability of 5·10–5 per gate and 16% QE,
measured with 1310 nm attenuated laser pulses.
APD inside cryostat C = CAPD
Differential
amplifier
50 Ohm
coaxial cables
Gate pulse
generator Bias
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3.3.  Afterpulse blocking
Trapping charge carriers at the trap levels during the avalanche and their subsequent
release is a major problem in many photon counting applications. The carriers are
released for some time following the avalanche, and can cause dark counts called
afterpulses. It has been experimentally determined that there are several (three to four)
trap levels with different lifetimes varying from tens of nanoseconds to tens of micro-
seconds [178, 128]. The severity of the afterpulsing effect depends on the semicon-
ductor material and technology of the APD. Ge and especially InGaAs/InP APDs have
much higher densities of trap levels than Si APDs. Afterpulsing also depends on the
operating mode of the APD in the SPD. Most of the research groups who construct
SPDs (including our group) do not have direct control over the technology: they have
to use APDs made by commercial manufacturers. However, a proper operating mode
and SPD electronics in a particular photon counting application often allow to mitigate
the afterpulsing effect to a significant degree. Afterpulsing can be reduced by the
following measures.
• Reduction of charge flowing through the junction during the avalanche. This
can be accomplished by speedier quenching and more sensitive electronics that
can sense pulses of lower amplitude (occurring at lower VE). The fastest
quenching is achieved in the gated mode with narrow gate pulses.
• Introduction of a hold-off time after each avalanche during which the voltage at
the APD is kept belov VB, so that most of the trapped carriers are released during
this time and dissipate without causing afterpulses. The APD is insensitive to
photons during the hold-off time. In the gated mode, the hold-off time is the recip-
rocal of the gating rate. When Ge and InGaAs/InP APDs are used in QKD sys-
tems, the gating rate is usually restricted to 0.1–1 MHz because of afterpulsing.
• Additional time selection of avalanches in the gated mode. While not pre-
venting afterpulses from happening, it does not count those of them whose onset
falls outside a set time window. However, this measure becomes unnecessary
with sufficiently short gate pulses whose width approaches the jitter of the SPD
or is matched to the width of the incoming light pulse, whichever is narrower.
• Selecting the temperature of the APD. Lowering the temperature reduces the
dark count probability, but tends to increase the lifetime of the trap levels. In a
QKD system, for any combination of the gating rate and other parameters there
is an optimal temperature of the APD at which the highest key generation rate is
achieved [179].
• Afterpulse discarding in gated mode (a technique introduced after we imple-
mented afterpulse blocking described in the following paragraphs). In this tech-
nique, post-selection of detector data is performed, and all detection events pre-
ceded by a detection event no farther that a set number N of time slots away are
discarded [85, 180, 175]. While not preventing afterpulses from happening, it ef-
fectively filters them out within the hold-off time (N +1) /(gating rate).
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Fig. 31. Principle of afterpulse blocking.
Fig. 32. Hardware implementation of afterpulse blocking. Grayed out parts are those in-
herited from the SPD without afterpulse blocking (Fig. 30); parts drawn in black lines
form the afterpulse blocking circuitry.
In our QKD system, we wanted to use a gating rate of 20 MHz, which was more
than an order of magnitude higher than afterpulsing would allow in a standard gated
mode. To make this rate possible, we introduced a hold-off time, for which a discrete
number of gating pulses after a registered avalanche is blocked from passing to the
APD, eventually calling this technique afterpulse blocking 15 (Fig. 31). It prevents
                                                     
15 The term was coined by Jason M. Smith.
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afterpulses from happening, and thus compares favorably with afterpulse discarding,
especially at higher gate rates. In a typical QKD system, the probability of photon
detection per gating pulse is low, typically one detected photon per several hundred
gate pulses. If a few tens of gate pulses are blocked after each photon detection (as we
have estimated would be necessary at our gating rate), this is not going to reduce the
overall detection probability per gate considerably. Thus, the key generation rate in the
QKD system is allowed to grow almost linearly with the gating rate.
The hardware implementation of afterpulse blocking (Fig. 32) consists of a switch
(MAX4544 CMOS analog switch) placed between the pulse generator and the APD, a
trigger and a counter (assembled from 74AC series high-speed CMOS ICs). N is setta-
ble via a set of manual switches to any number in the range 2–2050, or 0 (no blocking)
[95]. The addition of the analog switch spoiled the shape of the gating pulse, making it
close to triangular with FWHM of about 2 ns. In result, QE dropped in half at the same
dark count probability as before. If we used a proper RF pulse switching technique
instead of the CMOS switch, this detrimental effect would be absent or reduced.
Results of a test of our SPD with afterpulse blocking are shown in Fig. 33. The
APD was gated at 12 MHz and the number of gate pulses blocked after each avalanche
was varied from 0 (i.e., blocking switched off) to 2050. Both the dark count probability
and the count probability when the APD was illuminated at 0.005 photons per pulse
were measured. The count probabilities were calculated per gate pulse before the
afterpulse blocking circuitry. The illumination level of 0.005 photons per pulse was
chosen because it was of the order of magnitude typically found in a QKD system. We
can see from the chart that when no afterpulse blocking is employed at 12 MHz gating
rate, for every photon count or for every dark count not caused by trapped carriers
there are as many as four afterpulsing counts. However, when we start blocking a few
pulses after each detected avalanche, the count probability quickly drops down to a
steady value. The further smooth drop off in the photon count probability (Fig. 33,
lower chart) is caused by the increasing fraction of time the SPD is insensitive to light
when a larger number of gate pulses is blocked. From this test, we can deduce that
blocking approximately 30 pulses (or perhaps slightly more at 20 MHz) is sufficient to
reduce afterpulsing counts’ contribution to QBER to at least a manageable value,
without noticeable impact on the photon detection probability.
The accuracy of measurement in this test only allows us to make a qualitative con-
clusion. It has been planned to make a more accurate quantitative measurement of how
the number of blocked pulses affects QBER when the SPD is working as a part of our
QKD system. Unfortunately, the QKD experiment has so far not allowed us to do this,
due to unstable setup with low fringe visibility that masks all other effects (Section
2.2.3. ).
We think that afterpulse blocking would keep afterpulse counts manageable without
significantly affecting detection efficiency at gate pulse rates of at least an order of
magnitude higher than 20 MHz. However, we have not explored limits of its perform-
ance, because in our system many other components restrict the pulse rate to 20 MHz.
Finally, we note that afterpulse blocking can be used together with other measures
directed at reducing afterpulsing, for a better cumulative effect.
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Fig. 33. Test of afterpulse blocking: count probability vs. number of gate pulses blocked
after each detected avalanche. Results of a single experiment are shown on two charts in
different scales of the horizontal axis. The upper curve on each chart represents an aver-
age count probability of the SPD when it is illuminated with weak coherent 1310 nm
pulses at 0.005 photon per pulse; the lower curve represents average count probability
when there is no input light. The gate pulse rate is 12 MHz, gate pulse width is ~2 ns.
APD: Ge FD312L (s/n 1VUL1752), cooled to 77 K.
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3.4.  Conclusion
The single photon detector described in this chapter has operated stably and served
us well. The achieved quantum efficiency of 7% at 1.3 µm and the dark count prob-
ability of 5·10–5 per gate would be adequate for operation of a QKD system over 20 km
of optical fiber. The afterpulse blocking technique we have developed has allowed to
increase the gating rate of detector to 20 MHz, which would result in a roughly pro-
portional increase of the key generation rate comparing to a similar QKD system
operating at a lower detector gating rate.
After we presented the afterpulse blocking technique16, it has been used by other
groups for QKD [63], photon counting [126, 127], in a commercial single photon
detection module [130], and to shorten acquisition times in the photoluminescence
microscope of Ref. 181 by as much as two orders of magnitude [182].
                                                     
16 We have implemented afterpulse blocking in hardware by mid-1999 [95]. The author pre-
sented the idea and implementation of afterpulse blocking at the 1st QIPC Workshop in Pots-
dam, September 27–29, 2000. To the best of our knowledge, we were the first to implement and
report it. Unfortunately, we have never written a paper about the SPD with afterpulse blocking, so
we don’t get credited for it. To be fair, the group in Geneva also had this idea no later than in 1998
[123], but did not develop it before we reported our results.
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4.  Security
The two-millennia long history of cryptography is a history of failures. For the most
of it, the security of ciphers has depended on a perceived inability of adversary to crack
the cipher, while such cracking was possible and, for the majority of cipher systems,
sooner or later done thanks to the ingenuity of enemy codebreakers. Then, another
crackable cipher (invariably declared “perfectly secure” and “incrackable” by those
touting it) replaced the broken one.
It was only in the 20th century that ciphers and other cryptographic primitives
whose security was rigorously proven based on the laws of Nature appeared. Around
1920, Gilbert Vernam proposed a simple “one-time pad” cipher where each symbol of
the message was added modulo alphabet size with a symbol of a random secret key to
form a ciphertext; on the receiving end, the same operation was used to extract the
message [3, 4]. In 1949, Claude Shannon mathematically proved the security of this
cipher was perfect provided the key material was never reused [5]. Around 1980,
provable secure authentication techniques were developed [15]. In the last two decades
of the century, another cryptographic primitive — secure key distribution given a
quantum channel and an authenticated public channel — whose security is also based
on the laws of Nature has been developed; this is the QKD. The proofs of its security
have been developed by several authors during the last decade; more on this below in
Section 4.2.  The one-time pad cipher and QKD (with authentication techniques as a
part of it), when employed together, form a complete cryptographic system for trans-
mission of messages that is provably secure.
However, the theoretical proof is only one component to the security of any real-
world cryptographic system. The proof forms the basis, but there are three components
in total (Fig. 34). The first component is classical security: access control, proper
operational procedures, electromagnetic and acoustic shielding, etc. at the end points
where the cryptographic equipment is located and where the messages are handled in
the unencrypted form. The second component is the security proof itself: a proof
inevitably based on an idealized model of the real system. The third component is what
differs the real system from the idealized model in the proof: unexpected implementa-
tion loopholes not yet accounted in the theoretical proof.
The whole security chain is only as strong as its weakest link. All the links are
equally important. Should a quantum cryptography (QC) researcher then pay equal
attention to them? The classical security component is not something unique to QC; it
is mostly the same as for other cryptographic systems. It is not researcher’s business
then to care for this component, but that of the security specialists at the end customer
(though we will have some remarks on it in the next section). The security proof,
however, is definitely the business of a QC researcher. It has been at the very heart of
QC from its beginning, and now we can be reasonably sure QC has been shown to be
secure for a somewhat idealized model of the equipment. What about the remaining
component, the loopholes in particular implementations that can assist Eve but are not
described in the model? Searching for and closing these loopholes is the responsibility
of a QC researcher, because they are intrinsic to the setups he constructs and technical
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Fig. 34. Components of security in a quantum cryptosystem.
solutions he chooses. There wasn’t time to worry about them when QKD setups were
in the proof-of-the-principle stage (assembled on a single optical table [14], or the first
experiments over optical fiber). However, many laboratory experiments have since
grown ready to be commercialized, competing on such parameters as the ease of in-
stallation, key generation speed and transmission distance [30, 31, 32, 159]; commer-
cial offers are already available [47]. It’s time to pay attention to this last component of
the security then?
When we looked at it several years ago, there had been almost no studies of com-
ponent imperfections and loopholes outside of the several generic imperfections ac-
counted in the proof (which were: non-ideal optical alignment leading to errors, loss in
the transmission line and components, non-single-photon source statistics, and two
imperfections in single photon detectors: non-zero dark counts and uniformly lower
than 100% quantum efficiency). We saw several potential possibilities for Eve to use
other imperfections to stage a successful attack, and went on to investigate them. Our
ultimate goal has since been, after finding new loopholes and showing how Eve could
use them for eavesdropping, to close them by either suggesting which specific protec-
tion measures could be applied or by incorporating the relevant component imperfec-
tion into the proof.
This chapter is organized as follows. Remarks on conventional security are given in
the next section. A brief summary of existing security proofs is given in Section 4.2. 
For the rest of the chapter, in Section 4.3. we present several attacks using implemen-
tation loopholes we have investigated. The attacks have been studied to various depth:
some of them thoroughly with experiments (large pulse attack, faked states attack
using detector efficiency mismatch), some only theoretically (faked states attack on
1.  Conventional security; trusted equipment manufacturer
2.  Security proof against quantum attacks
3.  Loopholes in optical scheme
Alice Bob
2   3
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schemes with passibe basis choice), and for some only the theoretical possibility of the
attack is stated (light emission by APDs, high-power damage).
4.1.  Conventional security
Quantum cryptography (with properly implemented and authenticated key extrac-
tion [183]) only provides security against attacks on the quantum and conventional
communication lines. The end equipment and its usage is not and can not be intrinsi-
cally secure. The conventional security measures at Alice and Bob are required, just as
for any other non-quantum cryptolink. They are just as critical links in the whole chain
as security against attacks specific to quantum cryptosystems is.
The users and providers of a quantum cryptolink should follow the same set of secu-
rity procedures they would use for a conventional cryptolink that uses the type of con-
ventional encryption that is now supplied with a quantum-distributed key. (The conven-
tional encryption could be the one-time pad, or a symmetric cipher with frequently
changed key as currently implemented in MagiQ Technologies QPN quantum cryptosys-
tem [184].)
The additional security procedures specific to the quantum cryptosystem as they
look to the end user would be:
a) the seed key distribution at the time of installation;
b) monitoring the single indicator for functionality of the quantum cryptosystem.
A properly implemented quantum cryptolink should monitor all parameters responsible
for its security automatically and summarize them in a single “working / not working”
indicator for the end user. Should any problem possibly leading to a security breach be
detected, the key generation is automatically halted and the service or the link provider
is called to check the problem.
Please note that the equipment manufacturer and the provider must be trusted, just
as in the case of any conventional cryptosystem. We highly doubt that verifying secu-
rity of the end equipment is in principle possible, given that the manufacturer can in
principle conceal arbitrary devices and modifications inside the equipment and that
there is a convenient optical communication channel for their remote activation and for
information exchange.
To illustrate how a covert communication device could be concealed inside the
setup, consider for example fiber optic lithium niobate phase modulators used in many
QKD schemes. Lithium niobate modulators come from the factory as a sealed box,
typically about ten centimeters long, a couple centimeters wide and a centimeter or so
thick (see Fig. 35). This sealed box
a) has full information about bit values in Alice’s setup (modulation voltage car-
rying bases and bit values is supplied directly to its connectors);
b) sits on the fiber;
c) has a significant electrical power supplied to it (through modulation connector);
d) cannot be non-destructively opened for inspection (see Appendix A for depic-
tion of consequences).
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Fig. 35.  Lithium niobate phase modulator (JDS Uniphase UTP PM-130-080 travelling-
wave 8 GHz, manufactured in 1998), cover removed. Reproduced here in 1:1 scale.
Package size 892310 mm (not including protruding elements). The coaxial con-
nectors are of the SMA type.
This makes it quite possible to conceal a covert optical communication device in-
side an otherwise normally functioning phase modulator, that would report the bit
values via the fiber channel. Moreover, a skillfully implemented device would be hard
to discover even when the modulator package is opened. The covert circuitry could be
hidden inside the thick metal base of this box, which appears to be feasible given the
state of miniaturization of necessary electronic and fiber optic components. In a work-
ing equipment, such a device can lie silent for a long time, waiting either for a pre-set
date or for activation by an external optical signal. By the way this is about how close
you can come in this field to the original meaning of the term “Trojan horse” (accord-
ing to the classification given in [185], this is a pre-lurked Trojan horse).
This is just one of the uncounted possibilities the manufacturer and the suppliers of
components have in their disposal to break the security, if they are not absolutely
trustworthy parties.
J. Larsson has shown [186] for the Ekert protocol [187] that when both Alice and
Bob are trojaned, there is no need for communication back from them into the optical
fiber.
To emphasize the importance of conventional security measures and security prac-
tices once more, let’s quote a somewhat discordant passage by Bruce Schneier:
„Security is a chain; it’s as strong as the weakest link. Mathematical cryptography,
as bad as it sometimes is, is the strongest link in most security chains. The computer
security, the network security, the people security — these are all much worse.
Cryptography is the one area of security that we can get right. We know how to
make that link strong. Maybe quantum cryptography can make that link stronger, but
why would anyone bother? There are far more serious security problems to worry
about, and it makes much more sense to spend money securing those.
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It’s like defending yourself against an approaching attacker by putting a huge stake
in the ground. It’s useless to argue about whether the stake should be fifty feet tall or a
hundred feet tall, because the attacker is going to go around it.“ [188]
While we don’t agree with his pessimistic verdict regarding quantum cryptography,
this comparison underlines the role of conventional security quite well.
4.2.  Security proofs
Security of the BB84 protocol [14] for an idealized model of equipment including
several common component imperfections has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Following the work of Mayers [189], several proofs with slightly different model
assumptions appeared [190, 191, 192, 193]. The latest GLLP proof [194] simultane-
ously allows for such imperfections as small basis-dependent flaws at the source and
detector, and sources that emit weak coherent states. The inner workings of the proofs
differ, but perhaps the most interesting is the version of the proof establishing the
formal equality of the BB84 protocol with an imaginable protocol using entanglement
distillation and the Calderbank-Shor-Steane quantum error correction codes [190, 194].
For an idealised model, the available bit rate after privacy amplification (i.e. the
yield of the final secret key bits per bit of the sifted key) is [190]:
)2H(1 QBERR −= , (12)
where H is the binary Shannon entropy H(x) = − x log2 x − (1−x) log2(1−x), and QBER
is the quantum bit error rate measured by Bob. This function is plotted in Fig. 36.
Existing error correction protocols that use two-way communication between Alice and
Bob allow the bit rate in a real system to come close to within a few percent of this
limit function.
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Fig. 36. The available bit rate after privacy amplification as a function of the measured
QBER (Eq. 12).
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The most of our work presented later in this Chapter falls outside of the model in
these security proofs. We consider imperfections and countermeasures separately from
the proof. In the latest paper, however, we’ve made an attempt to integrate the pa-
rameter describing detector efficiency mismatch with the results of the proof and
obtain a security bound (see Section 4.3.3.2. ).
Security of protocols other than BB84 has not been analysed to the same extent. For
some of them, proofs considering individual attacks (i.e. attacks where Eve does not
interact coherently with many qubits at once) exist (for SARG04, see [66]; for six-
state, see [195, 196]), while for other only the simplest attacks have been considered
(for DPSK, see [75, 32]).
4.2.1.  Use of light source with multiphoton component
Sources that emit weak coherent states (as opposed to true single photon sources)
provide an educating example of an imperfection that was initially not in the proof
model, but is now fully incorporated into it. Moreover, several methods have been
proposed to mitigate the detrimental effect  of coherent states on the protocol perform-
ance (such as the reduction of the key generation rate and the maximum transmission
distance). Systems using a weak coherent source at Alice can now be built that ap-
proach the performance of ones with a true single photon source. We review this
important imperfection and countermeasures below.
For an experimenter, a very convenient and cheap light source is a laser followed by
an attenuator. The state of a coherent light [197, 198]
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provided the phase θ is unknown. In the case of a pulsed laser source the phase is
unknown (it arises from random fluctuations every time laser generation is started); for
a continuous laser source or a reflection type “plug and play” scheme the phase can be
randomized by an auxiliary phase modulator.
Unfortunately, such a light pulse could be found, with the probability defined by the
Poisson distribution (15), to contain more than one photon. This allows Eve to stage a
powerful photon number splitting (PNS) attack.
It took some time for the research community to recognize the implications of this
attack. The PNS attack is known at least since the works [14, 199], and has been ana-
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lyzed in more recent works [200, 201, 202, 203]. In the most powerful version of the
attack, Eve splits multiphoton pulses in the channel letting one photon pass undisturbed
to Bob while keeping the rest of the photons in a quantum memory until the basis is
announced, blocks all single photon pulses, and decreases the channel attenuation in
order to keep Bob’s detection rate the same. After the basis is announced, she measures
the stored photons and obtains the full information about the key. To execute the attack,
Eve should have the ability to perform the photon number measurement (and a photon
splitting operation), the ability to substitute the optical channel with a lossless one
(either a better physical channel or 100%-efficient quantum teleportation), quantum
memory, and perfect, zero-loss optical components and detectors. The attack makes
QKD insecure when the channel transmittance t becomes less than the average photon
numer at Alice’s output µ halved: t < µ/2 (assuming µ << 1; the exact insecurity bound
is t < (1 − e−µ − µe−µ) / µ ). Less powerful versions of the attack involving only existing
technology also exist [200]. For example, with beamsplitters and perfectly efficient
single photon detectors Eve could run an intercept-resend attack probabilistically
measuring three-photon pulses; it would work for t < µ2/24. Although the technologies
for running the most powerful version of the PNS attack are not available today, we shall
not underestimate Eve, and shall consider her be only limited by the laws of physics.
The most powerful version of the PNS attack severely reduces the key generation rate
and the maximum transmission distance [201, 202, 203]. It turned out, several early
fiber optic QKD experiments (e.g., [28]) were in fact not secure against this attack.
One way to mitigate the PNS attack is to use quantum states with low multiphoton
component, which is cited as the principal advantage of entangled pair based schemes [50].
Although experimental demonstrations have been made, entangled pair sources and other
single photon sources [204, 205] remain impractical outside the laboratory. Another way
is to include a strong reference pulse that must be always detected by Bob [65].
Around 2003, two solutions requiring minimal modifications to the existing imple-
mentations of QKD using the BB84 protocol have been proposed. One is the SARG04
protocol, which uses the same physical setup as the BB84 and only differs in classical
processing of the detection results (see Section 4.3.1.1. ). It does not eliminate the
effects of a weak coherent source, but allows for higher bit rates and longer transmis-
sion distances than BB84 while requiring only software modification. Another ingen-
ious solutuion is a decoy state protocol [206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 197, 211]. The decoy
state protocol is designed to guaranteely detect the PNS attack should Eve try to run it.
Following the original proposition of Hwang [206], Alice sends coherent states choos-
ing  at random between two different average photon numbers: a normal coherent state
iθ
µe with µ << 1, and a decoy coherent state iθeµdecoy with µdecoy ≥ 1. Besides this,
she encodes into all states her qubits normally. After the transmission, Alice announces
to Bob which of the two photon numbers was used for each bit. Bob divides his re-
ceived bits into two groups by the announced photon number, and estimates the chan-
nel transmittances t and tdecoy based on the detection rate in each group. If the estimates
of transmittance differ significantly, this signals Eve’s PNS attack. Indeed, suppose
Eve does a photon number measurement on Alice’s pulse and obtains n = 2. Can she
tell which of the two average photon numbers this pulse has had? No. If she is to
proceed with the PNS attack, she has to split this pulse. However, since µ < µdecoy, Eve
would send on to Bob disproportionally more photons from split multiphoton pulses
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for the decoy state than for the normal state (and, conversely, find n = 1 in normal state
pulses more often than in decoy state pulses, so that normal pulses get blocked more
often). This reveals her.
After Hwang’s proposal [206], theoretical proofs and more efficient versions of the
decoy state protocol quickly appeared. In the limit of infinite number of decoy states,
the protocol completely eliminates the PNS attack and allows for a much higher opti-
mal average photon number for any given line attenuation. Realistic protocols ap-
proaching the limit closely are possible. For instance, in Ref. 210 two decoy states — a
vacuum and a very weak decoy state — are used. Examples of protocol performance
for realistic sizes of data set of about 1 Gbit and 84 Gbit are given, with the latter
falling 10 km short of the limit of the transmission distance (130 km instead of
140 km), while providing key generation rates for the most of the possible transmission
distance range comparable to those in a system using a true single photon source. The
modification to the setup required to implement the decoy state protocol is minimal:
one needs to add a fast electrically controlled attenuator. The first experimental dem-
onstration has already been done [211].
4.3.  Attacks through optical loopholes
In this section, results of our studies are presented and three papers are reprinted.
Note on terminology. These and other attacks of this kind are often called Trojan
horse attacks in the literature. However, we have not yet seen a formal definition of a
Trojan horse attack in the context of a quantum cryptosystem. To us, it is difficult to
draw parallels with the usage of this term in computer security (where it denotes a pro-
gram with malicious payload disguised as something benign). Neither is it always easy
to draw exact figurative parallels with the original, historical use of the Trojan horse17
                                                     
17 The Trojan Horse is part of the myth of the Trojan
War.
The Greek siege of Troy had lasted for ten years. The
Greeks devised a new ruse — a giant hollow wooden
horse. It was filled with Greek warriors led by Odysseus.
The rest of the Greek army appeared to leave and the
Trojans accepted the horse as a peace offering. A Greek
spy, Sinon, convinced the Trojans the horse was a gift de-
spite the warnings of Laocoon and Cassandra. The Tro-
jans celebrated hugely and when the Greeks emerged
from the horse the city was in a drunken stupor. The
Greek warriors opened the city gates to allow the rest of
the army access and the city was ruthlessly pillaged — all
the men were killed and all the women taken into slavery
[212].
There is a small museum within the territories of an-
cient city Troy. The museum includes the remnants of the
city and a symbolic wooden horse built in the garden of
the museum to depict the legendary Trojan horse (Fig. 37). Fig. 37. Wooden horse in Troy.
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when you consider attacks on quantum cryptosystems (unlike the usage of this term in
computer security where such parallels are clear). These attacks do not always contain
a signal which the legitimate parties are explicitly made aware of, hence the parallel
with the horse often fails. We therefore prefer to use the term conventional optical
eavesdropping for the large pulse attack and detection of light emission from APDs,
and faked states attack for the attacks presented in Section 4.3.3.  Conventional optical
eavesdropping is defined as the class of eavesdropping where Eve gets information
through the optical channel used to transmit quantum states, without interacting with
the quantum states. Note that some of attacks in this class initially get information this
way, and then interact with the quantum states using the obtained information. These
attacks are also classified into conventional optical eavesdropping.
4.3.1.  Large pulse attack
This section consists of our paper published in Journal of Modern Optics 48, 2023–
2038 (2001); reprinted verbatim on the following pages, with its own list of references
on p. 95 and own figures numeration inside the paper.
The paper is then followed by notes on the SARG04 protocol and a single-detector
BB84 protocol patent, both of which have been introduced after the paper was pub-
lished, as well as a review of a quantitative evaluation of Eve’s information given by
Gisin et al. [213].
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[ End of reprinted paper ]
In Fig. 38 on the next page, you can see how Eve’s setup looked like in the lab.
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4.3.1.1.  Large pulse attack and newer protocols
Since the paper was published, a new QKD protocol, the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin
2004 (SARG04), was proposed [64, 65, 66].18 The protocol has improved characteristics
against the PNS attack described in Section 4.2.1.  The SARG04 is a simple variation
of the BB84 protocol intended for QKD schemes that use a weak coherent source.
We’ll show shortly that it is, unlike the BB84, vulnerable to the large pulse attack.
The SARG04 protocol can be made equivalent to the BB84 protocol in what states
and bases are used in the quantum channel, and differ only at the sifting stage
(Fig. 39(a)). Alice sends randomly one of the four states |0a, |0b, |1a or |1b. Bob
measures either in 0 or 1 detection basis. At the sifting step, Alice announces publicly
one of the four pairs of non-orthogonal states {|0a , |1a}, {|0a , |1b}, {|0b , |1a} or
{|0b , |1b}. For definiteness, suppose that for a given qubit Alice has sent |0a, and that
she has announced the set {|0a , |1a} (one state in the announced set is always the state
which was sent, and the other is a state randomly picked from the opposite basis). If
Bob has measured in the 0 basis, he has certainly got the result 0a; but since this result
is possible for both states in the set {|0a , |1a}, he has to discard it. If Bob has measured
in the 1 basis and got 1a, he again cannot discriminate. But if he has measured in the 1
basis and got 1b (which happens with overall probability 1/4), then he knows that Alice
has sent |0a, and adds a 0 to his key.
As it is shown in Ref. 64, this simple modification of the protocol makes it more
difficult for Eve to eavesdrop using the PNS attack: now she can obtain full informa-
tion only if she can block all pulses containing one and two photons, and a fraction of
pulses containing three photons. This typically increases the critical channel attenua-
tion above which it cannot be considered secure by 10 dB or more, which translates
Fig. 39. States configuration for QKD protocols robust to PNS attack: (a) SARG04
protocol: two pairs of non-orthogonal states on the equator of the Poincare sphere,
physically equivalent to the states used in the BB84 protocol; (b) bit encoding in a PNS-
resistant protocol using four bases (reprinted from [65]).
                                                     
18 Perhaps in an intended pun, the word sarg means coffin in German.
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into additional ~50 km of transmission distance at 1550 nm (shifting the distance limit
from ~50 km for the BB84 protocol to ~100 km). A more accurate, though not yet
general, security bound for SARG04 is derived in Ref. 66.
However, there is a problem. While the SARG04 protocol provides protection
against the attack which is not technologically feasible today, ironically it makes the
system vulnerable to the large pulse attack. The measurement bases at Bob directly
represent bit values. As we know from the above paper, reliable protection against
Eve reading Bob’s modulator settings is difficult to construct. The SARG04 protocol is
just as vulnerable to the large pulse attack as the B92 protocol.
A generalization of the SARG04 protocol to six or more non-orthogonal states has
been proposed (a possible configuration with eight states is shown in Fig. 39(b)). Using
increased number of states further extends the safe transmission distance [65]. How-
ever, the measurement basis at Bob still necessarily represents the bit value, and the
protocol remains vulnerable to the large pulse attack.
Another recent example of an “improvement” that makes the system vulnerable to
the large pulse attack is a single-detector BB84 protocol described in Ref. 214. It
proposes to apply at random four phase shift values instead of two at Bob’s phase
modulator, and eliminate one single photon detector from Bob’s setup (at the expense
of halving the yield of the key bits). In this case as well, the phase shift value at Bob’s
phase modulator represents the bit value.
Table 3 summarizes the required protection agaist the large pulse attack for the
protocols and schemes we have studied.
Finally, we note recently proposed multipass quantum cryptographic protocols, in
which a quantum state transmitted from Alice over the communication line to Bob is
modulated and transmitted back from Bob to Alice (and in some of these protocols,
once more from Alice to Bob) [215, 216, 217, 218]. Besides being not very practical
because losses in the communication line multiply over the two or three passes, these
protocols imply no attenuation whatsoever for light pulses being modulated and re-
flected. Thus, they are wide open to the large pulse attack, and would be very difficult,
if not impossible, to make practically secure.
4.3.1.2.  Bound on Eve’s information
In the recent paper by Gisin et al. [213], a quantitative bound on the amount of in-
formation Eve could obtain through the large pulse attack has been given. The bound
assumes that the interrogating pulse returning to Eve is attenuated to a sub-photon
level. In the case where Eve possesses the phase reference, her information is
( ) )(2ln
1
)(
422
α+α≈α OI TrojanEve , (16)
where |α|2 is the photon number of the coherent state Eve receives. If the setup being
interrogated uses an auxiliary phase modulator to remove Eve’s phase reference (which
might be a good idea for some types of setups anyway [79]), Eve’s information is
reduced to
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Table 3. Summary of security measures against the large pulse attack for different
schemes and protocols.
Protection
Scheme Protocols
at Alice at Bob *
BB84
Passive
(delay)
Yes
Townsend’s
B92,
SARG04,
single-detector BB84
Passive
(attenuator
+ isolator) Active
(detector)
BB84
Passive
(delay)
Yes
“Plug and play”
B92,
SARG04,
single-detector BB84
Active
(detector)
Active
(detector)
*
 Eve is granted quantum memory (in reality she could use bases detection on Bob’s
side, not needing long storage).
Fig. 40. Reprinted from [213]: Eve’s optimal information gain per qubit in the function
of the mean photon number |α|2 that she can collect without being detected by Alice and
Bob. The upper curve corresponds to Eq. 16, the lower curve to the case that Alice
and/or Bob applies phase randomization, Eq. 17. For example, if Alice’s monitoring
detector sets a limit to Eve’s backscattered signal of 0.1 photon, then Eve may gain
0.135 and 0.095 bits if Alice does not apply or applies phase randomization, respectively.
101
222
)exp(1)( α≈α−−=αreduced
Eve
I . (17)
Eve’s information in these two cases is plotted in Fig. 40.
4.3.2.  High-power damage
An ultimate way for Eve to assist or enable other types of attacks would be to mod-
ify characteristics of components inside Alice’s and Bob’s setups. Controlled changes
in components could potentially be made through a well-known effect of high-power
laser damage.
Let’s discuss briefly what changes in Alice’s and Bob’s setups Eve might want to make.
Consider, for example, Alice’s optical setup in one of the two present-day commer-
cial QKD schemes, the one sold by id Quantique [63], shown in Fig. 41 (exact details
of the other commercial QKD scheme sold by MagiQ Technologies have not been
openly published, but it is likely of the same type).
The detector DA serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it implements a feedback loop: DA
measures the energy of the incoming bright pulse from Bob and sets the attenuation of
the electrically controlled attenuator VA accordingly to obtain a proper average photon
number for the pulse going back into the communication line (the pulse passes through
the delay line DL, phase modulator PMA where it acquires the basis and bit values, and
reflects off the Faraday mirror FM). Secondly, thanks to the feedback loop, the detector
automatically monitors for the large pulse attack and negates it by increasing attenua-
tion, or it can raise an alarm. The detector also generates a trigger signal used to syn-
chronize Alice’s clock with Bob’s clock.
If the detector sensitivity to incoming light drops significantly, or if the attenuation
of the variable attenuator reduces significantly comparing to its factory calibration
scale, the scheme becomes insecure. This is because the average number of photons
per outgoing pulse will increase (allowing a classical deterministic detection by Eve),
or the large pulse attack described in Section 4.3.1.  becomes possible. Eve can try to
damage components in order to achieve this:
• try to burn out the detector;
• damage connectors in the detector arm (so that they increase attenuation);
• damage the beamsplitter BS (hoping its splitting ratio alters favorably to her);
• finally, consider what happens to the attenuator after its intensity damage
threshold: if it actually decreases attenuation, this also can be exploited.
Eve can try to control the place and character of damage by varying such parame-
ters as the wavelength, polarization, energy and time profile of her laser pulse.
Consider another example: in non-“plug and play” schemes like our scheme, the
last optical component in Alice’s setup before the line is a variable attenuator set at
rather high attenuation (50–60 dB). If the construction of the particular attenuator turns
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Fig. 41. Optical parts potentially vulnerable to a high-power damage attack in Stucky’s
et al. setup [63]. Alice’s part of the optical scheme is shown in the diagram (FM, Fara-
day mirror; PMA, phase modulator; DL, delay line; VA, variable attenuator; DA, detec-
tor; BS10/90, asymmetric beamsplitter).
out to be such that it lowers its attenuation when damaged, the scheme becomes inse-
cure for the same two reasons as in the above case (increased average photon number
and facilitation of the large pulse attack).
As yet another example, some of the faked states attacks on schemes with passive
basis choice considered in Section 4.3.3.1. depend on finding suitable parasitic reflec-
tions in Bob’s scheme. If a slightly damaged component or optical interface exhibits
increased backreflection, it may facilitate a subsequent faked states attack.
The possibility of high-power damage is potentially very dangerous for security and
at the same time challenging for study: nobody has looked into it. The topic of laser
damage is well studied [219], but not in relation to this application in quantum cryptog-
raphy. Experimental tests of high-power damage and eventually tests of protection
measures would be destructive to at least some of the components. We would like to
study this type of attack; however, acquiring the laser and expendable components
would requre a notable amount of money.
4.3.3.  Faked states attack
Along the line of our security research, we have come upon a new class of possible
practical attacks, faked states attacks, and begun to study it. This class of attacks is
introduced in the next paper below; it details attack application to schemes with pas-
sive basis choice. In this paper we also consider Eve’s workflow, whose steps are
generally applicable to the faked states attack and to the large pulse attack described
above in Section 4.3.1. 
In the following two papers reprinted in Section 4.3.3.2. , we continue the study of
the faked states attack and consider a generic detector imperfection: an efficiency
mismatch between the 0 and 1 detectors as a function of a control parameter accessible
to Eve. This imperfection allows the faked states attack on several protocols and
schemes, including schemes with active basis choice.
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4.3.3.1.  Attack on schemes with passive basis choice on
Bob’s side
This section consists of our paper published in Journal of Modern Optics 52, 691–
705 (2005); figures numeration and references in the paper have been integrated with
the rest of the thesis, otherwise the paper is equivalent to the published version sans
language changes made by the journal copy editor.
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Faked states attack on quantum cryptosystems
VADIM MAKAROV and DAG R. HJELME
Abstract.    A new type of attack on quantum cryptography systems is proposed.
In this attack, Eve utilizes various optical imperfections in Bob’s scheme and
constructs light pulses so that Bob does not distinguish his detection results from
normal, whereas they give Bob the basis and bit value chosen at Eve’s discretion.
Applying this attack to systems with passive basis choice on Bob’s side is consid-
ered. Also, a general workflow of breaking into a running quantum cryptolink
using this or Trojan horse attack is discussed.
1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography was introduced as a perfectly secure way of communication
based on the laws of physics. However, as the field matured and moved towards more
and more practical implementations, it was slowly realized that their security consists
of many components and that there are many fine points in the protocol and hardware.
A thorough discussion of quantum attacks gradually evolved to include such imper-
fections of physical apparatus as faint pulse sources (as opposed to true single-photon
sources), loss in the transmission line and non-ideal detectors [193, 194]. Realistic key
extraction protocols involving necessary authentication steps and probability estimates
have been developed [183]. It has been realized that the equipment manufacturer must
be trusted because there is no way for the user to verify the equipment [186]. Finally,
the search came down to optical loopholes in particular implementations and classes of
schemes, and eventually to electronic and software loopholes [220, 89]. It should also
not be forgotten that ‘classical’ security at the end points of the communication link is
just as important (even though this is not a task for the designer or manufacturer of
communication equipment).
The whole security is only as strong as the weakest link in it. While it is still true
that the laws of physics form the foundation of security in quantum cryptography, its
real security will probably be determined by technological implementations, technical
measures and unexpected loopholes in them [16].
So far, search for such loopholes has attracted a limited interest. One reason for the
lack of interest is that these issues have little connection with fundamental physics that
most of the people working in the field have background in. Another reason is that
quantum cryptosystems have not really taken off into widespread practical use (only
few devices have been sold), thus lacking much of the motivation to try and crack
them, and to protect from the crackers. Nevertheless we think that a researcher has to
pay attention to possible loopholes in implementations because it reflects on the tech-
nology he can use.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of practical attacks which we named faked
states attacks. The point of this paper is not so much to estimate how easy or difficult
would it be to carry out these attacks, but to raise awareness of their existence. Attacks
that have not been discussed at all and have been blissfully ignored may end up as real
security holes.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we define the faked states at-
tack, discuss it on the example of one particular implementation of quantum crypto-
system, and consider protective measures. In section 3, we give an idea of how Eve
could proceed with breaking into a running cryptolink in practice. We discuss the
general steps involved, what factors influence them, and what present-day technology
Eve can employ.
2. Faked states attack
Definition. Faked states attack on a quantum cryptosystem is an intercept-and-
resend attack where Eve does not try to reconstruct the original states, but generates
instead light pulses that get detected by the legitimate parties in a way controlled by
her while not setting off any alarms.
It is well known that intercept-and-resend attack is a strategy doomed to fail if it
attempts to regenerate the quantum states as close to the original as possible after
detection. However, legitimate parties could sometimes be fooled, using imperfections
of their setups, into thinking they are detecting original quantum states while they are
in fact detecting light pulses generated by Eve. We call these light pulses faked states.
Faked states are specific to each particular scheme or even particular sample of equip-
ment being attacked.
A successful faked states attack gives Eve full knowledge of the key. (A partially
successful faked states attack gives Eve partial information about the key.)
We have chosen to explain the attack on the example of entanglement-based quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) system developed by the Geneva group [50]. While we
don’t consider any other system in this paper, the above attack definition is applicable
to any type of quantum cryptosystem. In particular, faked states attack can also be run
against a system with active basis choice on Bob’s side, which we would like to detail
in our next paper.
The QKD system in [50] we consider here exploits photon pairs entangled in en-
ergy-time, where the sums of both the energy and the momenta of the down-converted
photons equal those of the pump photon. We recap here how the system works. The
photon pair source is located at Alice and is asymmetric, producing pairs where one
photon in the pair has wavelength optimized for detection (810 nm) and the other
photon in the pair has wavelength optimized for long-distance transmission (1550 nm);
see figure 42. The 810 nm photon goes into Alice's interferometer, while the 1550 nm
photon is sent to Bob over optical fibre and goes into Bob's interferometer. Unbalanced
Mach-Zehnder interferometers are used: an open-path, bulk optics interferometer at
Alice, and a fibre-optic interferometer at Bob. While the interferometers have different
construction, the path difference between the short and long arm is matched to a frac-
tion of wavelength between them. Photons can propagate in four ways: both photons
through the short arms at Alice and Bob, both photons through the long arms at Alice
and Bob, one through the short arm at Alice and the other through the long arm at Bob,
one through the long arm at Alice and the other through the short arm at Bob. The
short-short and long-long processes are indistinguishable and yield two-photon inter-
ference, registered as coinciding counts at Alice’s and Bob’s photon detectors. Actu-
ally, whenever one of Alice’s four detectors registers a count, it generates a pulse that
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Figure 42. Reprinted from [50]: asymmetric system for quantum key distribution util-
izing photon pairs (PBS, polarizing beam splitter; D, single-photon detector; λ/4, quar-
ter-wave plate; HSM, half-silvered mirror).
is transmitted to Bob via a classical channel and gates his detectors in order to try to
detect the other photon in the pair.
In order to do QKD, Alice and Bob must implement two incompatible measurement
bases in their interferometers. The basis can be selected in each interferometer by
randomly introducing either 0 or π/2 phase shift in one of the interferometer arms. In
this system, the basis choice is passive on both Alice’s and Bob’s side. In Alice’s
interferometer, the π/2 phase shift is introduced at λ/4 plate (see figure 42) for one
linear polarization of the beam only. The two linear polarizations get separated from
one another at the polarizing beam splitters (PBS). Photons are inserted into the inter-
ferometer polarized such that they have about equal probability of experiencing 0 or
π/2 phase shift and going either way at the PBSes; the basis for each photon is known
by which pair of detectors registered it. In Bob’s setup, each photon chooses its detec-
tion basis at the PBS (see figure 43) and experiences a different delay for the two
bases. Bob’s detectors are gated twice and the detection basis is known by the gate that
yielded a click. For additional details about this scheme, we refer the reader to [50].
We show that passive basis choice on Bob’s side in this scheme in fact represents a
vulnerability that can be exploited in a faked states attack.
Let’s consider how faked states attack can be implemented (from Eve’s standpoint)
and how it can be thwarted (from Bob’s standpoint) for several attack—countermea-
sure iterations.
In all implementations considered below, Eve’s attack is dependent on forcing Bob
to detect not in randomly chosen basis, but in the basis chosen by Eve. Eve cuts into
the line and connects the fibre running from Alice to an equivalent of Bob’s setup,
noting the detection basis and bit value for every quantum state she detects. Then, she
sends a faked state towards Bob for every quantum state detected, programming her
detection basis into the faked state. Bob always detects it in the basis programmed by
Eve. Eve’s presence remains hidden, because after the sifting step all the bits in the raw
key have been detected by her in the proper basis, and the subsequent check by Alice
and Bob shows no increase in quantum bit error rate (QBER).
(1) Basis choice via polarization.
In the original setup used in the experiment, each photon chooses its detection basis
in Bob’s setup randomly at the polarizing beam splitter (PBS), see figure 43 [50]. The
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Figure 43. Reprinted from [50]: schematic diagram of Bob’s interferometer (PBS, po-
larizing beam splitter; FM, Faraday mirror; PC, polarization controllers; ABE, adjust-
able birefringent element; DSF, dispersion-shifted fibre).
choice is random because the photons in the setup are depolarized after travelling the
line that connects Alice and Bob.
In the original paper, it is noted that ‘Eve could devise a strategy where she could
benefit from forcing detection of a given qubit in a particular basis, we must introduce
a polarizer aligned at 45° or a polarization scrambler in front of the PBS’. Indeed,
without this component Eve could launch polarized photons, so that they are directed
into one or another PBS output port at Eve’s discretion, thus allowing her to choose
Bob’s basis and run a successful faked states attack as described above.
(2) Basis choice via polarization using polarizer imperfections.
Let’s suppose Bob uses the first of the named defenses, a polarizer aligned at 45°.
Eve’s task would be to make sure her photons have the desired polarization (0° or
90°) after the polarizer. No polarizer is perfect. We speculate in Appendix A that there
always exist two input polarization states (close to the maximum extinction state of the
polarizer), for which the output polarization states become the required 0° linear and
90° linear. The polarizer may have high attenuation for these polarization states (sev-
eral tens of dB), but Eve can easily compensate for this by increasing the intensity of
her pulses.
Thus, the polarizer alone is not a viable defense.
Let’s now suppose Bob uses the second of the named defenses, a polarization
scrambler. An active polarization scrambler driven from a random-number generator
would transform the incoming polarization state in a way unpredictable to Eve at each
moment in time. This would be a sufficient defense against this attack.
(3) Basis choice via timing using reflections off optical interfaces.
Unable to force basis choice via polarization, Eve can now exploit the fact that
Bob’s gated detectors are not sensitive to incoming light most of the time, and use
parasitic reflections that always exist in the setup.
The normal path for light pulses in Bob’s setup would be to reflect off the Faraday
mirrors (FM) (figure 43). Let’s suppose the timing of the light pulse reflected off the
FM in the short arm is such that it strikes Bob’s detectors during their detection win-
dow. Then, should this same pulse or some part thereof take the path in the long arm
and reflect off the FM there, it would also strike the detectors during their another
detection window. The timing of the two detection windows at Bob is chosen such that
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both parts of Alice’s pulse arrive during the windows — the one that has travelled the
short arm, and the one that has travelled the long arm.
The two arms in Bob’s interferometer would, however, likely contain other reflec-
tion points besides the FMs at the ends. There will be weaker reflections off splices, off
connectors in the arms, and also off collimating optics at the PBS ports. These reflec-
tions will likely not be time-matched between the arms, i.e. a pulse reflected off such a
parasitic reflection in one arm and hitting the detectors during their detection window
will not be reflected at the corresponding point in the other arm and won’t reach the
detectors during the other detection window.
Thus Eve gets to choose the basis again by sending a pulse timed to reach the de-
tectors during only one of the two detection windows, via a suitable loophole reflection
path.
If a suitable single parasitic reflection does not exist for one or for both bases, Eve
can search for more complex multiple-reflection paths.
Reflection levels from optical components and connectors vary widely depending
on the nature, specifications and quality of the component, measuring −10 dB to
−70 dB (see Appendix B for some examples). Using a weak parasitic reflection to
route light pulse into the detector during its detection window means a much stronger
pulse that has travelled the normal path hits the detector outside the detection window.
If the residual sensitivity of the detector outside the detection window is high
enough, this may cause an error count at Bob, which is no good for Eve. In APDs used
as single-photon detectors, we envision two possible mechanisms of residual sensitiv-
ity:
(a) An APD reverse-biased below breakdown has a sensitivity to incoming light. Its
A/W ratio is determined by how close to the breakdown voltage it is biased. If a light
pulse causes a current through the APD comparable to the current during an avalanche,
the electronics may react to it and register a ‘photon count’ (provided it is able to
register a count timed off the normal avalanche).
(b) Current flowing through the APD caused by light outside the detection window
may leave charges trapped in the junction and cause an equivalent of afterpulsing
effect at the next detection window. We shall note, however, that Bob’s detection
system must cope with afterpulses caused by normal avalanches. This ensures that
there are at least some time zones during which a current flowing through the APD
won’t have a substantial probability of causing an avalanche in the next detection
window.
A possible countermeasure to this attack from Bob’s side would be to eliminate
Michelson interferometer from his setup, and use two identical Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometers and four detectors instead of one interferometer and two detectors.
(4) Basis and bit value choice via timing using non-overlapping parts of detection
window.
A perfect alignment of detection windows between the bases is not necessary for
Bob’s operation. It is enough for him if Alice’s pulse arrives at the detector during the
time when the detection windows for both bases overlap (figure 44); the setup is
probably adjusted to achieve this and nothing more. The detection windows, however,
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Figure 44. Bob’s detection windows shown in the time frame of the incoming light
pulses. Bob’s detection windows may be shifted relative to each other between the bases
and bit values. This does not affect normal operation: Alice’s pulse is shown arriving
during the time when all the windows overlap. However, if well defined non-
overlapping zones exist like on this drawing, Eve may exploit them to choose the basis
(her pulses shown on the diagram), and also the bit value.
may and most likely will remain shifted relative to one another. By using a short pulse
timed to the non-overlapping parts of the detection windows, Eve can choose the basis.
The detection windows for ‘0’ and ‘1’ detectors may likewise have some non-
overlap between them, allowing to choose the bit value. This attack may be useful in
combination with the attack (3). Suppose Eve has found optical paths allowing her to
choose the basis, but is having difficulty injecting light with properly aligned linear
polarization into the Mach-Zehnder interferometer via these paths in Bob’s setup (or
more generally, can’t align the polarizations at the coupler where the pulses should
interfere). Thus she is unable to obtain interference with good visibility to choose the
bit value interferometrically. She may then try to choose the bit value via timing, using
non-overlapping parts of ‘0’ and ‘1’ detection windows.
Bob’s defense would be to check that his detection windows are aligned sufficiently
well and don’t have any non-overlap between them. This is an additional manufactur-
ing step, or at least design step to take care of.
We would love to verify experimentally whether the vulnerabilities described in (3)
and (4) exist, and if they can be practically exploited. However, this would require
access to the Geneva group’s experimental setup, which we don’t have. Besides, there
is only a limited value in testing particular vulnerabilities of a laboratory setup. If the
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Figure 45. Additional security equipment needed to protect Bob (who is using passive
basis choice) from the faked states attack described in this paper. In addition to what is
shown on the diagram, Bob must match the timing of his detection windows to each
other exactly.
setup makes it to the production version, these vulnerabilities would not be exactly like
in the lab prototype, and new vulnerabilities may be introduced in development.
Note that up to this point, we’ve implied Eve uses the same wavelength as Alice.
However, Eve may use various wavelengths for her pulses, in order to exploit wave-
length-dependent properties of Bob’s setup and have additional flexibility in con-
structing faked states. Wavelength-dependent properties useful for Eve would be
different reflection and transmission coefficients, different detector sensitivity, and
different light speed in the fibre. In particular, antireflection coatings can have very
large reflection coefficients outside the wavelength range they are designed for.
The difference in group speed can be useful in timing attack if the path length is dif-
ferent between the bases and between the bit values. For example, in the scheme that
we are considering, the two arms of the Michelson interferometer have the path differ-
ence of 200 ns (figure 43). If we assume that the long arm is made of Corning SMF-28
fibre, the path difference would be smaller by about 80 ps when Eve uses 1310 nm
wavelength pulses instead of 1550 nm used by Alice [221]. While this 80 ps imbalance
is not sufficient alone for the timing attack, it may contribute towards the total detec-
tion windows misalignment required for a successful attack.
To protect from the attacks (1)–(4), Bob can employ a combination of measures
(figure 45): a sensitive monitoring detector, a narrowband filter that only passes Al-
ice’s wavelengths, and a polarization scrambler. He must also make sure all detection
windows are aligned.
In addition, the control software should perform all kinds of ‘sanity checks’ on the
detector data. For example, Eve may have difficulty creating faked states for one
particular basis, bit value, or basis/bit value combination, in which case she would send
it less frequently or avoid altogether. Bob should check that his detector data contains a
proper mix of all possible detection outcomes (including ‘double clicks’ etc.), and
preferably also check that the relative ratio of different outcomes does not fluctuate in
time more than would be expected statistically.
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(5) Incapacitation of monitoring detector.
A possible strategy for Eve would be now to render the monitoring detector insen-
sitive. It could be possibly done by damaging it with a very strong light pulse when the
system is not operational (or if Bob would disregard a single alarm resulting from this
action).
If the detector is employed, it is therefore advisable to power the detector and alarm
trigger circuit from a battery-backed power supply. A single registered alarm, or a
detection circuit downtime due to power failure should both be regarded as potential
security breach events.
At this point we stop conjecturing ways to attack and note that Bob now has several
extra optical components in his setup while it is still possible for Eve to successfully
compromise the link if she is lucky. Some readers will surely say that the above attacks
are difficult and not very likely to succeed, or that more studies are needed to claim the
attack will work. Note, however, that neither not likely to succeed nor more studies are
needed is a definition that equals perfect security, — which is what quantum crypto-
systems have been supposed to be.
3. Workflow of breaking into cryptolink
While breaking into a cryptolink, four factors influence Eve’s workflow:
(1) The ability to stage the attack on samples or replicas of Alice’s and Bob’s appa-
ratus. In a commercial environment, Eve would be able to buy the equipment for
detailed study of its innards and for troubleshooting the attack sequence. If, however,
neither the equipment nor information about its detailed construction is available for
Eve, this doesn’t make the attack impossible, just more difficult.
(2) The ability to install a tap on the optical quantum channel while it is not in use.
If the channel is constantly running and an interruption of the connection for the time
needed to connect to the line by conventional methods (cutting and splicing) would
raise alarm, Eve must use a more elaborate technology for a non-interrupting tap.
(3) How much time elapses between quantum transmission and public discussion
between Alice and Bob about this quantum transmission. By watching the public
discussion, Eve can infer the QBER Alice and Bob perceive. Monitoring QBER,
especially QBER for groups of bits or for particular bits, provides Eve important
feedback to tune parameters of her attack (see section 3.C below). The quicker she has
the feedback, the faster she can optimize the parameters until the full eavesdropping
can be run. We assume here that Alice and Bob use a bi-directional (interactive) error
correction protocol, which is more practical but leaks information about error positions
to Eve [183]. If Alice and Bob, however, implement a uni-directional error correction,
it will not provide Eve information about error positions.
(4) The presence of a continuous monitoring detector in the equipment being at-
tacked. This one can make Eve’s life considerably more difficult, if done properly.
The worst case Eve can face is that of breaking into a running cryptolink, not hav-
ing detailed knowledge of the setups, and very long time between the quantum trans-
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Figure 46. Tap on fibre channel that can be installed before installation of quantum
cryptolink or when a quantum cryptolink is temporarily not in use (SW, electro-optical
switch).
mission and public discussion usable for inferring QBER for this transmission. This
worst case combination is only a deterrent but no guarantee the attack is impossible. If
any of the factors (1)–(3) turn to Eve’s advantage, that makes the attack easier and
more likely to succeed.
The presence of monitoring detector (4) can be a formidable deterrent in many
cases. However, some types of faked states attack do not in principle require signifi-
cant excess optical power at Bob. Eve can manage to keep below the detector’s thresh-
old, especially if the threshold is known to Eve from staging (1). For example, two of
the attacks discussed in section 2 run with little optical power: basis choice via polari-
zation, and basis and bit value choice via timing using non-overlapping parts of detec-
tion window.
Let’s now consider the general workflow, which can be divided into three stages:
establishing an optical connection with the line, optical time domain reflectometry
(OTDR) measurements, and testing/optimizing the attack parameters.
A. Establishing optical connection with the line
There are three possible cases.
(1) Installing a tap before installation of quantum cryptolink. If Eve knows about
installation plans in advance, this is the easiest case for her. Eve just installs her
equipment onto a dark fibre and waits until Alice and Bob begin to use it for a quantum
cryptolink.
The equipment Eve installs may consist of an electro-optical switch. She connects
to the line with two standard fusion splices (figure 46). Depending on the timing re-
quirements of the attack, Eve may need two switches, one for splitting off photons
from the line, and another for injecting pulses later down the line. The electrical signal
speed in Eve’s equipment can be made faster than the speed of light in the fibre line
(which is about 2/3c) through the use of e.g. free-space radio signals with travel speed
close to c. She can compensate for her processing delay and even inject pulses at the
second switch earlier than Alice’s photon would have passed it.
The second switch can be substituted by a simple weak-coupling-ratio coupler.
Electro-optical switches may be substituted by mechanical ones if their switching
speed is sufficient to perform the attack.
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Figure 47. Evanescent-wave technology: (a) using side-polishing techniques, a small
portion of the cladding is removed to access the evanescent tail of the propagating wave
in the fibre. The removed cladding is replaced with a material to facilitate the function
required for the component. The method is non-invasive to the optical core and the
components modify the wave propagation by locally changing the guiding conditions,
rather than impinging the propagation path (image courtesy Phoenix Photonics);
(b) cross-section of a variable-ratio evanescent-wave coupler. The coupling ratio is var-
ied from 0% to 100% by laterally shifting the fibres relative to each other (image cour-
tesy Canadian Instrumentation & Research Ltd.).
(2) Installing a tap into a quantum cryptolink when it is not in operation. The times
when the link is temporarily not in use may include maintenance, upgrade, equipment
failure, and power outage. Some of these events can be anticipated and even arranged
by Eve.
If the link is not in use for the time sufficient to make two splices, Eve can employ
the same approach as in (1). There are two possible differences, however: Eve may
need to take care of the optical delay in the line (it shouldn’t change after installing the
tap), and of the additional attenuation she introduces (it should be small enough so that
Alice and Bob do not become aware of the tap).
(3) Installing a tap into a quantum cryptolink when it is constantly running. Con-
ventional splicing cannot be used in this case. To do the tap, Eve needs a technology
that neither interrupts the line nor introduces a noticeable attenuation for a significant
time spell.
Though the authors admit that they are unaware of any commercially available
technology that fits this requirement, there are some ideas on how it may look like. The
existing evanescent-wave fibre technology would be a good place to start looking. In
this technology, a part of the fibre cladding is polished away, allowing access to the
mode field (figure 47a). A number of passive and active devices based on this technol-
ogy are available: fixed and variable attenuators, shutters, polarizers and depolarizers,
optical fibre taps, fixed- and variable-ratio couplers [222, 223]. A variable-ratio cou-
pler consists of two fibres with parts of their claddings removed, placed in contact to
one another for the length of several millimeters (figure 47b). By laterally shifting the
fibre, the coupling ratio can be varied from 0% to 100%. An added advantage of this
device is virtually zero intrinsic insertion loss.
Perhaps such couplers could be manufactured on a running quantum cryptolink
(figure 48). Then, either both of them are quickly switched from 0% to 100% coupling
ratio to connect Eve’s devices into the line, or the coupling ratio of the first coupler is
slowly varied from 0% to 100% as the attack progresses while the second one is used
in weak-coupling mode for pulses injection.
Removed cladding
a) b)
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Figure 48. Tap on fibre channel that can be installed while the quantum cryptolink is in
continuous operation (EWC, evanescent-wave coupler; SW, electro-optical switch).
Many QKD implementations also utilize a dedicated fibre-optic channel between
Alice and Bob to carry synchronization signals and sometimes the public discussion.
The same technology used to tap into the quantum channel can be used to tap into this
classical channel.
B. OTDR measurements on Bob’s setup
After installing the tap, Eve might want to measure exact time delays to and be-
tween various reflections in Bob’s setup. She can use standard OTDR technique to
study reflections in Bob’s setup. This is especially needed if Eve doesn’t have com-
plete information about Bob’s setup.
There are two dangers for Eve to avoid on this stage.
(1) Getting OTDR probing pulses into Bob’s detection windows, increasing QBER
and setting off alarms. To avoid this, Eve can start probing with weak pulses and
monitor public discussion between Alice and Bob for QBER. She can adjust the timing
of her pulses, scan the whole time interval and gradually increase their brightness, until
a slight raise in QBER is detected. Thus she can learn the positions of Bob’s detection
windows.
(2) Detection of the scanning activity by a continuous monitoring detector, if Bob
has one. Perhaps, in this case Eve could use weak and infrequent pulses, performing
OTDR over long time.
C. Optimizing the attack parameters
Eve tries to proceed with attack, substituting at first not all photons in the line, but
only few randomly chosen photons. To do this seamlessly, a high-speed switch at the
tap is required. However, if the tap has been made with a single coupler, simply
changing its coupling ratio and substituting those photons that get split off at the cou-
pler and detected by Eve may be good enough.
Monitoring detection probability and QBER for those photons Eve substitutes with
faked states is crucial at this stage. Eve listens to the public discussion and adjusts the
parameters of the pulses she sends until they become indistinguishable from real
quantum states for Bob.
After that, Eve switches to substituting every photon in the link. To say more accu-
rately, she blocks all Alice’s light from reaching Bob, diverts it to Eve’s detectors, and
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substitutes enough detected photons with faked states so that Bob experiences the same
detection rate as before.
Stages B and C are optional. For a well-tested attack sequence, Eve may not need
them.
The technology for breaking into a quantum cryptolink discussed above is also ap-
plicable to executing Trojan horse attacks, for example large pulse attack [89].
6. Conclusion
(1) Use of passive basis choice on Bob’s side is risky from security standpoint.
Employ a random number generator and an optical modulator to set the detection basis
explicitly. This way, Bob knows the basis for sure.
To ensure true randomness of the basis, it is advisable to use a physical random
number generator, for example the quantum random number generator described
in [224].
(2) Installing a narrowband filter and sensitive, continuous monitoring detector on
both Alice’s and Bob’s sides as a standard security equipment may be a good idea,
whether with passive basis choice or not. Given that several attacks have been discov-
ered that depend on shining light into legitimate parties’ setups, this would be a justi-
fied precaution to hinder future exploits.
An interesting question arises if Eve does not find sufficiently strong vulnerabilities
to run a successful faked states attack, but finds nevertheless some imperfections in
Bob’s setup that would allow her to influence Bob’s detection probabilities, e.g.,
depending on the time delay or polarization of Alice’s quantum states. This can ulti-
mately contribute towards Eve’s quantum attack and allow her to execute an attack that
causes smaller increase in the QBER level than the theoretically optimal quantum
attack on a perfect setup would cause [194]. This means the threshold QBER taking
such inevitable setup imperfections into account should be lower than follows from the
pure theory (e.g., less than 11%), and Alice and Bob should compress the key more
during the privacy amplification — but, by how much? While this problem is ad-
dressed theoretically to some extent in [194], the task of finding the imperfections,
quantifying them and refining the theoretical model remains.
The most general conclusion we’ve come to in our security study is that the perfect
basic principles behind quantum cryptography are not a magic bullet that automatically
provides perfect, unbreakable security. The real security story is still the perpetual cat-
and-mouse game that has kept busy generations of codemakers and codebreakers over
the centuries. The game continues at the next level of technology.
Also, the widespread belief that the danger of quantum cryptography being broken
down overnight is negligible, should be amended. This belief rests on two points [16]:
(1) QKD is futureproof in the sense that any advances in technology in the future
cannot be used to attack QKD keys that are created today, contrary to cryptosystems
based on mathematical assumptions.
(2) Progress in technology is much easier to monitor than progress in mathematics.
While we don’t dispute the first point, the second one does not appear to be always
valid. An implementation loophole like one of those discussed in this paper may be
116
discovered in secrecy and the first expoits can be made rather quickly. Depending on
the diversity of installed base of quantum cryptosystems, such an implementation
loophole can temporarily compromise anything from a small percentage of systems to
nearly all of them. The loophole will require a hardware fix once it becomes known to
the public.
Is it really possible for a determined intruder to explore these attack possibilities,
some of them seemingly extremely effort- and time-consuming? We find the historical
example of cracking Enigma cipher inspiring in this regard. The task required increas-
ingly larger effort, the use of an expertise unconventional to the codebreaking field at
the time (mathematics), and new complex technology (electromechanical automated
machines) [1]. Nevertheless, the German communications were routinely deciphered
by Polish cryptanalysts and then by the Allies during 1933–1945. At the end of the
war, several thousand cryptanalysts had to work to provide the British command with
daily intelligence. Still, it was done. And of course, the German High Command never
believed their unbreakable cipher was cracked (and so were unsuspecting former
British colonies using the Enigmas in the years following the war).
In the present-day world, three-letter government agencies might be content with
the fact that quantum cryptography equipment provides potential loopholes that may be
exploited given a large budget and qualified dedicated staff, just like these agencies
have, plus some motivation. So that they can listen to the quantum-encrypted commu-
nications while everybody else can’t.
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Appendix A: Preparing linear polarization states through an imperfect
polarizer
Any linear optical component can be represented by its Jones matrix T. The Jones
matrix determines its effect on the polarization state and intensity of the incident wave
s , i.e. it relates the output Jones vector t  to the input Jones vector s  via
st T= . To generate a particular output state t  we need to apply an input state
ts
1−
= T . Provided the Jones matrix is non-singular we can in principle generate an
arbitrary output polarization state.
The Jones matrix of an ideal polarizer is singular, however, a real polarizer would
have imperfections rendering the Jones matrix non-singular in general (albeit close to
singular). The Jones matrix of a real polarizer rotated 45° can be written
SCLIN
TTT += , where TLIN represents the ideal polarizer and TSC represents the small
imperfections. The inverse of T will have large components, on the order of the inverse
of the elements in TSC. Thus to generate a linear polarized output state t  oriented at
+/−45° to the extinction axis will require high input power with polarization state s
close to the extinction axis.
Some of the best commercially available polarizers based on birefringent prisms
have extinction ratio of the order of 50 dB [225]. The attenuation of up to ~50 dB such
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a polarizer would inflict on Eve’s pulses can be easily compensated by their increased
energy. Obtaining the proper output polarization states would require, however, a very
precise setting of the input polarization states at the polarizer, which will require pre-
cise polarization control at Eve. Slight polarization instabilities in the path between
Eve and Bob’s polarizer may present an additional difficulty for Eve, and even effec-
tively act as a random polarization scrambler.
Appendix B: Reflection coefficients for different fibre-optic components
Figure 49. Reflection coefficient values of common fibre-optic features, components and
faults. Note that the measured Rayleigh Backscatter coefficients depend on the OTDR
distance resolution; on this diagram, they are specific to the OFM130 system by Opto-
Electronics, Inc., which has better than 1 m distance resolution in Rayleigh measure-
ment mode. Courtesy of Opto-Electronics, Inc. (http://www.opto-electronics.com/).
[ End of included paper ]
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4.3.3.2.  Attack on schemes with active basis choice on Bob’s
side using detector efficiency mismatch
This section consists of two papers.
The first paper published in Physical Review A 74, 022313 (2006) is reprinted ver-
batim on the following pages, with its own list of references and own figures numera-
tion inside the paper. Derivation of bounds in this paper has been made by Johannes
Skaar.
A preprint quant-ph/0702262 of the second paper submitted to the Journal of Mod-
ern Optics is reprinted verbatim after that, with its own list of references and own
figures numeration inside the preprint. We note that the ideas developed in it have
originally been presented in May 2006 [228].
Effects of detector efﬁciency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
Vadim Makarov,1,2,* Andrey Anisimov,2 and Johannes Skaar1
1Department of Electronics and Telecommunications, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway
2Radiophysics Department, St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University, Politechnicheskaya street 29,
195251 St. Petersburg, Russia
Received 4 November 2005; revised manuscript received 15 May 2006; published 17 August 2006
We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efﬁciency as a
function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control
parameter can be the timing of the incoming pulse. When the eavesdropper sends short pulses using the
appropriate timing so that the two gated detectors in Bob’s setup have different efﬁciencies, the security of
quantum key distribution can be compromised. Speciﬁcally, we show for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 BB84
protocol that if the efﬁciency mismatch between 0 and 1 detectors for some value of the control parameter gets
large enough roughly 15:1 or larger, Eve can construct a successful faked-states attack causing a quantum bit
error rate lower than 11%. We also derive a general security bound as a function of the detector sensitivity
mismatch for the BB84 protocol. Experimental data for two different detectors are presented, and protection
measures against this attack are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography enables secure communication be-
tween two parties Alice and Bob, given a quantum channel
and an authentic public channel 1–4. The security is guar-
anteed by the laws of quantum mechanics 5–8 rather than
assumptions about the resources available to a potential ad-
versary. Although the protocol for secret key distribution,
quantum key distribution QKD, can be proved secure in
principle, in the real world the system is not perfect. Flaws in
the source and/or detector may be exploited by an eavesdrop-
per commonly called Eve to collect information about the
key without being discovered. Intuitively, it seems clear that
when the imperfections are sufﬁciently small, the QKD pro-
tocol may still be secure. The impact of several imperfec-
tions has been discussed previously, and corresponding secu-
rity bounds have been established 6,9–11.
Before we go on to consider a speciﬁc detector imperfec-
tion, let us discuss the place of our studies in the picture of
security. For any system where security is required, the set of
all possible input signals can be divided into three subsets
Fig. 1. The subset A are the input signals for which the
system is guaranteed to function normally e.g., for a key
distribution system, generate a secret key. The subset C are
the input signals for which the system fails to perform the
required function explicitly e.g., fails to generate the secret
key and alarms legitimate users about it. The subset B are
input signals for which the system behaves in a way the
developers are not quite sure about, thus potentially includ-
ing subversions by a third party e.g., generation of a key
known to Eve while not raising an alarm. The last subset
ideally should not exist and subsets A and C should ideally
border one another, or at least the developers should be rea-
sonably sure they do.
With classical digital systems requiring security, input
data are binary strings, and the situation where the system is
reasonably guaranteed to have empty subset B is achievable.
For example, implementations of common cryptographic
primitives are usually known to be reasonably secure. How-
ever, developers of protocols and applications with more
complex functionality e.g., most software for personal com-
puters often release them knowing that the subset B is likely
nonempty; successful attacks would be found with time, and
closed by applying patches on an ad hoc basis. The latter
situation is clearly not acceptable for QKD.
The problem is that input data for Bob in a QKD system
are not binary strings which are well deﬁned and could be
directly checked by an algorithm running on a classical com-
puter. The input data for Bob are states of light that we, at the
present level of technology, are having considerable difﬁ-
culty detecting at all, and that have more degrees of freedom
than binary data. This makes the important task of develop-
ing a complete security proof and building a QKD system
that fully corresponds to the model in the proof intricate. We
contribute to this effort by ﬁrst showing that the subset B is
still nonempty in the currently used model: some subset B1
of input light states exists that results in a compromise of
security, or that has merely not been considered before.
Then, we try to ﬁnd ways to expand the subsets A and C to
cover B1 via both extending the model in the proof and sug-
gesting modiﬁcations to QKD setups.
More concretely, we will consider a speciﬁc imperfection
at the detector; a mismatch in detector timing that occurs in
most practical implementations of QKD over optical ﬁbers.
*Electronic address: makarov@vad1.com
A –
provably
secure
B –
unknown
C – fails explicitly
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FIG. 1. Set of all possible input signals for a secure system.
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Most of today’s quantum cryptosystems operating in the
1300 and 1550 nm telecommunication windows use gated
avalanche photodiodes APDs as single-photon detectors.
The detector is sensitive to an incoming photon for a short
time a few nanoseconds called the detection window, and
has practically zero sensitivity outside the detection window.
The systems operate in a pulsed mode, where the expected
time of photon arrival is synchronized with the middle part
of the detection window. The systems have at least two sepa-
rate detection windows or two separate detectors at Bob’s
side for 0 and 1 bit values. These detection windows, while
both covering the time when the photon comes, are inevita-
bly shifted relative to each other, due to ﬁnite manu facturing
tolerances. The shift may arise due to small optical path
length differences or wire length differences, as well as other
imperfections and variations in the detector electronics. Al-
though the detector sensitivities might seem well matched
when characterized with Alice’s pulses, there may exist rap-
idly varying differences at the edges that can only be re-
solved with extremely short pulses.
Eve may exploit a detector timing mismatch by using a
version of the so-called faked-states attack 12. A faked-
states attack on a quantum cryptosystem is an intercept-
resend attack where Eve does not try to reconstruct the origi-
nal states, but instead generates quantum mechanical or
classical light pulses that get detected by the legitimate par-
ties in a way controlled by her while not setting off any
alarms. In this case, she may adjust the timing of her states in
order to change the sensitivity of the 0 detector relative to
that of the 1 detector, and vice versa. By using very short
pulses she may take advantage of any rapidly varying fea-
tures in the detector sensitivity curves not visible to Alice
and Bob.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we introduce
the faked-states attack in the “ideal” case where either detec-
tor can be totally blinded on Eve’s choice. This attack gives
Eve full information about the key while Bob registers no
increase in the quantum bit error rate QBER. In Sec. III we
derive efﬁciency ﬁgures of a practically possible intercept-
resend attack in a more realistic situation with partial efﬁ-
ciency mismatch. Section IV contains a discussion of the
security for any eavesdropping attempts. Measurements of
detector sensitivity curves for two different detectors are pre-
sented in Sec. V. Finally, we discuss protection measures
against this attack and conclude the paper in Sec. VI. Al-
though the attack is exempliﬁed using the Bennett-Brassard
1984 BB84 protocol 1, other protocols that use four states
in two bases may also be vulnerable.
II. TOTAL DETECTOR SENSITIVITY MISMATCH
To explain the attack, let us consider an ideal case when
the detector sensitivity curves are signiﬁcantly shifted in
time relative to one another, so that time zones exist when
one detector is completely blind while the other remains sen-
sitive. Such a situation is depicted in Fig. 2. The ﬁgure also
shows the last part of the scheme with a Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer, a scheme example on which we will consider
this attack1. During normal operation, Alice’s pulse denoted
“Normal signal” is timed to the middle of the detector sen-
sitivity curves, and both detectors are sensitive to it. Now if
Eve mounts a faked-states attack, she cuts into the line and
measures Alice’s quantum states choosing the basis ran-
domly, and replaces them with faked states. She can con-
struct faked states of pulses shifted in time to the sides of
Bob’s detector sensitivity curves, so that only one of the two
detectors can ﬁre in each case the other one is blinded by
timing. Thus she can set her bit value for Bob. Unlike the bit
value, she has no direct control over which basis Bob applies
with his phase modulator. However, Eve can make sure Bob
never detects anything if he chooses a basis incompatible
with Eve’s measurement which happens randomly in 50%
of the cases. To do this, she sets the relative phase of the
pulses in the two arms of the interferometer such that, if Bob
chooses an incompatible basis and applies the corresponding
phase shift to his phase modulator PM, the interference
outcome at the 50-50 coupler BS leads all light toward the
detector that is blinded by timing. If, however, Bob chooses
another basis compatible with Eve’s, the interference out-
come at the coupler will be 50%-50% and the other detector
will click. This trick works because, with today’s compo-
nents and transmission lines, Bob detects only a small frac-
tion of the photons sent by Alice. The click at Bob’s detector
in the case of attack occurs with a reduced probability, but
Eve can easily compensate by increasing the brightness of
her faked states and thus keeping Bob’s average detection
rate the same as before mounting the attack. It is also easy to
see that the bit statistics obtained by Bob is the same as that
obtained in the absence of the attack. As you see, Eve now
gets a complete copy of the key, and remains hidden.
The case of total detector sensitivity mismatch is not only
convenient for explaining the principle of the attack, but can
also occur in practice, as the experimental data later show.
However, much more common and, indeed, unavoidable in
reality would be the case when the detector sensitivities vary
relative to each other in time but the ratio between them does
1Although a scheme with phase encoding is given as an example
in Sec. II, the attack and all obtained results equally apply to polar-
ization encoding, owing to the formal isomorphism between the two
encodings 4.
FIG. 2. Color online Bob’s part of the setup. Bob chooses the
basis with the phase modulator PM. The large detector efﬁciency
mismatch is shown on the plot to the right.
MAKAROV, ANISIMOV, AND SKAAR PHYSICAL REVIEW A 74, 022313 2006
022313-2
not get very large. The implications of this property of de-
tectors for security are analyzed in the rest of the paper.
III. PARTIAL DETECTOR SENSITIVITY
MISMATCH
We will now consider the case when the sensitivity curves
are slightly shifted, i.e., the detectors can only be partially
blinded. For analysis in this section, we shall choose an
eavesdropping strategy that is not necessarily optimal, but
could clearly be implemented today. Let us simply adopt the
intercept-resend strategy as described in the previous section
for that.
Having chosen the strategy, let us consider all the possible
basis and bit combinations during the attack. If we look at
the relative phase of the pulses that Eve generates, we can
note that, formally, she always chooses to resend to Bob the
opposite bit value in the opposite basis compared to her de-
tection. For example, if Eve detects a 0 in the Z basis, she
sends a 1 bit in the X basis to Bob. She also chooses the
timing so as to suppress 1 detection, i.e., a timing t= t0 for
which the ratio 1t /0t is small, where 0t and 1t
denote the time-dependent detector efﬁciencies. The different
events are shown in Table I for the special case where Alice
sends a 0 in the Z basis the other three cases are symmetri-
cal to this case. Initially, we assume that all states involved
in the protocol and the attack are single-photon states. Later
we will discuss the case where Alice and Eve use states with
other photon statistics, e.g., faint laser pulses. Also, for now
it is assumed that Bob’s detectors have no dark counts
which is of course not true but we account for that later on.
We assume that Eve’s detectors and optical alignment are
perfect, and that Eve generates faked states that match the
optical alignment in Bob’s setup perfectly. Based on the
probabilities in the table we can now estimate the efﬁciency
ﬁgures for this strategy in terms of the QBER and the mutual
information between Eve and Alice, and Bob and Alice.
We discard all cases where Alice and Bob have chosen
incompatible bases. When Alice sends a 0 in the Z basis, the
probability that the qubit arrives at Bob is
ParriveA = Z0 =
1
4
0t0 + 0t1 + 21t0 . 1
The probability of arrival averaged over Alice’s four choices
is found by symmetrization of this expression, yielding
Parrive =
1
8
0t0 + 30t1 + 31t0 + 1t1 . 2
Similarly, we ﬁnd the QBER,
QBER = Perror
Parrive
=
20t1 + 21t0
0t0 + 30t1 + 31t0 + 1t1
,
3
where Perror accounts for the cases when Bob detects a bit
value different from what Alice has sent.
Having established the QBER, we will now compare
Bob’s and Eve’s amount of relevant information 13. Denot-
ing the mutual information between Alice and Bob HA :B,
and the mutual information between Alice and Eve HA :E,
the security is guaranteed when HA :BHA :E 14. This
condition is sufﬁcient and necessary for protocols with only
one-way classical communications no advantage distillation
15; with advantage distillation it is not necessary. For
intercept-resend attacks, it is clear that A→E→B is a Mar-
kov chain. Hence, HA :BHA :E, so Bob’s key is gener-
ally not secure. Note that advantage distillation is not pos-
TABLE I. The intercept-resend attack when Alice sends a 0 in
the Z basis as indicated in the ﬁrst column. The second column
contains the basis chosen by Eve and the measurement result; the
third column shows the basis, bit, and timing as resent by Eve. In
the next columns Bob’s basis choice and measurement results are
given. For the case with partial detector sensitivity mismatch, the
probabilities for the different results are shown, given Eve’s basis,
bit value, and timing in addition to Bob’s basis. Note that, for ease
of discussion, the ﬁrst two rows are repeated so that each row in the
table occurs with probability 1/8.
Alice →Eve Eve→ Bob Results, Probability Sifting
Z0 Z0 X1t0 Z 0,
1
2
0t0 Keep
1,
1
2
1t0 Keep
—, 1−
1
2
0t0−
1
2
1t0 Lost
Z0 Z0 X1t0 X 0, 0 Discard
1, 1t0 Discard
—, 1−1t0 Lost
Z0 Z0 X1t0 Z 0,
1
2
0t0 Keep
1,
1
2
1t0 Keep
—, 1−
1
2
0t0−
1
2
1t0 Lost
Z0 Z0 X1t0 X 0, 0 Discard
1 , 1t0 Discard
—, 1−1t0 Lost
Z0 X0 Z1t0 Z 0, 0 Keep
1, 1t0 Keep
—, 1−1t0 Lost
Z0 X0 Z1t0 X 0,
1
2
0t0 Discard
1 ,
1
2
1t0 Discard
—, 1−
1
2
0t0−
1
2
1t0
Lost
Z0 X1 Z0t1 Z 0, 0t1 Keep
1, 0 Keep
—, 1−0t1 Lost
Z0 X1 Z0t1 X 0,
1
2
0t1
Discard
1 ,
1
2
1t1
Discard
—, 1−
1
2
0t1−
1
2
1t1
Lost
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sible because intercept-resend attacks remove any
entanglement between Alice’s and Bob’s qubit.
To analyze in more detail how this particular attack per-
forms we will evaluate the mutual information between Alice
and Eve HA :EHA−HA E. After the basis has been
revealed, A takes only two possible values 0 and 1 while
Eve’s result is Z0, Z1, X0, or X1. We assume that Alice and
Bob have used the Z basis by symmetry in the QKD proto-
col and the eavesdropping strategy we need only consider
this basis choice. The entropy HA is found from the prob-
abilities PA, which, in turn, can be calculated from the
arrival probabilities 1 and 2:
PA = 0 =
0t0 + 0t1 + 21t0
0t0 + 30t1 + 31t0 + 1t1
, 4a
PA = 1 = 1 − PA = 0 . 4b
To identify the conditional entropy HA E, we need the
conditional probabilities PE A, and also PA E which can
be found using Bayes’ rule:
PAE =
PA
PE
PEA . 5
The conditional probabilities PE A are calculated using
Table I:
PE = Z0A = 0 =
0t0 + 1t0
0t0 + 0t1 + 21t0
, 6a
PE = Z1A = 0 = 0, 6b
PE = X0A = 0 =
1t0
0t0 + 0t1 + 21t0
, 6c
PE = X1A = 0 =
0t1
0t0 + 0t1 + 21t0
. 6d
In the case A=1 we ﬁnd the conditional probabilities directly
from 6 using the symmetry. The probabilities PE are
found using the relation
PE =
a
PEA = aPA = a , 7
and the conditional entropy is
HAE = −
e,a
PA = aPE = eA = alog PA = aE = e .
8
After substitution of the probabilities above, the result is
simple: HA E= QBER, where the QBER is given by Eq.
3. Hence,
HA:E = HA − QBER . 9
The mutual information between Alice and Bob,
HA :BHA−HA B, is found by a similar procedure.
After the basis has been revealed A and also B take only two
values 0 and 1. The conditional probabilities PB A are
PB = 0A = 0 =
0t0 + 0t1
0t0 + 0t1 + 21t0
, 10a
PB = 1A = 0 = 1 − PB = 0A = 0 , 10b
PB = 1A = 1 =
1t1 + 1t0
1t1 + 1t0 + 20t1
, 10c
PB = 0A = 1 = 1 − PB = 1A = 1 . 10d
In the special case with symmetric detector efﬁciency
curves, i.e., 0t0=1t1 and 0t1=1t0, we ﬁnd
HA :B=1−hQBER and HA :E=1−QBER, where
h is the binary Shannon entropy function hx
=−x log2 x− 1−xlog21−x. Thus all quantities, the QBER,
HA :B, and HA :E, depend only on one parameter; the
normalized efﬁciency 1t0 /0t0. The result is plotted
in Fig. 3. As mentioned previously, it is apparent that Eve has
always more mutual information with Alice than does Bob.
For =1/3 the difference HA :E−HA :B reaches its
maximum h1/3−1/30.58 for a corresponding QBER of
1/3. If Bob is not aware of his detector efﬁciency mismatch,
he thinks that the key is secure when the QBER is less than
0.11 symmetric protocols with one-way classical communi-
cations 8. Thus Eve can compromise the security of the
system if 0.066. The privacy ampliﬁcation 16 Alice and
Bob apply will not save them from this attack and will not
produce a secret key because the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Eve is always greater than that between
Alice and Bob.
In a real installation, Alice and Bob may expect the
QBER to stay at some level below 0.11, which leaves Eve
less room for the attack. Also in the practical scenario con-
sidered in this section, the contribution of dark counts in
Bob’s detectors to the total QBER is independent of other
error sources and is beyond the control of Eve. Only the part
of QBER not caused by dark counts in Bob’s detectors can
be used by Eve.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
η
H(A:B)
H(A:E)
QBER
FIG. 3. The QBER, the mutual information between Alice and
Bob, HA :B, and the mutual information between Alice and Eve,
HA :E, as functions of the normalized efﬁciency of the blinded
detector, .
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Let us consider any side effects this attack may produce
that may divulge it. Although the attack may not give any
alarm in terms of the QBER, it might be detected as a result
of different measurement statistics at Bob’s detector. From
4 and 10 and their analogs for the case where Bob used
the X basis incompatible basis, we observe that the mea-
surement statistics has changed as a result of Eve’s attack.
However, the changes may be reduced or even eliminated by
choosing suitable t0 and t1. For example, the bit rates are
equal in the symmetric situation analyzed above. Similar
skews in statistics may be produced in the absence of Eve’s
attack by random drifts and optical misalignments during
operation, and may lie within what Bob normally expects.
So far we have assumed that Alice and Eve use single-
photon states. Then Bob can detect the attack as a decreased
bit rate, because Parrive usually would be less than the
detection probability Bob has with no attack. Any reasonably
well implemented Bob would monitor the bit rate and raise
alarm if it drops signiﬁcantly. To compensate for the reduced
detection probability, Eve could increase the brightness of
her pulses several photons in each pulse, and possibly dif-
ferent photon statistics for the t0 and t1 pulses. However,
this compensation might be possible to detect from the coin-
cidence count rates at Bob’s detectors. Alternatively, Eve
could place her intercept unit and resend unit at two separate
locations along the transmission line, thus winning the pho-
tons that would be lost in the line between these two loca-
tions. In the limit we have to assume she would place the
intercept unit near Alice and the resend unit near Bob, get-
ting the whole amount of normal loss in the line to cover for
the reduction in detection probability caused by her attack.
If Alice uses faint laser pulses, the attack is still possible.
However, now Eve must consider the basis-dependent coin-
cidence count rates at Bob’s detectors. If we grant Eve a
future technology, namely, the ability to do photon number
measurement, she would be able to retain the coincidence
rates: Eve could measure the photon number ﬁrst, and run
the faked-states attack only on those pulses that contain one
photon, using a single-photon source to generate faked
states. Those of Alice’s pulses that contain two or more pho-
tons can be passed undisturbed to Bob at the expense of a
small part of the key becoming unavailable to Eve. Alterna-
tively they can be eavesdropped on using the photon number
splitting PNS attack 17–19, provided a version of the
PNS attack that does not alter coincidence counts could be
constructed in this case 20.
Watching the rates and coincidence statistics for different
bit-basis combinations is useful as a general precaution and
should be built into the key distribution protocol. But it does
not necessarily provide security against this attack.
IV. SECURITY BOUND
The intercept-resend attack described in the previous sec-
tion is not necessarily the optimal attack. Alice and Bob
want, of course, their protocol to be secure against any attack
permitted by quantum mechanics. Note that Eve can exploit
rapidly varying features in the detector sensitivity behavior
even though she does not regenerate the pulses. She may
perform a quantum nondemolition measurement of Bob’s
pulses to collapse them into much shorter ones, obtaining the
associated timing information of the resulting pulse. As
shown in the Appendix, this measurement will not disturb
the degrees of freedom encoding Bob’s qubit.
The following discussion of security will be based on the
proofs by Lo and Chau 7 and Shor and Preskill 8. Here,
Eve is allowed to do collective attacks and perform arbitrary
quantum operations on each block of data. Alice and Bob use
only one-way classical communications in the QKD proto-
col. Note that higher bit error rates can be tolerated if they
use two-way classical communications 21 advantage dis-
tillation.
The critical point in the Lo-Chau and Shor-Preskill proofs
is to bound the so-called bit and phase error rates. In the
entanglement puriﬁcation protocol used in the proof, this
corresponds to bounding the ﬁdelity of the Bell pairs re-
ceived by Alice and Bob, and therefore the mutual informa-
tion Eve has with their measurement results. In the QKD
protocol, Alice and Bob measure the error rate by sampling a
subset of the qubits randomly. Bob measures the qubits in
two bases chosen randomly for each qubit. The error rate as
measured in the random sampling process is denoted the bit
error rate; the error rate if Bob had chosen the opposite basis
is denoted the phase error rate. In the case where Eve can
control the detector efﬁciencies, we distinguish between the
measured bit error rate QBER and the actual bit error rate.
The measured bit error rate QBER is the error rate as mea-
sured by Bob, while the actual bit error rate is the error rate
that Bob would measure if his detectors were perfect.
An analysis of several attacks where the eavesdropper has
some information on the basis used by Bob is described by
Gottesman et al. 11. In the Trojan pony attack Ref. 11,
the eavesdropper can control the efﬁciency of the detectors
to create an asymmetry between the bit error rate which is
measured by Bob and the phase error rate which is not
measured. In the optimal case as seen from Eve’s view-
point all errors that Eve eliminates are bit errors. Note that,
in this case, the bit error rate as measured by Bob is the
actual bit error rate since Eve does not control the two de-
tector efﬁciencies separately as opposed to the situation ana-
lyzed in this paper. Bob’s problem is rather that he cannot
measure bit and phase errors on the same qubit.
Now, consider the case relevant to the present paper,
where Eve has no information on the basis used by Bob.
Instead she can control the 0 and 1 detector efﬁciencies sepa-
rately, by appropriate timing of the qubits. Since Eve does
not know Bob’s basis, the actual bit and phase error rates
will be equal. However, since Eve can force the efﬁciencies
of the two detectors to be different, the measured bit error
rate will be different from the actual bit error rate. Therefore,
Bob has to estimate the actual bit error rate from the mea-
sured bit error rate and a priori knowledge of Eve’s power
that is, he must characterize his detector sensitivity curves.
The available bit rate from the QKD after privacy ampli-
ﬁcation is 8
R = 1 − 2h , 11
where  is the actual bit error rate and h is the binary Shan-
non entropy function hx=−x log2 x− 1−xlog21−x. The
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actual bit error rate is related to the measured error rate and
the detector efﬁciencies. The two detector efﬁciencies are
denoted 0t and 1t, and at a certain time t, they may be
different. For example, take 0t1t. In a worst-case
scenario, Eve minimizes the measured bit error rate QBER
for a given . Assuming a large number N of qubits, N of
them would be detected as errors if the detectors were per-
fect. For Bob’s detectors, in the worst case this number is
reduced to 1tN provided Eve uses the timing t. At the
same time, the number of qubits detected as correct bits is
only reduced from 1−N to 0t1−N. The associated
QBER becomes 1t / 1t+0t1−. Minimizing
with respect to t, we obtain2
QBER = 
1 +  − 
, 12
where
 = min	min
t
1t
0t
,min
t
0t
1t

 . 13
In other words, the estimate for ,
 =
QBER
 + 1 − QBER , 14
and not the QBER, should be used to determine the required
amount of privacy ampliﬁcation. The QKD protocol is se-
cure provided 0.11 0.11 is the zero of 1−2h, which
means approximately that QBER0.11.
The bound above might be a little pessimistic: Eve needs
at least a “partial” qubit measurement to decide which timing
to use for the pulses going to Bob. This measurement must
certainly be performed before Eve gets information on the
basis used by Alice and Bob. The Shor-Preskill bound as-
sumes that Eve may wait with her measurement until the
basis choice is made public.
The security ﬁndings that have been made in the paper are
summarized in Fig. 4.
V. EXPERIMENTAL DATA
In this section we present measured detector sensitivity
curves of two different single-photon detectors. Both devices
under test were laboratory prototypes of detectors that were a
part of or intended for use in quantum cryptography systems.
A. Detector model 1
The ﬁrst detector we tested was a time-multiplexed detec-
tor, i.e., a single detector registering 0 and 1 counts in dif-
ferent time slots. The light pulses corresponding to the 0 and
1 bit values were combined into a single ﬁber one of the
pulses was delayed in an optical delay line, and fed to the
detector. The detector was gated at double the pulse rate,
with 0 pulses coming in odd gates and 1 pulses coming in
even gates. The model operated at 1310 nm and used a
Soviet-made Ge APD standard part number FD312L, devel-
oped by NPO Orion cooled to 77 K. Gate pulses at the APD
in this detector were made as narrow as practically possible,
around 2 ns full width at half maximum FWHM. The laser
pulse in the test was 100 ps wide FWHM and was actually
the same pulse normally used by Alice: we simply employed
the entire QKD setup described in Ref. 22 to do the detec-
tor test, only changing the time delay of the laser pulse in
order to measure the sensitivity curves. The measured curves
are presented in Fig. 5.
Since the same detector is used for 0 and 1 detections, we
would expect the shapes of sensitivity curves to be highly
identical. This is indeed the case. Also the curves have al-
most no time shift relative to one another, which means the
ﬁber optic delay line in our setup was cut and spliced with
good precision from these data we can estimate the cutting
inaccuracy to be less than ±25 ps or ±5 mm. Nevertheless
the time range encircled on the chart where the laser pulse
impinges the APD at the closing edge of the gate shows
sensitivity mismatch 1/2. It is possible the mismatch is
actually larger than this, but we could not resolve it unless
we used narrower laser pulses and did a more detailed mea-
surement in this time range. The other side of the peak where
the laser pulse impinges the APD before and at the opening
edge of the gate shows no discernible sensitivity mismatch,
because the APD sensitivity in this time range rises
smoothly. This is consistent with the presence of a trailing
tail in a typical APD time response 23,24.
The measured curves suggest that the practical attack de-
scribed in Sec. III would be impossible, but the general se-
curity bound 14 would impose a signiﬁcant penalty on the
2Eve may certainly use several different t’s for different qubits.
However, since ipi /iqiminipi /qi for any positive pi and qi,
the minimum QBER is still given by the minimum of
1t / 1t+0t1− and 0t / 0t+1t1− for
all t.
0 1
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(assumed insecure)
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0.0660
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with reduced key rate
FIG. 4. Security state of a QKD system as a function of the
normalized efﬁciency of the blinded detector  and the measured
QBER. In the “Secure” zone, the required amount of privacy am-
pliﬁcation is larger than without considering this attack, being de-
termined by  given in Eq. 14. In order to make this plot, we have
allowed for some simpliﬁcations. The border between “Not proven”
and “Insecure” zones is drawn assuming the special case of sym-
metric detector efﬁciency curves discussed in Sec. III. The QBER
for the “Insecure” zone is assumed to be without contribution from
dark counts in Bob’s detectors.
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key rate and maximum allowed QBER. It is also clear that a
better measurement with narrower laser pulse no wider than
few tens of picoseconds, smaller time increments, and ex-
tended time range would generally be desired for detector
testing.
The precision with which the ﬁber delay line was cut in
this setup was actually unnecessary for normal operation of
the QKD. Should less care be taken in cutting the delay line,
there would typically be larger mismatch at both sides of the
curve. In the worst possible case one of the curves could end
up shifted to the left by 1.1 ns, providing the same sensitivity
for Alice’s pulse as we have now while leaving sufﬁciently
large mismatch at the sides for Eve to attempt the practical
attack described in Sec. III.
B. Detector model 2
The second detector we tested was a dual detector, con-
sisting of two identical single-photon detectors registering 0
and 1 counts in parallel. This detector was one of the several
different test prototypes developed at the Radiophysics De-
partment at the St. Petersburg State Polytechnic University.
Each of the two detector channels had its own APD, gating,
and detection electronics, while the thermoelectric cooler for
the APDs, power supply, and external synchronization were
shared. JDS Uniphase EPM239BA former Epitaxx
EPM239BA single-mode ﬁber pigtailed APDs were used,
cooled to −48 °C. The APDs were gated at 100 kHz, with
gate pulses having magnitude of 8 V and width of 3.5 ns
FWHM. The laser pulse in the test had wavelength of
1560 nm and was less than 200 ps wide FWHM. The de-
tector was set into a mode that would be suitable for its
operation in a QKD system. The peak efﬁciencies in both
channels were made to be roughly equal, by adjusting the
bias voltage separately on each APD. The laser pulses im-
pinged both APDs almost simultaneously; the remaining
small difference in the optical paths, 9 mm or 45 ps between
the channels, was later accounted for when plotting the
charts so they represent the response to a laser pulse imping-
ing both APDs at exactly the same time.
With this detector, we tried to do a more thorough mea-
surement than with the previous one. The sensitivity curves
are shown in Fig. 6. Although the curves overlap in a 1.6
-ns-wide zone well enough for use in QKD, there are sig-
niﬁcant mismatches at the sides. Using the time t1 marked on
the chart, and a t0 where both detector efﬁciencies are small,
Eq. 3 gives QBER0.061. This may give an impression
that the attack described in Sec. III is possible. However, any
properly implemented Bob would raise an alarm if the 0 and
1 detection rates were signiﬁcantly different. To achieve
more similar detection rates, Eve can increase the brightness
of her t0 pulses and/or tune t0. In the limit where the two
detection rates are equal, she chooses the t0 as marked on the
chart to obtain the minimum QBER of 0.119. This means
that the attack would be discovered however, it is close to
the threshold. Nevertheless, the QKD system with this de-
tector will be rendered inoperative by the general security
bound 14, which for =1/30 allows a QBER of no more
than 0.0036. Note that shifting the curves relative to one
another never eliminates large sensitivity mismatch.
In the measurement above, we could not see the quantum
efﬁciency in the long tails, because it was masked by dark
counts. It was therefore natural to repeat the measurement
using three orders of magnitude brighter pulses. The ex-
pected result is complete saturation in the middle, and el-
evated, well-resolved tails. The result we obtained, however,
was quite surprising Fig. 7. Although the measurement did
resolve the tails showing a signiﬁcant mismatch around
1 ns, the detector performance in the middle part of the
chart was erratic, with sensitivity plunging to zero where
there should have been saturation. Using this behavior of the
detector, Eve could likely run the attack in conditions close
to the total sensitivity mismatch described in Sec. II.
Forced to explain this detector behavior, we turned to the
schematic of its electronics. The feature of this particular test
prototype was that it used signal reﬂected from the APD, so
that only one electrical waveguide had to be connected to
each APD, thus reducing the thermal ﬂow and easing cooling
Fig. 8. To split off the reﬂected signal, a microstrip coupler
was used, forming a circulator at frequencies above 1 GHz.
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FIG. 5. Detector model 1. Sensitivity curves for the 0 open
squares and 1 ﬁlled squares time slots, at low mean number of
photons at the APD 1. Dark counts were subtracted. The
curves, originally of different height, were scaled so that their peak
points coincide. t is the relative time of arrival of the laser pulse at
the APD; t=0 was the actual arrival time of Alice’s pulse in the
operational QKD setup before this measurement.
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FIG. 6. Detector model 2. Sensitivity curves for the 0 open
squares and 1 ﬁlled squares time slots, at mean number of pho-
tons at the APD =0.5. Dark counts were subtracted.
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The following ampliﬁer had the bandwidth of ca. 2.5 GHz.
Thus the whole tract for the reﬂected signal suppressed spec-
tral components outside the 1–2.5 GHz band. There was no
balancing circuit for spikes in the reﬂected signal that re-
sulted from the gate front and back edges causing current
through the APD capacitance, and also the spikes seeping
into the reﬂected signal tract through other electrical imper-
fections. These unwanted spikes were partially suppressed
spectrally: most of the spectrum of the spikes lay below
1 GHz, as the front and back edges of the gate pulse were
less steep than the front edge of the avalanche signal. The
comparator threshold was ﬁne tuned to be lower than the
avalanche signal, but higher than the parasitic signal at the
output of the tract in the absence of avalanche. This all
worked ﬁne for avalanches caused by absorption of 1-2 pho-
tons, as Fig. 6 illustrated. However, with avalanches caused
by almost simultaneous absorption of hundreds of photons
from every laser pulse, this spectral-selective circuit con-
nected to a ﬁnely tuned comparator produced the gaps seen
in Fig. 7. The use of a spectral-selective circuit was a neces-
sary condition for this abnormal behavior. The spectrum of
the avalanche pulse was a function of two varying param-
eters: the pulse length and the shape of its front edge. The
fraction of the avalanche pulse that passed through the
spectral-selective tract to the comparator thus depended on
these two parameters. Small changes in them due to the use
of brighter light pulses resulted in the observed behavior of
the output signal. Exact details of APD operation with
brighter pulses, however, proved to be elusive to measure
with the equipment we had.
Although we were able to eliminate the abnormal detector
behavior with =500 laser pulses by making adjustments in
the electronics, this test prototype together with the idea of
using reﬂected signal and/or spectral-selective detection tract
had to be scrapped. It is simply too risky from the security
standpoint to use detectors based on this or any other “ad-
vanced” approach in QKD systems, even if you test them
well. More straightforward detection schemes have to be pre-
ferred.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have seen that when the detection of 0 and 1 bits can
be blinded separately by timing, Eve can obtain full informa-
tion about the key while she is hidden. In the case with only
partial sensitivity mismatch, a similar attack is possible
which will not provide alarm to Alice and Bob in terms of
the QBER when the mismatch is sufﬁciently large. Although
the speciﬁc intercept-resend attack given in Sec. III only
works in certain conditions, more sophisticated attacks may
exist which are able to exploit small sensitivity mismatches.
Hence, to ensure secure QKD it is crucial to characterize
Bob’s detectors and specify maximum sensitivity mismatch.
Based on this information, the worst-case estimate for 
given in 14, and not the QBER, should be used to deter-
mine the required amount of privacy ampliﬁcation.
Speciﬁc measures aimed to specify and/or limit the sensi-
tivity mismatch might be the following.
1 Measure detector characteristics especially sensitivity
vs time over a variety of input signals, including those well
beyond the normal operating range. Use sufﬁciently short
pulses so that all features of the sensitivity curves are cap-
tured. Employing a simple, straightforward detector circuitry
can help lower the likelihood of hidden surprises, both dis-
covered and undiscovered by testing.
2 Introduce intentional random jitter in the detector syn-
chronization to “smear” the curves and lower the mismatch.
3 Implement active protection by checking timing of
incoming pulses at Bob. This can be done through random
shifting of Bob’s detection time window, by registering the
time of avalanche onset within the window, or with addi-
tional detectors.
In the future it would be desirable to see if the general
security bound, as implied by 14, can be narrowed. The
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FIG. 7. Detector model 2. Sensitivity curves for the 0 open
squares and 1 ﬁlled squares time slots, at mean number of pho-
tons at the APD =500. In the encircled time range 4.65–5.30 ns
the clicking probability in both detectors measured exactly zero 0
counts registered per 105 gates. Unfortunately the time reference
in this plot is not accurately matched with that in Fig. 6, and the
curves’ features cannot be directly compared between the two
ﬁgures.
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FIG. 8. Detector model 2. Equivalent diagram of a single chan-
nel. G is a single-shot generator that forms the gate pulse for the
APD. BPF is an equivalent band-pass ﬁlter representing the fre-
quency bandwidth of the tract for the reﬂection signal.
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security bound as it stays now is rather strict, and requires
the amount of privacy ampliﬁcation to be corrected in most
practical quantum cryptosystems that use four-state proto-
cols.
Not all QKD protocols are vulnerable to this attack. For
example, the Bennett 1992 B92 protocol 25–28 is not
affected, because it uses just one detector for quantum states
however, Bob should be careful not to allow Eve to make a
“faked” reference pulse which is accepted by Bob’s classical
detector but causes no clicks at his single-photon detector;
using a local oscillator as proposed in Ref. 26 is a good
solution to this problem; insecure implementations of B92
that do not use homodyne measurement have to be avoided
29,30. The modiﬁcation of the BB84 protocol in Refs.
31,32, with a single detector randomly chosen via phase
modulator setting to detect either a 0 or 1 bit, is not vulner-
able for the same reason.3 The six-state protocol 33–35
seems not to be vulnerable though we note that a faked-
states attack along the lines of Sec. II on the six-state proto-
col gives 25% QBER in the case of total efﬁciency mis-
match, while the straight intercept-resend attack results in
33.3% QBER.
On the other hand, the SARG04 protocol 36–38 is vul-
nerable to this attack. Also, faked states exploiting detector
efﬁciency mismatch can be constructed for energy-time en-
coding and differential phase shift keying QKD schemes
39–43; see examples of faked states in Ref. 44.
Implementations with a source of entangled pairs placed
outside of Alice and Bob as opposed to using it inside Alice
to prepare the states give Eve additional degrees of freedom
to run this attack. When photons travel from Alice to Bob,
Eve can completely block only one of Bob’s bases one de-
tector is blocked by timing and the other by destructive in-
terference in this basis. This allows to eavesdrop on the
protocols that use two bases BB84, SARG04, but not on
the protocols that use three bases six-state protocol, Ekert
protocol 3 if it is implemented with an entangled pair
source inside Alice. However when photons travel from the
entangled pair source to Alice and Bob with both paths ac-
cessible to Eve, she can replace the entangled pair source
with a faked one, generating two faked states synchronously:
one for Alice and one for Bob. She can generate a pair of
faked states that block completely one basis at Alice and
another basis at Bob. Then Alice and Bob only get coinci-
dence clicks in the same basis when they choose the third
basis in the protocol. This allows to eavesdrop on the six-
state protocol 33,34 if it is implemented in an entangled
pair version, with the source of entangled pairs placed be-
tween Alice and Bob. Also a set of faked states can be con-
structed for the Ekert protocol at least if it is implemented as
described in Ref. 3 with no additional consistency checks
besides checking that S=−22 44.
Throughout the paper, Eve used time t as a control param-
eter to alter detector efﬁciencies. We note that t could in
principle be regarded as a general control parameter allowing
Eve to change Bob’s detector efﬁciencies. It could be not
necessarily time but, e.g., polarization or wavelength. For
instance, in up-conversion single-photon detectors 45–47
hardware gating of detectors is removed, but a narrow wave-
length selectivity is introduced instead. Eve could try to use
the wavelength of pulses instead of time to run this attack.
Finally we note that Qi et al. have recently proposed an
interesting modiﬁcation of our attack 48.
APPENDIX: QUANTUM NONDEMOLITION
MEASUREMENT OF QUBIT TIMING
Here we will show that Eve can perform quantum non-
demolition measurements of the timing of the qubits, and
collapse Alice’s photon pulses into arbitrarily narrow pulses.
This measurement does not affect the degrees of freedom
encoding the qubit. While time-bin phase-encoded qubits
are considered here, one may treat other encodings in a simi-
lar way.
The phase-encoded qubit is denoted 	t0. Here, 	 is the
phase difference between the two pulses 0°, 90°, 180°, or
270°, and t0 is the absolute timing of the pulses, i.e., the
time of the peak of the ﬁrst pulse. If we assume that 	t0 is
a single-photon state,4 it can be expressed as
	t0 =
1
2 at0
† + ei	at0+

† 0 , A1
where 0 is the vacuum state of the single optical mode, 
 is
the time delay between the two pulses, and
at0
†
= dt t,t0a†t . A2
In Eq. A2, a†t is the continuous-time creation operator
49 of the optical mode. The operator satisﬁes the commu-
tator relation at ,a†t=t− t. The function t , t0 rep-
resents, for instance, a Gaussian pulse shape:
t,t0 = 22/1/4 exp− i0t − t0 − 2t − t02 .
A3
Here 0 and  are the central frequency and pulse band-
width, respectively. The duration t of the pulse is of the
order 1 /, and satisﬁes t
.
If Eve wants to measure the timing of a qubit pulse pair,
she should do a nondemolition measurement that does not
affect the degrees of freedom encoding the qubit. She divides
the pulse time range t0− t /2 , t0+ t /2 into small intervals
Ti= t0− t /2+ it , t0− t /2+ i+1t, where i is a positive
3Although the B92 protocol and the modiﬁcation of the BB84
protocol in Refs. 31,32 are not affected by the attack described in
the present paper, they are instead vulnerable to another attack.
These protocols apply the key bit values directly at Bob’s phase
modulator, encoded in the phase shift settings. This makes them
vulnerable to the large-pulse attack 51,52: The phase shift settings
could be read by Eve from Bob’s modulator using external light
pulses which do not have to be very bright. The Scarani-Acin-
Ribordy-Gisin 2004 SARG04 protocol 36–38 also applies the
key bit values at Bob’s modulator. Other protocols only apply de-
tection bases at Bob’s modulator, which makes them less vulnerable
to the large-pulse attack. 4Coherent pulses can be treated along the same lines.
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integer and t is her time resolution. We assume that she
has rough estimates of t0 and t a priori, with precision
better than of the order of t. Moreover, she knows 
 with
precision better than t. The non-demolition measurement
is described formally by the projectors
PTi = 
Ti
dta†t00at + a†t + 
00at + 
 .
A4
Note that PTiPTj=ijPTi and iPTi=1 in the Hilbert
space spanned by the signal states A1, so this is a valid
quantum mechanical projective measurement 50. More-
over, when the projectors PTi act on the state A1 the
pulse width of each of the two pulses collapses to a smaller
pulse width t; however the qubit encoding is not affected.
In other words, Eve compresses the pulses and obtains the
timing information i.
One way to implement this measurement is ﬁrst to switch
the two pulses into two optical modes a and b. The ﬁrst
pulse is then delayed by 
 so that the two pulses arrive
at the measuring device simultaneously. The signal state
A1 can now be expressed as 	= 12 a
†+ei	b†00
=
1
2 10+e
i	01, omitting the time notation for simplicity.
Now, Eve lets a probe a simple quantum computer interact
unitarily with the signal state, described as follows:
000→ 000, 010→ 011, 100→ 101. Here
the last state in the product denotes that of the probe. Since
000→ 000 and 	0→ 	1, Eve will detect the
presence of the qubit without disturbing it. Moreover, if her
measurement device is sufﬁciently fast, she is able to obtain
the timing and the pulses will collapse into shorter ones.
1 C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal
Processing IEEE Press, New York, 1984, pp. 175–179.
2 C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and J. Smo-
lin, J. Cryptology 5, 3 1992.
3 A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 1991.
4 N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev. Mod.
Phys. 74, 145 2002.
5 D. Mayers, in Advances in Cryptology—Proceedings of
Crypto’96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1109, ed-
ited by N. Koblitz Springer, New York, pp. 343–357.
6 D. Mayers, J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 48, 351 2001.
7 H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 1999.
8 P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 2000.
9 M. Koashi and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 057902 2003.
10 H. Inamori, N. Lütkenhaus, and D. Mayers, e-print quant-ph/
0107017.
11 D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lütkenhaus, and J. Preskill, Quan-
tum Inf. Comput. 4, 325 2004.
12 V. Makarov and D. R. Hjelme, J. Mod. Opt. 52, 691 2005.
13 C. Shannon, Bell Syst. Tech. J. 27, 379 1948.
14 I. Csiszár and J. Körner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 24, 339
1978.
15 U. M. Maurer, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 39, 733 1993.
16 C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Crépeau, and U. M. Maurer,
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 41, 1915 1995.
17 S. Felix, N. Gisin, A. Stefanov, and H. Zbinden, J. Mod. Opt.
48, 2009 2001.
18 G. Brassard, N. Lütkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 85, 1330 2000.
19 N. Lütkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052304 2000.
20 N. Lütkenhaus and M. Jahma, New J. Phys. 4, 44 2002.
21 D. Gottesman and H.-K. Lo, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 49, 457
2003.
22 V. Makarov, A. Brylevski, and D. Hjelme, Appl. Opt. 43,
4385 2004.
23 A. Lacaita, F. Zappa, S. Cova, and P. Lovati, Appl. Opt. 35,
2986 1996.
24 F. Zappa, A. Lacaita, S. Cova, and P. Lovati, Opt. Eng. Bell-
ingham 35, 938 1996.
25 C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 1992.
26 M. Koashi, Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 120501 2004.
27 A. Muller, T. Herzog, B. Huttner, W. Tittel, H. Zbinden, and N.
Gisin, Appl. Phys. Lett. 70, 793 1997.
28 J.-M. Mérolla, Y. Mazurenko, J.-P. Goedgebuer, and W. T.
Rhodes, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 1656 1999.
29 W. T. Buttler, R. J. Hughes, P. G. Kwait, S. K. Lamoreaux, G.
G. Luther, G. L. Morgan, J. E. Nordholt, C. G. Peterson, and
C. M. Simmmons, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3283 1998.
30 T. Durt, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 2476 1999; W. T. Buttler et al.,
ibid. 83, 2477 1999.
31 M. LaGasse, U.S. Patent No. 20050190922 pending.
32 P. M. Nielsen, C. Schori, J. L. Sørensen, L. Salvail, I.
Damgård, and E. Polzik, J. Mod. Opt. 48, 1921 2001.
33 D. Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 1998.
34 H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 59,
4238 1999.
35 C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, S. Breidbart, and S. Wiesner, IBM
Tech. Discl. Bull. 26, 4363 1984.
36 V. Scarani, A. Acin, G. Ribordy, and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. Lett.
92, 057901 2004.
37 A. Acin, N. Gisin, and V. Scarani, Phys. Rev. A 69, 012309
2004.
38 C. Branciard, N. Gisin, B. Kraus, and V. Scarani, Phys. Rev. A
72, 032301 2005.
39 W. Tittel, J. Brendel, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 84, 4737 2000.
40 Y. Nambu, T. Hatanaka, and K. Nakamura, Jpn. J. Appl. Phys.,
Part 2 43, L1109 2004.
41 K. Inoue, E. Waks, and Y. Yamamoto, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89,
037902 2002.
42 W. T. Buttler, J. R. Torgerson, and S. K. Lamoreaux, Phys.
Lett. A 299, 38 2002.
43 H. Takesue, E. Diamanti, T. Honjo, C. Langrock, M. M. Fejer,
K. Inoue, and Y. Yamamoto, New J. Phys. 7, 232 2005.
44 V. Makarov, J. Skaar, and A. Anisimov, http://
www.iet.ntnu.no/groups/optics/qcr/poster-minsk-200605/ .
45 R. T. Thew, S. Tanzilli, L. Krainer, S. C. Zeller, A. Rochas, I.
Rech, S. Cova, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin, New J. Phys. 8, 32
2006.
MAKAROV, ANISIMOV, AND SKAAR PHYSICAL REVIEW A 74, 022313 2006
022313-10
46 C. Langrock, E. Diamanti, R. V. Roussev, Y. Yamamoto, M.
M. Fejer, and H. Takesue, Opt. Lett. 30, 1725 2005.
47 E. Diamanti, H. Takesue, T. Honjo, K. Inoue, and Y. Yama-
moto, Phys. Rev. A 72, 052311 2005.
48 B. Qi, C.-H. Fung, H.-K. Lo, and X. Ma, e-print quant-ph/
0512080.
49 R. Loudon, The Quántum Theory of Light Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2000.
50 M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and
Quantum Information Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, U.K., 2000.
51 A. Vakhitov, V. Makarov, and D. R. Hjelme, J. Mod. Opt. 48,
2023 2001.
52 N. Gisin, S. Fasel, B. Kraus, H. Zbinden, and G. Ribordy,
Phys. Rev. A 73, 022320 2006.
EFFECTS OF DETECTOR EFFICIENCY MISMATCH ON¼ PHYSICAL REVIEW A 74, 022313 2006
022313-11
Faked states attack using detector eﬃciency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time,
DPSK, and Ekert protocols
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In quantum cryptosystems, variations in detector eﬃciency can be exploited to stage a successful
attack. This happens when the eﬃciencies of Bob’s two detectors are diﬀerent functions of a control
parameter accessible to Eve (e.g., timing of the incoming pulses). It has previously been shown that
the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol is vulnerable to this attack. In this paper, we show that
several other protocols and encodings are also vulnerable. We consider a faked states attack in the
case of a partial eﬃciency mismatch on the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocol,
and derive the quantum bit error rate as a function of detector eﬃciencies. Additionally, it is shown
how faked states can in principle be constructed for quantum cryptosystems that use a phase-time
encoding, the diﬀerential phase shift keying (DPSK) and the Ekert protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique that
allows remote parties to grow shared secret random key
material at a steady rate, given an insecure optical com-
munication channel and an initially authenticated clas-
sical communication channel between them [1, 2]. Since
the ﬁrst experimental demonstration seventeen years ago
[1], QKD systems have developed to commercial devices
working over tens of kilometers of optical ﬁber [3, 4], as
well as experiments over more than a hundred kilome-
ters of ﬁber [5, 6, 7, 8] and 23 km of free space [9, 10].
Although the security of QKD has been unconditionally
proven for a model of equipment that includes certain
non-idealities [11, 12, 13, 14, 15], not all real properties of
optical and electrooptical components have been included
into the proof. Identifying the properties of components
potentially dangerous for security and integrating them
into the proof (or closing the issue in some other way) is
an ongoing work [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21].
In this paper, we continue to analyse a common im-
perfection of Bob’s single photon detectors: variation of
their eﬃciency that can be controlled by Eve via a choice
of an external parameter. It has been shown in Refs. 20
and 21 that even smallest variations of one detector eﬃ-
ciency relative to the other detector reduce the amount
of secret information theoretically available to Alice and
Bob in the case of the BB84 protocol. The amount of
key compression during the privacy ampliﬁcation must
be adjusted based on an evaluation of the worst-case ef-
ﬁciency mismatch of Bob’s detectors. We recap these
results in Sec. II. In the following sections, we consider
other protocols and encodings: SARG04 in Sec. III, a
∗Electronic address: makarov@vad1.com
class of schemes using the phase-time encoding and the
DPSK protocol in Sec. IV, and the Ekert protocol with a
source of entangled photons in Sec. V. It is shown how to
construct a faked states attack [19] against these proto-
cols and encodings. For the SARG04, the upper bound
on available secret key information is estimated, through
calculating the quantum bit error rate (QBER) caused
by this attack.
II. BB84 PROTOCOL
Variation of eﬃciency is a common and, indeed, un-
avoidable imperfection of single photon detectors. The
eﬃciency may depend on the timing of incoming light
pulse (e.g., in gated detectors based on avalanche pho-
todiodes), wavelength of incoming light (e.g., in up-
conversion detectors [22, 23, 24]), polarization and
other parameters conceivably controllable by Eve. In
QKD schemes that employ two detectors (or a time-
multiplexed detector), the variation will be diﬀerent be-
tween the detectors (or detection windows), allowing Eve
to control the relative probability of one detection out-
come over the other. To illustrate how she can use this
to construct a successful attack on the BB84 protocol
[1], we assume ﬁrst that the eﬃciency mismatch for some
values of the control parameter is so large that Eve can
practically blind either detector while the other remains
sensitive, i.e., we have the case of a total eﬃciency mis-
match. We call the value of the control parameter that
blinds the 1 detector t0, and the value that blinds the 0
detector t1. Eve then proceeds with a faked states attack
[19], which is an intercept-resend attack where she uses
a replica of Bob’s setup to detect every Alice’s state, and
resends specially formed faked states to Bob. The faked
state she resends in this case would be a state normally
used in the protocol but with the opposite bit value in
2the opposite basis comparing to what Eve has detected.
Additionally, in the faked state she sets the value of the
control parameter that blinds the detector for the oppo-
site bit value from what she has detected. For example,
suppose Eve has detected the 0 bit value in the X ba-
sis. She resends the 1 bit in the Z basis, with the control
parameter t0. If Bob tries to detect this faked state in
the Z basis, he never detects anything, for his 1 detec-
tor is blinded by Eve’s choice of the control parameter.
If he tries to detect in the X basis, he with equal prob-
ability doesn’t detect anything or detects the 0 bit. To
run a successful intercept-resend attack, Eve needs either
her detection basis always be the same as Alice’s, or her
detection basis always be the same as Bob’s; here she
achieves the latter.1 The reader may notice that the at-
tack reduces the detection probability at Bob, but this
can be compensated by a proportionally increased bright-
ness of the faked states. Thus, in the case of the total
eﬃciency mismatch, Eve can run an attack that causes
zero QBER and provides her full information on the key.
In the case of a partial eﬃciency mismatch, when either
detector cannot be completely blinded, this attack causes
some non-zero QBER. Eve can pick the values of the
control parameter to minimize the ratios η0(t1)/η1(t1)
and η1(t0)/η0(t0), where η0 and η1 are eﬃciencies of the
0 and 1 detectors. It has been shown in Ref. 20 that in
this case the attack causes
(QBER) =
2η0(t1) + 2η1(t0)
η0(t0) + 3η0(t1) + 3η1(t0) + η1(t1)
. (1)
In the special case of symmetric detector eﬃciency curves
η0(t1)/η1(t1) = η1(t0)/η0(t0) ≡ η and Eve adjusting the
brightness of her faked states sent with t0 and t1 such
that Bob’s detection probability for both values of the
control parameter remains equal, this simpliﬁes to
(QBER) =
2η
1 + 3η
. (2)
The QBER value of 0.11 (commonly regarded as the
threshold value for the BB84 protocol, after which no
secret key could be extracted) would be reached at η ≈
1/15.
The attack described above is not necessarily optimal.
In Ref. 20 it is indicated that the BB84 protocol is secure
provided (QBER)  0.11η. However, note that Eq. 11 in
Ref. 20 is incorrect; the available bit rate after privacy
ampliﬁcation is reduced even in the case (QBER) = 0
[21]. A rigorous treatment of the security for arbitrary
attacks exploiting detector eﬃciency mismatch is still not
available.
1 Surely, in the latter case Eve detects half of Alice’s bits in a wrong
basis. However, when she forces Bob to detect in the same wrong
basis, all her wrong detection results are later discarded by Alice
and Bob during sifting.
III. SARG04 PROTOCOL
The purpose of the SARG04 protocol [25, 26, 27] is
to increase the maximum trasmission distance and key
yield in schemes that use a weak coherent source; the
protocol has improved characteristics against the photon
number splitting attack, comparing to the BB84. Here
we consider the version of the SARG04 that uses states
physically equivalent to those used in the BB84 (Fig. 1),
and diﬀers from the latter only at the sifting stage. The
bit values 0 and 1 in the SARG04 are encoded by the
choice of basis. Alice sends randomly one of the four
states |0a〉, |0b〉, |1a〉 or |1b〉. Bob measures either in the
0 or 1 detection basis, and uses two detectors labeled a
and b. At the sifting stage, Alice announces publicly a
set of two states that contains the actual state sent and
a random state from the opposite basis. For deﬁniteness,
suppose that Alice has sent |0a〉 and that she has an-
nounced the set {|0a〉, |1a〉}. If Bob has measured in the
0 basis, he has certainly got the result 0a; but since this
result is possible for both states in the set {|0a〉, |1a〉},
he has to discard it. If he has measured in the 1 basis
and got 1a, he again cannot discriminate. But if he has
measured in the 1 basis and got 1b, he knows that Alice
has sent |0a〉, and adds 0 to his key.
Since this protocol uses the same states as the BB84,
the faked states attack described in the previous section
could be applied to it. In the case of the total eﬃciency
mismatch, it obviously causes zero QBER. To calculate
the QBER it causes in the case of the partial eﬃciency
mismatch, we follow the approach of Ref. 20 and consider
all the possible basis and detector combinations during
the attack. The diﬀerent events are shown in Table I
for the special case where Alice sends the |0a〉 state (the
other three cases are symmetrical to this case). We dis-
regard the probability of Eve’s and Bob’s detectors ﬁring
simultaneously due to the multiphoton fraction of the
pulses, assume that Bob’s detectors have no dark counts,
assume that Eve’s detectors and optical alignment are
perfect, and that Eve generates faked states that match
the optical alignment in Bob’s setup perfectly. None of
these assumptions is critical for the attack to work, but
it is convenient to make them to simplify the calculation.
|0a
|1b
|1a
|0b
x
y
FIG. 1: States conﬁguration for the SARG04 protocol in the
case when the states used are physically equivalent to those
in the BB84 protocol. The circle represents the equator of
the Poincare sphere.
3TABLE I: The intercept-resend attack on the SARG04 pro-
tocol when Alice sends the |0a〉 state (as indicated in the ﬁrst
column; in the table, brackets around states are omitted for
clarity). The second column contains the basis chosen by Eve
and the measurement result; the third column shows the state
and timing as resent by Eve. In the next columns Bob’s basis
choice and measurement results are given. For the case with
the partial detector sensitivity mismatch, the probabilities for
the diﬀerent results are shown, given Eve’s state and timing
in addition to Bob’s basis. In the last two columns, pairs of
states announced by Alice during sifting (two possible pairs
announced with equal probability of 1/2), and the sifting re-
sults, are shown. Note that, for ease of discussion, the ﬁrst
two rows are repeated so that each row in the table occurs
with probability 1/8.
Alice →Eve Eve→ Bob Result,
Probability
Alice’s
announce
Sifting
0a 0a 1bta 0 a,
1
2
ηa(ta) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} Discard
b, 1
2
ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 1a (error)
{0a, 1b} 1b (error)
0a 0a 1bta 1 a, 0
b, ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 0a (right)
{0a, 1b} Discard
0a 0a 1bta 0 a,
1
2
ηa(ta) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} Discard
b, 1
2
ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 1a (error)
{0a, 1b} 1b (error)
0a 0a 1bta 1 a, 0
b, ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 0a (right)
{0a, 1b} Discard
0a 1a 0bta 0 a, 0
b, ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 1a (error)
{0a, 1b} 1b (error)
0a 1a 0bta 1 a,
1
2
ηa(ta) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} 0a (right)
b, 1
2
ηb(ta) {0a, 1a} 0a (right)
{0a, 1b} Discard
0a 1b 0atb 0 a, ηa(tb) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} Discard
b, 0
0a 1b 0atb 1 a,
1
2
ηa(tb) {0a, 1a} Discard
{0a, 1b} 0a (right)
b, 1
2
ηb(tb) {0a, 1a} 0a (right)
{0a, 1b} Discard
TABLE II: Faked states for a QKD system utilizing the phase-
time encoding. Each faked state is illustrated by a time dia-
gram. The arrows indicate how every pulse coming to Bob is
split into the two arms of his interferometer. The waveform
for the intensity of light at Bob’s detector that is blinded by
Eve’s choice of the control parameter t is printed in gray.
Eve’s
detection
result.
F a k e d s t a t e
S1
Bob’s D0
Bob’s D1
Eve’s output
Bob’s D0
Bob’s D1
Eve’s output
S3
S1 S2 S3
S1 S2 S3
 ll
 ss
tnormal
tnormal
Bob’s D0
 ssslll 
Eve’s output
Bob’s D1
Bob’s D0
Eve’s output
S20
S21
S1 S2 S3
S1 S2 S3
Bob’s D1
 ssslll 
t1
t0
4Based on the probabilities in the table, we calculate
the QBER caused by the attack. When Alice sends the
|0a〉 state, the probability that the qubit arrives at Bob
and is not discarded as an inconclusive detection result
during sifting is
P (arrive|A=0a)=18 [
1
4
ηa(ta)+
1
4
ηa(tb)+
13
4
ηb(ta)+
1
4
ηb(tb)].
(3)
The probability of arrival averaged over Alice’s four state
choices is found by symmetrization of this equation,
yielding
P (arrive) =
1
32
[ηa(ta) + 7ηa(tb) + 7ηb(ta) + ηb(tb)]. (4)
Similarly, we ﬁnd the QBER,
(QBER)=
P (error)
P (arrive)
=
4ηa(tb) + 4ηb(ta)
ηa(ta) + 7ηa(tb) + 7ηb(ta) + ηb(tb)
,
(5)
where P (error) accounts for the cases when Bob keeps a
bit value diﬀerent from what Alice has sent.
In the special case of symmetric detector eﬃciency
curves, we get
(QBER) =
4η
1 + 7η
. (6)
The SARG04 protocol has security bounds diﬀerent from
the BB84 protocol [27, 28, 29]. While it is invalid to
directly compare QBER between the protocols, we note
that in SARG04 this attack causes QBER lower than 0.11
when η  1/30, while in BB84 (see Eq. 2) the same hap-
pens when η  1/15. Thus, the eﬀect of the described at-
tack on these two protocols appears to be quantitatively
diﬀerent, although of the same order of magnitude.
IV. PHASE-TIME ENCODING AND DPSK
PROTOCOL
In a QKD system with the phase-time encoding [30],
Alice prepares one of the four states: |l〉, |s〉, |l〉+ |s〉 or
|l〉−|s〉, where |l〉 and |s〉 denote states that have travelled
via the long and short arm of Alice’s AMZ (Fig. 2). Bob
gates his detectors three times. The state |l〉 can cause
a detection either in the S1 or S2 time slot. The state
|s〉 can cause a detection either in the S2 or S3 time slot.
The states |l〉 + |s〉 and |l〉 − |s〉} can cause a detection
in any of the three time slots. The plus or minus sign
determines which of the two detectors (D0 or D1) clicks
when the detection happens in the S2 time slot where the
pulses from the two arms of Bob’s AMZ have interfered.
Thus, pairs of states {|l〉, |s〉} and {|l〉+ |s〉, |l〉−|s〉} form
two bases. This system uses the BB84 protocol. (We
note that the function of Bob’s apparatus is similar to
an earlier system that uses entangled photons in energy-
time Bell states [31].)
Faked states for this QKD system are listed in Ta-
ble II. Eve uses an apparatus that can form a single pulse
(denoted |ll〉) in the time slot that follows the time slot
of Alice’s |l〉 state, a single pulse (denoted |ss〉) in the
time slot that precedes the time slot of Alice’s |s〉 state,
or coherent states consisting of four pulses with certain
phase shifts between them and a certain value of the con-
trol parameter t (which can be timing as shown on the
diagrams, or some other parameter). The single pulse
states are sent with the control parameter value tnormal
that blinds neither detector. The coherent four pulse
states are sent with the control parameter value t0 or t1
that blinds the detector D1 or D0. The faked states rely
on the lack of detector gating in what would be Bob’s
time slots S0 and S4, or on Bob discarding detection re-
sults with these times. Additionally, in the last two faked
states, Eve blinds one of Bob’s detectors by the choice of
the control parameter.
In a QKD system with the DPSK protocol [8], Al-
ice randomly modulates the phase of a weak coherent
pulse train by {0, π} for each pulse, and sends it to Bob
with an average photon number of less than 1 per pulse
(Fig. 3). Bob measures the phase diﬀerence between ad-
jacent pulses with a 1-bit delay interferometer followed by
two detectors placed at the interferometer output ports.
Detector D0 clicks when the phase diﬀerence is 0 and
detector D1 clicks when the phase diﬀerence is π. Since
the average photon number per pulse is less than 1, Bob
observes clicks only occasionally and in a random time
slot. Bob informs Alice of the time slots in which he has
observed clicks. From her modulation data Alice knows
which detector has clicked on Bob’s side, so they share
an identical bit string.
Faked states for this QKD system are constructed sim-
ilarly to the previous one (Fig. 4). In the case of the
DPSK, Eve can run two generators of faked states in
parallel, so that states with the values of the control pa-
rameter t0 and t1 may overlap. When Eve has had iden-
tical detection results in two adjacent bit slots, she can
use a single-pulse faked state. In all other cases she gen-
erates longer faked states that encompass two or more
detection results with the same bit value. In these faked
states, Bob’s other detector is blocked by the choice of the
control parameter, and unwanted bit slots are blocked by
destructive interference. In the limit, Eve may just gen-
erate two consecutive trains of pulses with the control
parameters t0 and t1, and modulate the phase of pulses
in each train to produce the detections she wants at Bob.
The part of Eve’s setup that generates faked states for
both systems considered in this section may be similar
to Alice’s setup in Fig. 3. In the case of the DPSK, two
such setups could possibly be used, with their outputs
combined on an optical coupler.
Although we do not calculate it here, the faked states
presented in this section would obviously work in the
case of the partial eﬃciency mismatch, causing the more
QBER the smaller the mismatch becomes. We note that
schemes utilizing the DPSK protocol with limited-length
states [32, 33] can also be attacked using the methods
considered in this section.
5FIG. 2: Scheme of a QKD system utilizing the phase-time encoding [30]. SMZ, symmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer; AMZ,
asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer; PM, phase modulator; Att., optical attenuator; D0 and D1, single photon detectors.
FIG. 3: Scheme of a QKD system utilizing the DPSK protocol [8]. IM, intensity modulator; PM, phase modulator; Att., optical
attenuator; D0 and D1, single photon detectors.
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FIG. 4: Time diagram of a QKD system utilizing the DPSK ptotocol, and faked states for it. The three uppermost waveforms
represent the intensity of light during normal system operation; the phase ϕ of each Alice’s pulse is noted. The rest of the
diagram shows examples of possible faked states. For the compactness of illustration, Alice’s average photon number per pulse
is increased greatly, which gives Eve more frequent detections than would be possible in a real system. The arrows indicate
how every pulse coming to Bob is split into the two arms of his interferometer.
6V. EKERT PROTOCOL
The Ekert protocol [34] uses an external source of en-
tangled pairs of photons in a singlet state, from which
one photon is routed to Alice and the other to Bob. Alice
and Bob perform measurements on their photons in one
of the possible bases (Fig. 5), choosing between the bases
randomly and independently of one another for each pair
of incoming photons. After a series of measurements has
taken place, the choices of bases are publicly announced.
For those pairs where Alice and Bob both have registered
a count in their detectors, quantum mechanics guaran-
tees certain degree of correlation between the measure-
ment results, depending on the combination of the bases
chosen. The quantity
E(ai,bj) = P++(ai,bj) + P−−(ai,bj)
−P+−(ai,bj)− P−+(ai,bj) (7)
is the correlation coeﬃcient of the measurements per-
formed by Alice in the ai basis and by Bob in the bj basis.
Here P±±(ai,bj) denotes the probability that the result
±1 has been obtained in the ai basis and ±1 in the bj
basis. For two identical pairs of bases (a2,b1 and a3,b2)
the measurement results are totally anticorrelated:
E(a2,b1) = E(a3,b2) = −1. (8)
These measurement results are used in the protocol to
form a secret key. Four other basis combinations are
used to check for possible eavesdropping via computing
the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt quantity
S = E(a1,b1)− E(a1,b3) + E(a3,b1) + E(a3,b3), (9)
which in the absence of eavesdropping should be equal to
−2√2.
If the pairs of detectors on both Alice’s and Bob’s sides
have a total eﬃciency mismatch, Eve can successfully
mount a faked states attack that provides S = −2√2.
She substitutes the source of entangled photons with one
that generates, with certain probabilities, pairs of faked
a2
a3
a1
b1
b2
b3
EPR+1
–1
+1
–1
Bob Alice
FIG. 5: Possible measurements by Alice and Bob in the Ekert
protocol. The circles represent the equator of the Poincare
sphere. Measurement bases are denoted by letters with in-
dices; each measurement can yield +1 or −1 result as labeled
on the diagram. EPR, source of entangled photon pairs.
states listed below. We have assumed that, at Alice and
at Bob, one detector is used to get the +1 measurement
result in all three bases, and the other to get the −1 re-
sult. We have also assumed that Alice and Bob normalize
detection probabilities separately for each combination of
ai and bj before computing E(ai,bj) correlation coeﬃ-
cients.
The simplest set of faked states consists of two pairs;
however, to make it symmetric, we expand it to four pairs
grouped in two combinations. The purpose of one com-
bination named α is to be detected with equal proba-
bility and always produce total anticorrelation regard-
less of Alice’s and Bob’s choice of basis. It can, for
example, consist of a pair of states conjugate to ev-
ery other state used in the protocol and sent to Alice
and Bob with opposite values of the control parame-
ter t+1 and t−1, which blind the −1 and +1 detec-
tors. If linear polarizations are used in the protocol, Eve
randomly sends to Alice and Bob either a pair of cir-
cular polarizations [(circular)t+1 , (circular)t−1 ] or a pair
[(circular)t−1 , (circular)t+1 ].
2 In the other combination
named β, Eve sends either a pair [(|−a3〉)t+1 , (|−b1〉)t+1 ]
or a pair [(|a3〉)t−1 , (|b1〉)t−1 ]. It produces total correla-
tion for the pair of bases a1,b3 used in computing S, and
for three other pairs of bases (a1,b2; a2,b2; a2,b3) which
are not used in the protocol. The combinations α and
β are generated by Eve with probabilities Pα = 0.586,
Pβ = 0.414. It is easy to check that this will result in the
desired value of the quantity S:
S = −1− (−0.172)− 1− 1 = −2
√
2. (10)
If we add a third combination to the set, it would be
possible for all four terms in the equation for S to have
an equal absolute value, just as in the absence of the
attack. In the third combination γ, Eve sends either a
pair [(|−a2〉)t+1 , (|−b2〉)t+1 ] or a pair [(|a2〉)t−1 , (|b2〉)t−1 ],
and the combinations are now generated by Eve with
probabilities Pα = 0.116, Pβ = 0.653, Pγ = 0.231. This
gives
S = −0.707− 0.707− 0.707− 0.707 = −2
√
2. (11)
Although our attack reproduces the expected value of
S, it has side eﬀects. Detection probabilities for diﬀer-
ent combinations of bases become substantially unequal,
and the three unused correlation coeﬃcients are not re-
produced properly. Thus, the attack relies on the absence
of additional consistency checks on the data by the legit-
imate users. We have not been able to come up with a
2 Alternatively, in the combination α, instead of a circular polar-
ization Eve can send a statistical mixture of two states from
a single basis used in the protocol. In particular, she can
send either a pair [(|a3〉 or |−a3〉)t+1 , (|b1〉 or |−b1〉)t−1 ] or a
pair [(|a3〉 or |−a3〉)t−1 , (|b1〉 or |−b1〉)t+1 ]. This would sim-
plify Eve’s apparatus, because here she needs to generate the
same states as in the following combination β.
7set of faked states that does not produce any side eﬀects.
Also, the attack relies on the source of entangled photons
being outside of Alice and Bob. If the source is placed in-
side one of their setups and only one of the two photons is
accessible to Eve, it seems to us that with protocols that
use more than two bases (the Ekert protocol and the six-
state protocol [35, 36, 37]), a zero-QBER attack using the
approach described in this section cannot be constructed.
However, the six-state protocol implemented on a setup
that uses an external source of entangled photons could
be successfully attacked using a faked pair source similar
to the one described in this section.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have shown that detector eﬃciency mismatch can
be exploited to attack the SARG04 and Ekert protocols,
as well as schemes that use the phase-time encoding and
the DPSK protocol. The faked states attacks considered
here might not be the optimal ones; however, they cer-
tainly set upper bounds on the secret information. We
emphasize the necessity of characterizing the detector
setup thoroughly and establishing security proofs with
partial detector eﬃciency mismatch integrated into the
equipment model.
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4.4.  Conclusion
The last chapter has been about the one most important issue in quantum cryptogra-
phy: its security. We have been specializing in the area of security studies dealing with
component imperfections and optical loopholes.
We have considered several practical attacks on QKD systems, and proposed pro-
tection measures for each of the discussed vulnerabilities. We have studied the large
pulse attack, introduced a new class of attacks — faked states attacks, discovered and
studied effects of a common detector imperfection on security — the efficiency mis-
match between the 0 and 1 detectors. Also, two possibilities of attacks have been
pointed out: detecting light emitted by APDs, and using controlled high-power damage
to assist in eavesdropping.
It is too early to see what effect our work would have on the field of quantum
cryptography. However, the author is glad to see at least some of the latest QKD sys-
tems designed to avoid the vulnerabilities we have pointed out and studied (e.g., [73,
159, 213]). Perhaps the most enthusiastic readers of our publications have been re-
searchers at MaqiQ Technologies, who have applied for several U.S. patents describing
protection measures against our attacks ([226, 227]; also [214] with an optical filter “to
block photons generated by the SPD”).
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Conclusion and future plans
In our research at NTNU, we have tackled several aspects of the interdisciplinary
field known as quantum cryptography. We have attempted to construct a fiber optic
QKD system and demonstrated its operation in a laboratory setting, developed an
optimal phase tracking algorithm for an interferometer working in the photon counting
mode, developed an APD-based single photon detector with an afterpulse blocking
technique allowing it to run at a higher gating rate than other similar detectors.
A special attention has been paid to the security of QKD, which is a difficult and
intricate problem requiring a large amount of scrutiny. Our niche and our contribution
to the security field have been the study of vulnerabilities not yet accounted for in
theoretical proofs. A large pulse attack, faked states attack, detector efficiency mis-
match have been evaluated in detail and protection measures proposed. We think that
our group has built a unique expertise in the practical security of QKD, or quantum
cryptanalysis as we like to call it.
Will the QKD technology succeed and be adopted for wide use? Will it lead to new
discoveries beyond what we foresee now? It’s perhaps still too early to tell for sure. Right
now, QKD has to compete with classical security solutions that are superior in convenience
and price, and there seemingly is no pressing need to replace them. When and whether
such a pressing need arises, depends on the progress in cryptanalysis (classical cryptanaly-
sis, development of quantum computers), on the one hand, and progress in mathematical
encryption (asymmetric ciphers, complexity theory), on the other hand. Then, the market
for hi-tech stuff follows its own logic. Sometimes, in the security field, more convenient
solutions with weaknesses are chosen over strong but more demanding ones. Sometimes an
unforeseen alternative appears. Sometimes, even, a technology is suppressed due to politi-
cal reasons; though so far, quantum cryptography has enjoyed a strong government support
both in the USA and in the European Union, through centralized research and collaboration
programs. QKD has a large room for improvement that will be achieved through research
in the coming years. Let’s not miss our chance to be a part of this development.
Future directions of research at NTNU
Despite the nascent commercialization [47], the bulk of research in quantum cryp-
tography remains at the academia, and continues to grow in volume worldwide. As we
see it, possible future directions of this research at NTNU are the following.
• Continuing security studies. Further investigations beyond those presented in the
thesis are already being made. An experimental investigation has been done of a
blinding mode in a passively quenched Si APD that can be used for a successful
faked states attack on a cryptosystem that employs this type of APDs. Also, we
are attempting to further improve the general security bound for the BB84 proto-
col that includes the detector efficiency mismatch into the equipment model.
• Repairing the existing QKD setup and doing experiments demonstrating key
distribution and characterizing detector performance. Since we already have the
setup and necessary equipment, all this can be done relatively cheap. The ex-
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periments might include characterizing performance of QKD over various
lengths of spooled and installed optical fiber, further assessing the performance
of phase tracking, assessing the performance of afterpulse blocking, and meas-
uring various characteristics of APDs in our detector.
If a sufficient funding is obtained, security studies could be expanded in directions
that require setting up new experiments, e.g., eavesdropping assisted by high-power
damage as outlined in Section 4.3.2.  Experimental investigation of some of the nu-
merous novel ideas in QKD would also be actual, e.g., the decoy state protocol (see
Section 4.2.1. ), differential phase shift keying [32, 74, 75], upconversion detectors
(see Section 3.1. ), gigahertz modulation rates.
A wider national support for quantum cryptography and quantum information re-
search in Norway is needed. Let me refer to a map that shows locations of research
groups in the area of quantum information (Fig. 50). While most other European and
Scandinavian countries have multiple groups, we in Trondheim are a lone dot in Nor-
way, and even we are underfunded at the moment.
Fig. 50. Cartography of European research groups in quantum information processing
and communication, as of August 2006. Each dot represents a registered research group
(map taken from member’s area of the ERA-Pilot website, http://qist.ect.it/ ).
140
Appendix A.  Breakdown in lithium
niobate phase modulator
As we were finishing the eavesdropping experiment described in Section 4.3.1. , an
electrical breakdown in one of the phase modulators happened.
The breakdown occurred between planar electrodes separated by 8 µm gap in JDS
Uniphase UTP PM-130-080 travelling-wave 8 GHz phase modulator (Fig. 51).
While not being of any scientific significance, this mishap stalled the experiments
for a long time, because phase modulators for 1300 nm were no longer manufactured.
We had to place an order with a different company (Alenia Marconi / Crisel Instru-
ments) for custom-made ones, which cost us a lot and took a long time to deliver.
When we were discussing the replacement order, an Alenia Marconi engineer in-
formed us that they were factory-testing all their phase modulators (which had the
electrode gap of a similar width) at over 40 V, and that the breakdown that occurred in
our modulator at a lower voltage was probably due to contamination (dust) left inside
the package. Indeed, we had to open the hermetically sealed package of the ill-fated
modulator previously to “surgically” remove the built-in 50 Ohm terminating resistor.
The resistor, as we found out well after the modulator purchase, would have over-
heated and burned up at our modulation voltages. It was a bad idea anyway to leave the
heat-producing resistor inside the modulator package even if it withstood the voltage,
because the heat generated would cause a large phase drift in the interferometer.
Fig. 51.  Microphotograph of the damaged area of the waveguide. The gold electrodes
and lithium niobate substrate melted and probably partially evaporated in the arc (the
“smoke plume” seen on the photograph is static debris deposited on the crystal surface).
Voltage was supplied to the left side of the thin electrode; breakdown occurred at 20 to
30 V, probably assisted by contamination left in the modulator after we had to open its
hermetic package. The surface optical waveguide (invisible on this image) made in the
crystal somewhere near the electrode gap was also damaged by the discharge: the opti-
cal attenuation rose by 10 dB comparing to the normal value.
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Appendix B.  List of publications
This work has led to five journal publications:
• Vadim Makarov and Johannes Skaar, “Faked states attack using detector effi-
ciency mismatch on SARG04, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols,”
quant-ph/0702262; submitted to the Journal of Modern Optics. — reprinted in
Section 4.3.3.2. 
• Vadim Makarov, Andrey Anisimov, and Johannes Skaar, “Effects of detector
efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems,” Physical Review A
74, 022313 (2006). — reprinted in Section 4.3.3.2. 
• Vadim Makarov and Dag R. Hjelme, “Faked states attack on quantum crypto-
systems,” Journal of Modern Optics 52, 691–705 (2005). — reprinted in Sec-
tion 4.3.3.1. 
• Vadim Makarov, Alexei Brylevski, and Dag. R. Hjelme, “Real-time phase
tracking in single-photon interferometers,” Applied Optics 43, 4385–4392
(2004). — reprinted in Section 2.3. 
• Artem Vakhitov, Vadim Makarov, and Dag R. Hjelme, “Large pulse attack as a
method of conventional optical eavesdropping in quantum cryptography,” Jour-
nal of Modern Optics 48, 2023–2038 (2001). — reprinted in Section 4.3.1. 
Results of this work were timely reported at the following international and national
conferences (without publication in proceedings):
• XI International Conference on Quantum Optics in Minsk, Belarus, May 26–31,
2006.
• 1st Quantum Information Theory (QIT) workshop of SECOQC project in Erlan-
gen, Germany, September 13–17, 2004.
• Norwegian Electro-Optics Meeting 2004 in Tønsberg, Norway, May 2–4, 2004
(talk given by B. Vignes).
• Norwegian Cryptographic Seminar 2002 in Trondheim, Norway, October 17–18,
2002.
• Norwegian Electro-Optics Meeting 2002 in Flåm, Norway, May 2–5, 2002, on
which the author claimed the Best poster presentation by a young scientist award.
• 2nd QIPC Workshop in Turin, Italy, October 28–31, 2001.
• QUICK: Quantum interference and cryptographic keys: novel physics and ad-
vancing technologies in Cargese, Corsica, France, April 7–13, 2001.
• 1st QIPC Workshop in Potsdam, September 27–29, 2000.
• Norwegian Electro-Optics Meeting 1999 in Balestrand, Norway, May 6–9, 1999.
Also, the five master theses done by students under the Quantum Cryptography
project, this doctoral thesis, our papers and additional materials have been published on
the project Web site at  http://www.iet.ntnu.no/groups/optics/qcr/
We take the liberty to include group pictures from three of the conferences listed above
that the author had the pleasure not only to present his work at, but also to photograph :)
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